the Warsaw Pact. The capability of the United States to reinforce NATO is equally essential to compensate for the threat of a rapid Warsaw Pact build-up and attack into Central Europe. [Deleted.] As President Nixon has pointed out in his 1972 Foreign Policy Report to the Congress “Soviet troops are not deployed in Europe just to match ours. They secure Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe; most importantly, perhaps, they embody the Soviet Union's permanent presence as a power in the European sphere". [Deleted.] Their unwillingness to receive the NATO "Explorer" and their expressed preference for a Conference on European Security and Cooperation suggest that they will be very cautious about negotiating force reductions in Europe. [Deleted.] To achieve these objectives the Soviets may ultimately seek to negotiate mutual force reductions [deleted]. (Additional classified information was furnished to the committee.)

Question. Measured specifically in terms of out-of-pocket cost, is it more or less expensive to replace soldiers performing base support functions with civilians?

Answer. It is less expensive to use civilians to perform base support functions than trained soldiers. A contract-hire civilian costs, on the average, $6400 per man-year, versus the $8770 average man-year cost of a trained soldier. In addition, on the average, 4 civilians release 5 soldiers to their assigned military duties.

Question. You state you have made great progress in the past year in stabilizing the assignments of our leaders, and that a parallel stabilization policy has been initiated for key senior non-commissioned officers. Your goal is to achieve an optimum 24month tour for key NCO's with a minimum of 18 months for sergeants major and at least 12 months for first sergeants. How do these periods compare with what has previously been the Army policy?

Answer. Army policy has always been to provide the maximum stability in the lives of its personnel, and to move individuals only on the basis of valid military necessity. The lack of stability in personnel assignments stemmed from the large buildup in Vietnam in the late 1960's. From 1965 to 1970, many career officers and noncommissioned officers underwent an average of one permanent change of station per year. With the reduction of forces in SEA, the Army has placed the highest priority on reimplementing established stability policies.

Question. Assuming that the Air Force could guarantee air superiority over the battle line, do you believe that the Army could satisfactorily perform the close air support mission employing the Cheyenne helicopter without Air Force support?

Answer. The Army feels that one aircraft cannot do everything necessary to support the maneuver elements. Cheyenne and Air Force fixed wing aircraft have particular places in the Close Air Support spectrum: Cheyenne in discrete, responsive, highly mobile fires operating as part of the ground maneuver force; fixed wing in concentrating heavy firepower at threatened sectors. However, it may well be that Air Force Close Air Support aircraft, particularly in the early stages of a conflict, will be committed to higher priority tasks such as air superiority. In such cases, Army forces will be dependent upon their own firepower means such as artillery and attack helicopters.

Question. Why is it necessary to conduct an analytical and flight evaluation of the 3 different helicopters to validate the presently stated performance requirements which would lead to continuation of the Cheyenne program. Isn't this really giving lip service to the other two candidates?

Answer. To the contrary. A flight evaluation supplementing a paper analysis is a much more thorough and thus more objective way to validate the Army's Advanced Attack Helicopter Requirement. The Army is not prejudging the outcome of the evaluation. In short, there is no foreordained conclusion.

Question. In your opinion, are you confident that the quality of the South Vietnamese Army which is substantial a number will be equal to the task of maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia after we withdraw?

Answer. First, I might qualify the question with respect to the maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. [Deleted] to provide a force that would be tasked with maintenance responsibility for all of Southeast Asia. Certainly, there would be some regional benefits realized for other Free World countries bordering on or near South Vietnam, in the establishment of a force capable of maintaining the peace and stability in South Vietnam [deleted].

The quality of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) has shown continued progress; this, in turn, has affected favorably progress in the pacification area. The expressed support [deleted] and confidence in their ability to handle any military threat, has established ARVN in a position of being able to blunt enemy initiatives and retake any lost ground. [Deleted.] The performance of some Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) units has shown marked improvement, and [deleted].

There are, of course, some serious deficiencies requiring continuing attention. Utilization of manpower, understrength units, and operational [deleted] are a few of the deficiencies most closely associated with the ARVN.

It should be reiterated that US withdrawal is phased [deleted]. Theoretically then, withdrawal of all US forces would imply that the RVNAF has achieved a level of quality and proficiency commensurate with the requirements of maintaining the peace and stability in South Vietnam, which would contribute to regional stability throughout Southeast Asia.

Considering the progress made to date in Vietnamization, and given continued improvement, as expected, I am confident that the ARVN will be equal to the task of maintaining peace and stability in South Vietnam (additional classified information was furnished the Committee).

PERSONNEL COST AS PERCENTAGE OF BUDGET

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I think Senator Byrd has been here and has a knowledge of the situation.

Senator BYRD. General, I have had some opportunity to talk in detail with the Chief of Staff, so it will not be necessary to go over that ground today. I would like to ask the Secretary one or two questions.

It appears to me, Mr. Secretary, that while on page 12 of your statement you indicate that the personnel cost will be 42 percent of the total Army budget, in looking at the figures, it seems to me that the military pay and related costs will run substantially-not only substantially above that figure but also substantially above 50 percent.

Secretary FROEHLKE. That is a confusing point. It is about 62 percent if you include civilian pay and if you include retirement benefits. So I think your point is well taken, Senator, that if you want to take people costs in the Army, the figure is close to 62 percent; this 42 percent, however, just refers to the pay of the men in uniform, both active and reserve.

Senator BYRD. Because looking at your tabulation of the $22.713 billion total obligational authority, it seems to me that for that amount, the Nation is buying very little new equipment percentagewise.

Secretary FROEHLKE. I would agree with that observation and I would defend it because I think this is a good budget for the Army. We do have a little over $2 billion for research and development and this, of course, is vital. For the ongoing Army, as the size of the Army goes down, as we have the retrograde from Vietnam, we have an excess of a number of items of equipment which we have used in Vietnam. That explains, for instance, why we now can supply our reserves when previously we could not.

Therefore, for the weapons that we presently have, we do not have to procure many more. Our problem now is people. These are the key to the Army. And in the future, the new main battle tank, the new attack helicopter are our concern. But the equipment that we have on the line today is, generally speaking, sufficient.

Senator BYRD. The only thing I am suggesting is that we are buying, for the total amount of money that is being spent on the Army, we are buying very little in the way of hardware.

Secretary FROEHLKE. That is a correct observation.
Senator BYRD. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good point, Senator.

Senator Thurmond, would you mind if we go ahead with a few questions then I will turn it over to you.

Senator Thurmond is a very valuable member of this committee and he has not had the opportunity to be here this morning and we want him to have time.

I have to leave at 12:30. I was going to suggest if you let me ask just a few questions, we can turn it over to you and you can stay until 1 or whenever you want to.

Senator THURMOND. Ordinarily, I could stay, but I have a 12:30 engagement.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want anybody to have to abbreviate their questions, so let's come back at 2:30.

Senator, you can come back at 2:30?

Senator THURMOND. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you will be recognized at 2:30.
Now, some more questions here, gentlemen.

On this matter of manpower-this is off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

TROOP REDUCTION

The CHAIRMAN. Last year we had this moderate reduction worked out. There were some press reports-just press reports and they cited several high-level Army sources as they said they did not name them that a cut of 50,000 man-years in Army strength by the Congress last year was primarily responsible for Army personnel turbulence. I do not think this was borne out by General DePuy's excellent testimony here 2 weeks ago and I want us to set the record straight.

By the way, he was an excellent witness.

Secretary FROEHLKE. He is an outstanding officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, he is.

First of all, the real cut, as it turned out, was 27,000 men, not 50,000, because, as General DePuy pointed out, the Army was 23,000 over strength under the President's announced withdrawal schedule from Vietnam. Do you remember? Did it not run at just about that level?

Secretary FROEHLKE. Yes.

General WESTMORELAND. About that.

The CHAIRMAN. So this overstrength was the basis for about one-half of the reduction by Congress.

Last year on the 28th of April the decision to cut was made here and the Washington Post in the July 1 issue announced that the Senate. and House conferees had agreed to this point. Our records show here that you had this before you on June 30.

General Westmoreland, you were here and, Mr. Secretary, you were not in office then although you were over there. So you had that before

you as early as June 30 and you did not act on it until sometime in the fall. Now, that is not putting the blame on you or anything; you were doing the best you could, but I do not want the Congress to be blamed for the turbulence that the Army has undergone.

Secretary FROEHLKE. I would be delighted to set the record straight, Senator.

First of all, the 50,000, you are correct. We had planned on 27,000, so really, the Senate's action was 23,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary FROEHLKE. That, I would say, was the straw that broke the camel's back. That is the first factor. It was not just 23,000; it was 23,000 piled on top of, as General Westmoreland said, approximately 200,000 which had already been planned. 482,000 men will leave the Army and 260,000 will enter it, with a net loss of 262,000. This 23,000 was the straw that broke the camel's back, and the third factor is, yes; we did know in July. In August we took some action which proved to be insufficient. In October, we took more action which proved to be insufficient.

We are dealing with unknowns; we do not know how many because so much of the early drop was voluntary. We did not know how many men would opt to get out of the Army early. By the same token, with the increased reliance on recruiting, we do not know before the actual man signs up how many will come in.

So I would say it is the combination of the three-the turbulence of 480,000 leaving the Army; second, this straw that broke the camel's back; and, third, the fact that we incorrectly guessed the number of people that would be leaving and would be coming in.

Do you have anything to add, General?

General WESTMORELAND. I think you have stated all the elements, Mr. Secretary, but I would like to reemphasize that we make the most intelligent estimates we can as to our gains and losses. We cannot do it precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. We were acting from informed sources. No one wanted to hurt anyone, but after that cut was made, I got calls and messages of various kinds wanting to back up on it, even after the announcement was made.

I do not think the camel's back was broken as far as that is concerned.

He was a mighty small camel if a little figure like that broke his back. I thought he would be stronger than that

Secretary FROEHLKE. I believe he is, too, Mr. Chairman, but he was shaken up a bit.

General WESTMORELAND. Could I add one point?

That is the man-year cut as opposed to end strength. This is basically what broke our back and required the early release of men 1 day short of 6 months in the United States and 150 days in Europe. Heretofore, Congress has controlled our manpower by prescribing an end strength, rather than average strength. The man-year cut is what really caused us major problems.

I just wanted to point out that because of the man-year control as opposed to the end strength control, we had to start very early to make this drastic cut; it is not the efficient way to use manpower.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you survived pretty well. If it had not been for that point, we would have had a figure higher than 50,000, General.

That is all history and I think you agree you were not hurt much. But we have to get into these matters and we will continue to. I think we will get the bill out earlier this year and that will help some. Secretary FROEHLKE. That will help considerably, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. But after we make a decision here, I just do not like to be called every few days to go over the same thing, to be frank with you, the same thing over and over and over, especially after it has become a decision of the committee or of the Senate. Of course, at a conference, that is to reconcile the differences.

Someone told me you had some computer trouble over there and was the reason that you made these estimates which were not enough. Was that involved?

Secretary FROEHLKE. No; I do not think we can blame it on computers. I think we just have to blame it on our inability to guess right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a hard decision and I rather think, even though you use computers, you make the decisions, you know, on experience and what you have been through before.

Now, another thing here, I am interested in reserves-Army, National Guard, and Army Reserves, but your reference about their availability, even on the list dated October 31, 1971-M plus 180 days, mobilization plus 180 days-that is 6 months. [Deleted] you know, on that date. [Deleted] as I read this analysis by the Army. This is NATO that I am talking about.

General WESTMORELAND. Yes, sir. Of course, under our present plans to get the [deleted].

(Colloquy deleted.)

The CHAIRMAN. As brigades, they did not show up here.

General WESTMORELAND. Our objective is to have a brigade ready by [deleted]. To do this, we have to train our troops effectively at the company level. If we can train all the Reserves at the company level, we can meet those schedules. That means that it will be [deleted]. That, we feel, is the best we can do; but that is [deleted].

Our readiness has not achieved those objectives yet and I do not know when they will achieve such objectives.

Secretary FROEHLKE. We are also relying on a number of support units from the Reserves.

General WESTMORELAND. Oh, yes, very heavily on the support units. As a matter of fact, we have relatively little combat support in our active structure now. Almost all of our SSIS are in the Reserves. The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

TANK IMPROVEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. I always make it clear that I do not know anything about tanks; I do not try to make a judgment on them. But we went a long time on the one that was discarded and I told Mr. Packard and I think you, General, that I would stay with it, you know, through fiscal - 1972, and I did. But I think the biggest thing was not only length of

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