(The information follows:) The wartime mission of the European Command is the control of nuclear weapons in Europe. USCINCEUR is assigned the important task of control of nuclear weapons in accordance with NATO and unilateral U.S. procedures. ELIMINATION OF COMMAND LOCATED AT STUTTGART Senator THURMOND. Thank you. At the headquarters for the European Command in Stuttgart, there are 369 officers, 295 enlisted and 124 civilians. Is it not possible to eliminate this headquarters, recognizing that the 22 SHAPE headquarters have a wartime mission to conduct and fight a NATO war and the individual services with their own separate headquarters take care of the peacetime mission requirements for their own personnel, training, and logistic requirements? Mr. KELLEY. I will have to comment on that for the record. I cannot answer the question. (The information follows:) In the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which amended the National Security Act of 1947, Congress reaffirmed the validity and necessity of the unified command concept of executing United States national interests. A single, clear line of authority and responsibility, emanating from the President, assures the country of responsible and responsive leadership of the forces it provides. The importance of this structure is given credence by the fact that the President personally approves and signs the Unified Command Plan, which assigns missions and responsibilities to the Commanders. The reasons for selecting Stuttgart as the headquarters site continue to militate against elimination of the headquarters in Stuttgart. The decision resulted from the FRELOC (elimination of the French line of communication) study, necessitated by France's request to move NATO-associated representation out of France, and have since been reinforced by expanded missions/areas given to EUCOM by the President in the 1971 revision of the Unified Command Plan. EUCOM must have a staff, structure, and communications facility devoted solely to its unified command mission to execute its responsibilities in Western Europe, the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean Sea and islands therein, the entire Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East land mass to the eastern border of Iran, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Combining EUCOM headquarters with 7th Army/USAREUR (U.S. Army, Europe) headquarters, or with other Service headquarters elements in Europe, would result in triple-hatting of commanders and staff personnel. With present missions, these headquarters structures have been decimated by personnel reductions to the extent that they are barely capable of properly performing. Adding an additional, even more critical mission, would seriously detract from the attention given to any one mission, and would be contrary to the national interest as regards the security of Europe. While short-term economies can be gained by closing headquarters, the longerrange impact of a less secure Europe and of less than maximum support and attention to the leadership of American forces militate against such action. SENIOR OFFICERS IN EUROPEAN COMMAND Senator THURMOND. The European Command Headquarters has 14 generals and admirals, 71 colonels, captains, and captains of the Navy, and 165 lieutenant colonels assigned out of 362 officers. Do you feel this is an imbalance of too many senior officers assigned? Mr. KELLEY. I would like to comment on that for the record. I will make the general comment here that in the course of my visits with senior officers in Europe I was not struck by an overindulgence in stars and rank considering the total size and responsibilities of the organization, but I think your question deserves a more precise answer than that. (Further information follows:) The manpower structure for Headquarters, EUCOM, as shown in the chart below, is reviewed annually by the Joint Staff and the Services to insure that the commander has the appropriate number of qualified personnel to accomp'ish his assigned missions. In addition, an on-site survey is conducted by the Joint Staff and the Services at least every three years to validate the manpower requirements. Each position is reviewed to insure that the proper skill level, qualifications and experience level is accurate. Because EUCOM is the senior US headquarters for the European area with management requirements for some 300,000 manpower assets and their costly weapons systems, it is quite evident why the jobs require an experience level greater than subordinate commands. Therefore, you will find it normal to have more senior officers in these positions who must have varied experience and expertise that can only be acquired through years of services. The attached chart reflects the FY 1972 authorized staffing requirements for Headquarters, EUCOM. 1 This includes a 54 space increase that was approved effective Jan. 1, 1972 to support change in the unified command plan. The increase includes 26 additional 05's, 7 04's and 1 03. IMBALANCE BETWEEN COMBAT AND COMMAND UNITS Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the European Command Headquarters have increased from 740 persons authorized in July 1967 to 793 in July 1971. Yet, the total U.S. personnel in the Command was reduced from 307,100 in 1967 to [deleted] in 1971. Why do headquarters staff's continue increasing even though the combat units are substantially reduced? Mr. KELLEY. We shall comment for the record on that. (The information follows:) The reductions in authorizations for elements of USEUCOM since 1967 are reflected in Chart A. It should be noted that EUCOM Headquarters is smaller now than it was in 1966. The major reduction of 34,000 for Reforger/Crested Cap units did not reduce the planning and training function of USEUCOM for these units. In fact, these functions required greater emphasis because of the detailed planning required for movement of the units in the event of an emergency and the necessity for conducting training maneuvers in theater periodically to test the various plans. In addition, during this period technological developments in the fields of management, intelligence, communications, readiness/ effectiveness, and command and control have required increases in manpower to support these expanding functions. Major basis for change CHART A-FORCES UNDER EUCOM Freloc (elimination of French lines of communication).. Redcoste, Libya closeout (program to reduce costs in Europe by cutting headquarters and Other miscellaneous reductions. Total.. CHART B-HEADQUARTERS EUCOM MANPOWER 11966-67, -92. SECDEF directed 15 percent military reduction in move from France. #1967-68, +39. JCS Manpower Survey (+13 J-2 ADP and +26 J-3 ADP). 1968-69, -35. -47 Redcoste reduction; +4 electronics warfare (J-3); +3 combat logistics support (transfer) J-4; +5 elimination of joint area petroleum offices (transfer) J-4. 1969/70 +44. JCS manpower survey (+44 fiscal year 1971) net change by staff activity: Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, what manpower reduction in this headquarters is possible, or do you want to comment for the record? Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; please. (The information follows:) Manpower requirements for EUCOM headquarters are based on desired readiness/effectiveness of component forces, necessary command and control, and the changing technology in the fields of management, intelligence, and communications. Due to the nature and the level of the current and projected workload, no reductions in EUCOM headquarters are feasible at this time. TURNOVER OF EUROPEAN PERSONNEL Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, is it not a fact that the Army has experienced a tremendous personnel turnover in Europe, approximating [deleted] percent annually, for the past few years, and does this not indicate that the Army would find it extremely difficult to train and maintain effective combat units in the light of this constant and rapid turnover in personnel? Mr. KELLEY. I would like to comment on that. The Army has indeed experienced high turnover and turbulence. The forces of the Army in Europe became the supply grounds for filling up the vacancies in forces in Vietnam. At the present time, Reserve forces here in the United States, Reserve units of the Active Forces, are being used to build up the active forces in Europe of the Army. As General DePuy will describe in the course of his comments, this factor of severe turbulence is a condition which the Army expects to overcome in the later months of this calendar year. In other words, in the early part of fiscal 1973. Were this turbulence to continue, it would without any question impair the ability of the Army to provide combat-effective and trained units. The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, gentlemen, but the time is up. Senator THURMOND. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd? Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a number of questions, so when my time expires, if the chairman will let me know. Mr. Secretary, I want to join with the chairman in commending you on this statement you have given today. I think it is a good statement. I think that the Government is fortunate in having a man of your ability and dedication in this important position. That is not to say, however, that I agree completely with the judgment expressed in each of these matters, naturally. CLASSIFIED PORTION OF STATEMENT I want to start first pursuing the question raised by Senator Symington. I want to raise it in a little different way. I would like to have pointed out to me just what secret information there is in this statement. I have read it twice. It is true I have read it hurriedly but I am used to reading rapidly and I cannot see anything secret in it. I would like to have somebody in the room point out just what secret information is involved. Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. I will do that in a moment. A secret piece of information is found at the top of page 10. "Forces in Europe" include over four divisions [deleted.] That latter information is not treated as public information. Senator BYRD. The fact that there are four divisions in Europe is public information, is it not? Mr. KELLEY. Yes. I said the latter portion of that is not public information. Senator BYRD. What else? Mr. KELLEY. That is to my knowledge, the only secret portion of the entire statement. Senator BYRD. That is about 10 words in 40 pages, 46 pages. I think that is dubious because all you are talking about is what you might possibly do at some future time. Mr. KELLEY. Well, it is Senator BYRD. But, anyway, we will not urgue that point. Mr. KELLEY. It is a plan. Senator BYRD. It is a fact that there are only about 15 words out of 46 pages that you yourself say should be considered secret. It seems to me you could either have left out those 15 words or declassified the whole document. Mr. KELLEY. First, the judgment as to whether it deserves to be classified or not is a judgment which is made by others than myself. Senator BYRD. I am aware of that. Mr. KELLEY. In immediate response to your question, this is the only thing that I can think of in the entire statement which deserves the classification of secret. Senator BYRD. I do not think this whole document of 46 pages containing a lot of information that the American people should know, that the press should know, that the other Members of the Congress ought to know, should be classified secret on the basis of 15 words. Mr. KELLEY. I welcome your reaction, Senator, and as I said to Senator Symington, I would be delighted to provide an unclassified version of this statement. Senator BYRD. As I understand it, everything is unclassified except those 15 words. Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; I did not say that. I said on the basis of my immediate recall that is the only thing which in my judgment deserves a secret classification, but I am not standing in judgment on the entire statement here. Senator BYRD. If you are going to-of course, you will comply with what Senator Symington requested but I would like for you to comply in a different way and that is submit along with it any information that you regard or the Pentagon regards, the Defense Department regards as secret. Mr. KELLEY. All right. Senator BYRD. Because if we get another big 45 pages back, whatever it might be, I will not know what has been deleted. The CHAIRMAN. Senator, if you would yield to me there, the committee would join you in your request that a clean copy be sent over not later than tomorrow morning and it be delivered to the membership of the committee. Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, that is only part of it. By a clean copy I assume you mean The CHAIRMAN. Maybe a cleared copy. Senator BYRD. I assume you mean a copy that can be released. Senator BYRD. I want to know what has been eliminated without having to pore over every word. The CHAIRMAN. I see your point. Mr. KELLEY. I understand. Senator BYRD. We get down to the question that touched on Mr. KELLEY. Excuse me, Senator. Before we leave that subject, I should just like to register a reaction which is that it may be inappropriate to release for public consumption the manpower portion of the Defense statement before Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer have had the opportunity to appear before this committee. Senator BYRD. It seems to me this is a waste of time to have this meeting, then. I thought we could stand on the figures you submitted. If we cannot, then I have no more questions. Mr. KELLEY. We certainly stand on it. Senator BYRD. Then, what is the objection to making the information available? Mr. KELLEY. I assume that the posture of the Defense Department could be better appreciated against the broader backdrop of Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer's statement than if my statement were to be taken by itself. Senator BYRD. I am not asking that it be released but I was just trying to understand why a document of 46 pages that I went over |