that the user was from a large family, a man who felt insecure in being in a large family, and they were usually in a certain young age bracket' and that it had no relationship to experience on the battlefield or over the battlefield or on the water, that it was just about the same, this man told me, as the high school problems.

What I asked you before, General, was what the Army is doing to offset, if you can, these lies and distortions that have been made about the services by the press?

General WESTMORELAND. Dr. Wilbur, who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Medical Matters, had a press conference when he returned from Vietnam about 6 weeks ago. He made a very favorable report about the activities in Vietnam and the trend and gave the facts to the press. They received that day quite a bit of visibility.

When Secretary Froehlke returned from Vietnam, he had a press conference and as I remember, Mr. Secretary, you emphasized the same thing.

Secretary FROEHLKE. It did not get much notice, however.

General WESTMORELAND. It did not get much visibility, but this is all available to the press.

Senator GOLDWATER. It might not hurt to make that a part of this record. It might be used in the general comments to the Senate. I think it is disgraceful that the man in uniform has been attacked this way and the attackers have been allowed to get away with it.

TEST RESULTS AND COMMENTS

If it is all right with you, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that we ask each of the services to supply us with their finding in urinalysis tests and any opinions that they care to give relative to the use of hard drugs. They cannot detect the soft drugs, but they can comment on amphetamines, which I understand is the biggest problem, next to whiskey, in the United States.

Can you do that?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be taken in and placed in the record after the staff has perused it and if it should be too voluminous, they can condense it some.

(The information follows:)

ARMY

Meaningful data are available only since the latter part of last year when urinalysis testing was implemented. Trends are down in overseas areas.

a. Comparative results of urinalysis screening of soldiers departing Vietnam for reassignment follows:

Note: Heroin is the predominant drug identified as being abused by soldiers in Vietnam.

b. Comparative results of urinalysis screening in Europe of soldiers departing for reassignment, taking leave, and extending their foreign service tour are as follows:

Laboratory testing results in Europe reveal the following breakout by type drug identified by urinalysis since 22 November 1971:

Percent

In the Continental United States (CONUS) urinalysis testing results are holding steady. During the period 16-31 January 1972, 177 (1.6%) of 10,925 soldiers tested in unannounced spot checks were found to be drug users. Breakout by type drug identified by urinalysis in CONUS through laboratory tests since 15 August 1971 follows:

Amphetamines..
Barbiturates_

Opium derivatives..
Polydrug-

Percent

20. 5

50. 8

24. 4

4. 3

Amphetamine use varies depending on the location. In addition to being a problem in Europe and CONUS as shown above, use of amphetamines account for a significant portion of the drug problem among soldiers in Hawaii and Panama.

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DRUG DETECTION PROGRAM

: NAVY

The Navy initiated urinalysis screening in Vietnam in June 1971. The testing was extended to overseas bases, and stations in the United States in September. Screening of deployed afloat units was initiated on 18 October 1971, and the first phase of Navywide random urinalysis screening began on 15 March 1972. Statistical data from this last initiative has not yet been compiled but early trends are discussed below.

Since the beginning of the urinalysis program 122,068 Navy personnel have been tested with 493 laboratory confirmed positive results. This represents 0.40 percent positive results from the total population tested. For individuals who may be identified as positive through the laboratory biochemical screen, a medical evaluation provides the only means of differentiating drug dependent indíviduals, casual drug abusers, legitimate drug users, and false positives. A positive test result, per se, does not label an individual as a drug abuser. A reporting system for determining the percentage of clinically confirmed positive results has recently been implemented but data received to date is insufficient to identify a trend.

The percentage rate of positive results from laboratory analysis alone has remained near 0.33 until recently. For the period 1-15 Maṛch 9,901 samples were tested with 95 positives or 0.96 percent positive rate. This recent rise in the positive rate cannot be properly analyzed until further data has been received. Complete random urinalysis testing will be implemented by 1 July 1972, and could surface a greater percentage of drug abusers.

AIR FORCE

Urinalysis testing of Air Force personnel commenced on 21 June 1971 in Vietnam. By the end of 1971 urinalysis testing programs began expanding to a world

wide basis. Testing in the Continental United States (CONUS) was directed at new entrants into basic military training. During 1971, 135,492 urinalysis tests were administered worldwide to Air Force personnel. These tests resulted in the identification of 655 drug abusers for a worldwide urinalysis confirmed “positive” rate of 0.5%. In Vietnam, the rate for CY 1971 was 0.7%. The total Southeast Asia rate (includes Thailand and Vietnam) for CY 1971 was 0.5%. For other Pacific areas outside Southeast Asia the rate was 0.2%. Testing in Europe resulted in a 0.01% rate. Entry screening of basic military trainees in CY 1971 resulted in a 0.7% rate.

During the first two months of CY 1972, 52,770 tests were administered worldwide with 306 (0.4%) confirmed “positive” for drug abuse, The CY 1972 experience is about the same as that in CY 1971, e.g., the CY 1972 Southeast Asia rate is 0.5%.

Expansion of the urinalysis testing program to CONUS based Air Force personnel, other than entrants into basic military training, is programed to be achieved by 1 July 1972. Therefore, quantified assessments on the pervasiveness and extent of illicit drug use is premature, particularly for a specific type of drug such as amphetamines. Our urinalysis experience from entrants to basic military training indicates that of the "positives" about 25% were identified as users of narcotics and the remaining 75% as users of dangerous drugs such as amphetamines or barbiturates.

While the scope of the drug abuse problem has yet to be completely defined, urinalysis experience to date has indicated much less involvement and dependency on hard drugs than was projected in early 1971. By July 1972, the DOD joint urinalysis testing plan will be implemented. Under this plan, the Air Force will be conducting large scale urinalysis tests of personnel on a no-notice random basis. Random tests will permit estimates on the prevalence and type of hard drug use. However, considering all evidence to date and the drug abuse control actions taken within the past year, it is our opinion that the drug problem is not insurmountable. The increased emphasis on education prevention efforts coupled with effective identification and treatment programs is expected to reduce the incidents of drug abuse.

Senator GOLDWATER. I will yield back the rest of my time to Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. No, you go ahead.

Senator GOLDWATER. No, I was here this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, will you yield to me just a moment?
Senator THURMOND. Yes, sir.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR STENNIS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary and General Westmoreland. I am going to ask you to excuse me now. I have matters on the floor of great interest to me concerning people from my State and other States and all over the United States. I do not want to neglect that. I have had the privilege of being here with you gentlemen all morning and have asked all the questions I wished, except a few that I ask unanimous consent now to have put in the record for that purpose.

(Questions submitted by Senator Stennis. Answers supplied by Department of the Army.)

Question. Both the Congress and the DOD have been urging all the Services to simplify and reduce the costs of the weapons. We have done little on this so far, but on the contrary, costs keep going up (Example: Safeguard).

Where has the Army reduced weapons costs? Give an example.

Answer. Reduced pipeline quantities, resulting from intensive management of aircraft engines and components, coupled with increasing engine mean time between overhaul rates, created long stocks of engines and components for the OH-58, UH-1, CH-47, and AH-1 aircraft. These long stock items were used as Government Furnished Material (GFM) in new production aircraft under an

Army program called RECOUP. Through FY 72 this program has resulted in a savings of $74.5M for DA and a total savings to DOD of $114.8M.

Question. Under the Army contingency plans we are advised that if war breaks out in Asia [deleted] will be sent to that part of the world.

How could this plan be consistent with the Nixon Doctrine which, as we understand it, presumes that Asian countries will furnish their own land forces for future wars? Answer. The Nixon doctrine stresses the need for our Asian Allies to improve their defensive war fighting capabilities with emphasis on ground forces. Our military assistance programs are designed to provide the equipment to achieve that goal.

We visualize our Asian Allies as developing the competence to use their ground forces to control an insurgency [deleted]. While such a goal is desirable, it does not appear feasible in the near time frame.

Thus, if war breaks out in Asia, our level of involvement would vary and would depend upon our interests, the threat and the level of war fighting capability achieved by our Asian Allies. These Army plans do not conflict with the Nixon doctrine, but are in accord with its goal.

Question. Mr. Secretary and General Westmoreland, I realize that all the services have thick documentation for their so-called support troops. I just want to point out that there sitll remains the basic question of why the Army needs an end strength of 841,000 troops for end '73. At the same time, have only 13, divisions which is about [deleted] percent of the men involved.

Answer. The planning figure of 16,000 times 13 divisions establishes a requirement for 208 thousand spaces in the Army divisions. Support for these divisions at the desired ratio of 2 support increments for 1 division would require a total of 624 thousand. In the FY 73 Army force [deleted] spaces are provided for this purpose in the active Army, a ratio of approximately [deleted]. The remaining support required to provide the 2 to 1 ratio is found in the Reserve Components. The remainder of the Army is in the other three force and manpower categories: Special Mission-forces that perform Defense Department assigned missions; General Support-forces that perform our training, logistics, and facility maintenance; and Individuals-transients, trainees, prisoners, patients, students, and cadets. The following figures are provided for all categories.

Question. Mr. Secretary, let me first say I have not made up my mind on the entire A-X-Cheyenne question. I do want to put this matter to you however. In the budget there are R&D funds for both A-X and Cheyenne, and it is generally agreed that both planes should have R&D completed up to production. I think it's recognized by all that the Services can't have all the weapons they desire, and every effort must be made to prevent any duplication in view of the financial crisis we face now and will face in the future. We have had testimony in the past that the A-X-Cheyenne weapons would duplicate or overlap each other by about 80 percent in mission.

Yesterday the Air Force stated that they would be willing to have a test between the A-X and Cheyenne and would be guided by the results of the test as to which one would be procured.

Now I realize the Army is planning to have a test among several helicopters— Cheyenne, Blackhawk, et cetera- and this is not an issue at this point. But the question I want to put to the Army is this: Would the Army be willing to have a test between the A-X and Cheyenne with the view of going into production with only one or the other and be guided by the results however the chips might fall?

Answer. No, sir, we would not, the Army's position should be quite clear on this point. The two weapons systems are not comparable and are not in competi tion. The Army considers the Cheyenne as an integral part of its ground combat forces, the same as a tank or a howitzer. In fact, when the decision was made to develop the Cheyenne, the Army traded off tanks and howitzers for the capability of raising part of its fire support means a few feet above the terrain and providing it with a significant increase in speed and manueverability. The wisdom of this decision and the validity of the requirement for such a capability has been con. firmed over and over again through studies and field experimentation and through combat experience in Vietnam.

In addition to the requirement to improve our ground combat forces, the Army has continually expressed an equally valid requirement for greatly improved close air support from our sister services. However, this is a separate and distinct consideration from our requirement to improve our land combat capability. The Army has accepted the Air Force decision to develop the A-X as evidence of their willingness to fulfill their portion of our close air support requirement. Further, we agree that they are in the best position to judge what type of equipment is required to perform the fixed wing mission and we support them in this. However, we do not agree that there is a fixed wing substitute for the rotary wing capability. The advanced attack helicopter is unique in that it fills a void for which there is no acceptable substitute. It has a superior night and adverse weather capability; it can navigate precisely while flying nap of the earth in the protective folds of the terrain; it can employ its weapons with exceptional accuracy from stand-off distances which will enhance survivability in a mid intensity air defense environment and it will be continuously available in forward areas and immediately responsive to the needs of the ground commander. If we were forced to choose, we would choose the helicopter; however, we do not think that there is a trade-off here. If any trade-offs exist, they are between the Cheyenne and other land combat fire support means (which the Army has already made), and between the A-X and other aircraft capable of performing the fixed wing close air support mission. There is no competition and no viable trade-off between the fixed wing and rotary wing capability. The Department of Defense has repeatedly testified before this and other committees that both capabilities are required and that they are complementary and not competitive.

Question. Mr. Secretary, my understanding is that in terms of actual numbers of troops the Army has added over [deleted] to those stationed in Europe in the past year. Is this correct? I am not referring to the authorized but to the actual numbers.

Answer. The statement is correct in terms of operating strength or personnel actually assigned to units in Europe. In January 1971, there were [deleted] personnel, officer and enlisted, assigned to USAREUR. It was at this time the Army initiated extensive actions to improve the strength and as a result, by end July 1971, the operating strength was [deleted]. This was an increase in operating strength of [deleted]. The recently initiated early release program subsequently reduced the operating strength to [deleted].

Question. If this is so, why do we maintain nearly 305,000 US forces in Europe?

Answer. As I indicated in my earlier testimony, I agree with General Goodpaster that this might be the case if we assume [deleted]. I can answer this question only with respect to Army troops in Europe. On the one hand, we hope that our USAREUR force level of [deleted] will act as a deterrent and preclude the situation which you posed. This current force level enables us to prepare to meet a variety of contingencies and [deleted] provides us with a base for rapidly expanding our forward deployed forces with additional combat forces which would arrive in Europe in the early stages of deployment or conflict. On the other hand, should a conflict develop in such a way as to require the [deleted]. These factors are a major reason for keeping our European forces at their current level.

Question. General, don't you believe that with 22 NATO headquarters involving over 1700 people; with a U.S. Unified Command headquarters now the European Command at Stuttgart; a U.S. Army Command at Heidelberg; a U.S. Air Force Command at Wiesbaden; and a Navy Command in London, that we have an excessive number of headquarters in Europe?