level and by so doing provide increased stability to the command as a whole. We foresee this objective as achievable in the not too distant future when our force structure begins to level off.

Question. The U.S. Army Europe is authorized [deleted] military personnel and has [deleted] assigned as of September 30, 1971. Who determines what the proper number of Army personnel in Europe should be?

Answer. The President determines the proper number of total military personnel to be in Europe. The Secretary of Defense, after reviewing the recommendations of the JCS and Service Secretaries, establishes the number of military personnel from each Service to be in Europe.

Question. Do you believe that the Army requires 185,000 military personnel in Europe to fight and support 4 divisions (whose strength approximates 64,000) plus the artillery and combat support troops?

Answer. Yes. In the Army's case, the number depends on the force level of 4% divisions, special mission forces such as the Berlin Brigade, and supporting forces. While some of the supporting forces are there to provide base overhead functions (about 3,000), most are there to provide support to operating elements of the division and special mission forces. Moreover, some support forces are maintained in the theater to assist in the rapid introduction of combat forces should they be needed in Europe.

Question. How many combat personnel are in Europe?

Answer. There are many ways to define combat personnel. For example, we could restrict our definition to these whose primary duty is to fire at the enemy. However, we know that many who would not fit the definition nevertheless do fight and work closely with the "shooters" in combat. Another way of defining combat personnel is to include those assigned to units (such as tank battalions) whose primary mission is to fire at the enemy. This also would be somewhat misleading, as some units in some Services include supply, maintenance, food service and similar functions whereas other units do not. We could use larger aggregations, such as Five Year Defense Programs, counting as combat those personnel in Programs I (Strategic Forces), II (General Purpose Forces), and IV (Airlift, Sealift Forces); however, each of these programs contains the base operations, logistics, and other non-combat support required for the program. Using the Fiscal Guidance Categories, we rearrange program elements to identify these support personnel separately from the combat personnel.

All of these classification schemes, as well as others which could be developed, have limitations. Data from year to year may not be entirely comparable because of accounting changes, fiscal constraints, and competing requirements for manpower. Comparisons among the Services may not be valid because of different missions, unit structures, and accounting systems.

In order to respond to your question, I shall use the Fiscal Guidance Categories, including as combat only these personnel in Europe assigned to Major Mission units. The numbers and percentages by Service are as follows: Army 167,000 (84%); Navy 30,000 (73%); Marine Corps 2,000 (67%); Air Force 30.000 (38%). It is especially important to note here that unit personnel who perform such functions as supply, maintenance, and food service are not included in this category by the Air Force but are included by the other Services; this accounts in large part for the low Air Force figure.

Question. How many combat support troops are in Europe?

Answer. Again, because of the many definitions which could be used, I would like to be consistent and use Other Mission Forces: Army has 12,000 or 6% in Other Mission forces; Navy 6,000 or 15%; Marine Corps none; Air Force 18,000 or 24%.

There is some limitation to the use of the above percentages. Apparent differences in the levels of combat/support ratios between Services are largely due to accounting, structural and organizational differences rather than relative differences in real ratios.

Question. How many combat service support troops are in Europe? Answer. Using the General Support functions Army has 20,000 or 10%; Navy 5,000 or 12%; Marine Corps 1.000 or 33%; Air Force 29,000 or 38%.

There is some limitation to the use of the above percentages. Apparent differences in the levels of combat/support ratios between Services are largely due to

accounting, structural and organizational differences rather than relative differences in real ratios.

Question. What reductions can and should be made in each of these areas? Answer. We have reviewed each of these areas very carefully, recently completing a thorough analysis of whether we could reduce any noncombat forces in Europe. As for the combat personnel, their assignment to the mission forces is essential if those forces are to remain a credible deterrent and to be viable in a conflict. Other mission personnel are fairly small in number, yet they provide vital services both to our Allies and in our own direct interests.

We believe, at present, considering the forces deployed and current contingency planning, that the combat/support relationships in Europe are about right. We will continue, however, to review our support levels with the view toward continued improvement.

Question. How do you know there are not too many supply and logistics personnel in Europe?

Answer. The number of supply and other logistics personnel assigned to Europe is computed from workload measures. For example, a 155 millimeter howitzer battalion fighting in Europe for 90 days at intense rates will fire 751⁄2 tons of ammunition per day. One ordnance ammunition company can handle 1680 tons per day. So for every 21 of these howitzer battalions, we need one ordnance ammunition company in the force structure.

I would like to add that our study has shown that reductions in supply and other logistics people in Europe would seriously endanger our currently deployed combat and special mission forces. Also, by maintaining support units in the theater. we are able to introduce additional combat forces rapidly. If we were to reduce our deployed support, this would impair our ability to build up quickly for a contingency.

CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT SYSTEM

Senator SMITH. I do have one question, Mr. Secretary, at this time and that is, has there ever been any study or consideration of a contributory system for retirement?

Mr. KELLEY. As far as I know, Senator Smith, the answer is no. However, there is an imputed contribution made by the military of approximately 7 percent into the retirement system. In any comparisons made between military and civilian pay comparability or relationships, there is a 7-percent credit given for the fact that the military person is the beneficiary of a retirement system to which he is not actually making a cash contribution. But beyond that I know of no study that has been made.

Perhaps General Benade does know it.

General BENADE. Yes. I would like to mention, Senator Smith, that the University of Michigan at the request of this committee did an exhaustive study in the late fifties and reached the conclusion that a noncontributory system was in fact preferable. I would like to summarize very quickly the reasons why that is so.

There is, I think, a misconception that if the military were to be put on a contributory system, the equivalent to the Civil Service System, that this would ultimately meet the costs of the system. It would not, in fact. The reason is that about 11 or 12 out of every 100 new entrants into the service ultimately qualify for retirement. So, for the great bulk of other people who enter the service it would in effect simply be a form of saving which would then have to be returned to them perhaps with interest.

Also, because of the relatively young ages at which military people retire compared to civilian systems, the length of payments into such a system would not compare to that of a civilian system of people

who normally retire at older ages. The so-called normal costs of the military retirement system run about 23 percent of payroll and that of the civil service about 14 percent. That difference is accountable by the young age that military people retire at.

As Mr. Kelley has indicated, in developing what we would consider to be the proper or competitive level of pay, after having determined that level, we do reduce it within the Department of Defense by 7 percent to take account of the fact that a civil servant would require at least that much more in order to have the same take-home pay. We, therefore, recommend to the Congress a level of pay which is 7 percent less than the amounts otherwise calculated in the Pentagon as being the proper pay levels.

Senator SMITH. So, it seems to me that if we are going to have the defense that we need, we should have a smaller regular establishment, with the best pay possible, and in doing that it might be well to think about a contributory system, also less of the fringe benefits. Get them on a pay scale like the rest of the Government in the end and, of course, if we had the regular establishment of that kind we would have to have it backed up by a very, very strong reserve, an active reserve, which would be on the same basis.

Thank you very much for your expansion for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you yield to me just 1 minute on that?
Senator SMITH. Yes.

RETIREMENT FUND PAYMENT

The CHAIRMAN. General, are you prepared to recommend the military pay 7 percent into this retirement fund if there would be a corresponding adjustment some way as to the present salaries?

General BENADE. Originally, sir, this had been a concept. A great deal of attention has been given to the desirability of a salary concept for the military and there would be a system of charges. That would include an explicit contribution to retirement.

Two factors complicate the matter quite a bit. One is the fact that if you would avoid having military people take a loss, a reduction in take-home pay, you first have to have an increase of 7 percent in order to have them have the same take-home pay.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you willing now to recommend that they make that change, that they make the contribution but give them an increase in pay now to start?

General BENADE. The Secretary of Defense had publicly announced several times that an ultimate goal is a salary system for military personnel but there are certain costs of admission to the salary system that right now, in view of the competing demands for resources, the administration is not prepared to recommend.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not pressing you. Just for the information of the committee, one word further. There has been a calculation made on the present basis that by the year 2000 or near thereto, the annual cost of military retirement will surpass $16 billion and that is why I say it has become unmanageable and something must be done about it. The committee makes the following comments for the record concerning the question of 7.0% imputed military retirement contribution.

The committee would point out that since there is no accepted comparability system linking the various military and Civil Service pay grades it cannot there

74-696 - 72 - pt. 1 - 4

fore be reasonably said that military basic pay is being depressed by any percentage as an imputed contribution toward reducing military retired pay costs. The committee never has been presented with evidence nor has it adopted a comparability system of equating military and Civil Service pay grades. It is acknowledged that this is a very difficult matter. Within Civil Service grades themselves both the duties and responsibilities vary widely. This is also true of military pay grades.

A comparison of the Civil Service and military retirement systems alone poses a formidable problem of comparing values, benefits, costs and other elements involved. For example, at the present time, the so-called "normal cost" of the military retirement system is approximately 22% of basic pay as compared to approximately 14% for the Civil Service retirement system. Normal cost is defined as that percentage of salary which would have to be contributed (which would be reinvested and earn interest) during the working lifetime of a particular group of new members, in order to provide to those members all the benefits promised by the system.

In view of the difference in normal cost between the Civil Service System (14%) and the military retirement system (22%) there would have to be a considerably higher percentage of imputed contribution on the part of the individual in the military system than the Civil Service System, even if the "imputed" concept was accepted. Even here, however, the assumption would have to be accepted that two systems are otherwise equatable in terms of benefits and requirements which would be difficult to uphold.

Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I will be brief. I would appreciate your answers being brief. I cannot be here this afternoon. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to study this interesting statement and submit questions to be answered for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Without objection it will be so ordered.

UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, why is all this secret? Why should not this information be known to the taxpayers?

Mr. KELLEY. The majority of the statement, I think, should be known by the taxpayers, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you give us a supplementary statement that has in it everything except what you think should be classified? Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; be happy to.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is one ready yet?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Don't you think, with a $45-billion deficit coming up, some economists say the administration admits to $38.8 billion that we ought to get these facts out to the people?

Mr. KELLEY. I think public disclosure of the manpower problem is very important and I seek opportunities to speak to it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you release as much as possible of this statement?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

NATO TROOP REDUCTIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. On page 9 you say that the size of our general purpose forces is determined largely by our NATO commitments. Some of us for years have been trying to cut the NATO troops commitment. The big argument against such a cut has been that we wanted a mutual reduction of forces.

Recently the press has been carrying stories about the complications of any mutual reduction of force agreements; more complicated, for example, than the SALT talks; therefore as of now we are not particularly interested in reducing our forces in Europe through mutual agreement.

Would you comment?

Mr. KELLEY. Within the limits of my knowledge, Senator, my comments would be these. I have never regarded the rationale for NATO support forces as being strictly a military matter or strictly a political matter and I think it relates both to military requirements and political considerations.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it accurate to say that we are no longer interested in a mutual reduction of forces? Do you know about that? Mr. KELLEY. I am aware of no decrease in our interest in a mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

Senator SYMINGTON. So far as you know we are proceeding with that policy and will reduce our forces if the enemy will reduce theirs? Mr. KELLEY. Consistent with our NATO requirements and security obligations in Europe, yes.

BATTLE CASUALTIES

Senator SYMINGTON. On page 14 you give interesting figures about battle deaths going back to the Civil War, running through World Wars I and II, also Vietnam. Have you any figures about the cost to the taxpayers per death?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; I do not have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think you could supply those for the record, cost per casualty?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes. I am not sure that I know just how you want them provided.

Senator SYMINGTON. We spend so much money for each war. The cost of the Vietnam War, I am sure can be segregated from other costs. You say battle deaths are 3.6 percent per thousand men. I wonder what the cost per death is per man.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, it may be of interest. I think it is a loaded figure, frankly, sir. Our objective is to reduce battle casualties, and to the extent we reduce them we increase their unit cost, all other things being constant. But, we can provide the figures for whatever use they may be.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you provide them?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

(The information follows:)

The number wounded in action in Southeast from July 1, 1964 through June 30, 1971 for which hospital care was required was 151,305, as shown in the following table. This figure is most comparable to the "wounds not mortal" as reported for earlier wars. The total number wounded in action in Southeast Asia for this period was 299,652, including 151,305 requiring hospital care and 148,347 not requiring hospital care. The “requiring hospital care" figures were used because they are most nearly comparable to the other data available.

Estimates of incremental war spending have been regularly prepared for the war in Southeast Asia. These, shown on the last line of the table, represent the estimated costs of the war, over and above the on-going costs for the baseline force. Such estimates are not available for the earlier wars shown in the table; for these, total Defense spending is shown for the years indicated. The fiscal year after the war is included, to reflect the carry-over impact of war spending. The Federal fiscal year throughout this period is the same as it is today (July 1June 30).