stantial reduction of the total number of personnel required to staff the structure."

What is the view of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that you represent on this subject on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel position that this command structure is not only large and cumbersome but "unwieldy and unworkable in crisis and too fragmentary to provide the best potential for a coordinated response to a general war situation."

You have been through all of that, I know. I do not want to take you by surprise. What is your view as representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense on that?

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, that portion of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel is one in which the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs, more so than I, concerned themselves. I think it would be appropriate for me to pass that question and suggest that you direct it to the Secretary and Admiral Moorer when they are here.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us pass that question over then, members of the staff, and bring it back to my attention.

While we are on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, we would like to have a specific response to each of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's recommendations in this area, specifically the recommendations in section (I) (5) of the panel report on pages 56 and 57.

(The information follows:)

This provides a response to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendation I-5 which recommended in part:

The establishment of an operations staff, separate from all other military staffs, to provide staff support on military operations, and channel of communications from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commands;

The responsibilities now delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of Defense to serve as military staff in the chain of operational command with respect to the Unified Commands be rescinded;

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be limited to include only the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a reconstituted Joint Staff consisting of not more than 250 officers augmented by professional civilian analysts as required; Unified Commanders be given unfragmented command authority for their Commands, and the Commanders of component commands redesignated as Deputies to the commander of the appropriate Unified Command;

Major realignment of Unified Commands;

Redelegate responsibilities related to civil disturbance to the Tactical Command which are currently delegated to the Army; and

Unified Commanders be given express responsibility and capability for makrecommendations for operational capabilities objectives and allocations of force structures needed for the effective accomplishment of their missions.

Total implementation of this recommendation is partly dependent on establishing three Deputy Secretaries, which the Secretary of Defense has rejected in favor of two deputies. However, certain related actions taken by the Department have been consistent with the thrust of certain aspects of the recommendation. Prior to the issuance of the Blue Ribbon Panel Report, the Department had initiated a study to examine some elements of the Unified and Specified Command structure. We concluded that the Unified Commands, as they were then structured, together with the distribution of responsibilities among the various commands, did not represent the most effective organization of U.S. combatant forces in support of national policies, nor the most effective arrangement for the deployment of U.S. forces to meet likely contingencies. In view of this conclusion, changes have been made that have resulted in the realignment of the headquarters arrangements for command and control

of the Armed Forces world-wide. These changes are in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine and are consistent with our on-going efforts to revitalize the organizational structure in support of our policy of Realistic Deterrence,. The Unified Command Plan, which had not been changed since 1963, represents, as revised, the best judgment of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. This Unified Command structure will be reviewed periodically to assure that, as changes occur in U.S. policies, interests, and other considerations, the command structure will be modified to support them.

Specifically, the changes are:

U.S. Strike Command.-US Strike Command was disestablished, along with the title Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (USCINC MEAFSA). In its place, a new command, US Readiness Command, was established at MacDill Air Force Base. The new command is manned austerely to control US-based major combatant general purpose forces not assigned to other unified commands. It has the responsibility to provide a general reserve of combat ready forces to reinforce other U.S. commands, perform deployment planning, and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing doctrines and techniques for the joint employment of forces. (Deleted.)

U.S. European Command.-USCINCEUR's area of responsibility was expanded to include the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East to the eastern border of Iran. We think that the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and Middle East represents an increased threat to the southern flank of NATO; that all U.S. military planning and operations in this area and Europe should be coordinated and controlled by one military commander. Pacific Command.-PACOM area responsibility was expanded to include the Indian Ocean to 62° East Longitude, those South Asian countries formerly assigned to USCINCMEAFSA, the Aleutian Islands, and a portion of the Arctic Ocean. This change is more compatible with the forces likely to be deployed for contingencies in these areas.

Atlantic Command.-LANTCOM area responsibility was expanded to include the water areas around the continents of Africa and South America. It also includes a portion of the Arctic Ocean. This arrangement is more compatible with the existing and likely deployment of U.S. naval forces.

The Alaskan Command retained its mission in the state of Alaska and responsibility for Alaskan coastal islands.

The Strategic Air Command and the Continental Air Defense Command also retained their present missions.

The US Southern Command is unchanged.

The Department is in full accord with the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel concerning the streamlining of the combatant commands thereby reducing the personnel required to staff the structure. The changes in the Unified Command Plan which became effective January 1, 1972, provided for an improved command structure as well as effecting an overall reduction in the headquarters manning of the commands. For example, the disestablishment of US Strike Command and the establishment of the US Readiness Command resulted in the reduction of 306 personnel spaces. As a separate action, all major headquarters staff elements are being examined with a view toward reducing their size. Approximately a 20 percent reduction in the major staff elements is planned for FY 73 from the FY 69 level.

The decision has been deferred regarding that portion of the recommendation concerning (1) the reorganization of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (2) the establishment of an operations staff, separate from all other military staffs, to provide staff support on military operations, and a channel of communications from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commands. This aspect of the recommendation has been examined very closely. While it has not been implemented as suggested, we have taken action to improve the present system to provide a more effective, efficient, and economical command and control system to support the President and Secretary of Defense (DoD Directive 5100.30).

Certain limited advantages may perhaps be realized by separating the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command and other responsibilities related to operational matters as recommended by the Panel; however, the total impact of this action must also be considered. This includes, among other things:

The creation of another high level military staff organization and an associated layer of responsibility and authority which would accompany it.

The impediment of the decision-making process at the national level. Receipt of operational advice by the civilian leadership from a corporate body who, removed from the operational chain of command, would lack full awareness of support capabilities and would bear no responsibility for the readiness of the combatant forces.

Usurpation of the statutory responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an effort to improve the current system, guidelines have been issued to define the functional, organizational, and operational relationships among all elements of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), and to set forth responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to this system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have statutory responsibility to serve as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense. This function is recognized and has been interfaced with WWMCCS. Further, under WWMCCS, the Chiefs have responsibility to serve in the chain of operational command with respect to Unified and Specified Commands, to provide a channel of communication from the President and Secretary of Defense to Unified and Specified Commands.

Changing the title of the Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Staff of the Navy would serve no useful purpose and could create confusion by conveying the idea that major changes were being made in the Department of the Navy. Furthermore, this change would entail administrative costs which would be difficult to justify under the austere fiscal climate.

The current Unified Command Plan gives the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands maximum authority possible consistent with statutory requirements. This includes the authority to exercise operational command over all forces assigned to the command. The Unified Commanders have the authority to exercise those functions of command involving the control of assigned resources, composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission of the command. In consonance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, each Military Department is responsible for the administration of the forces assigned by that department to the combatant commands. The Defense Department is operating under this system at the present time.

Action has not been taken on the subject of redelegating the responsibilities related to civil disturbances to the Tactical Command since this command has not been established. In August 1971, as a separate action, however, the Department did reissue a Directive on the subject. This Directive established uniform DoD policies, assigned responsibilities, and furnished general guidance for utilizing DoD military and civilian personnel, facilities, equipment and supplies in support of civil disturbances. It improved the organization and clearly defined command relationships for the discharge of this Department's responsibilities relating to civil disturbances.

It is current practice for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to solicit recommendations from the Unified Commanders concerning operational capabilities, objectives and allocations of force structure needed for the effective accomplishment of their missions. The Services and the Unified Commanders actively participate in the formation of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan as well as short range operational planning. Moreover, the views of the commanders are also considered in the Force Structure Annual Manpower Review.

JUSTIFICATION OF HEADQUARTERS REQUIREMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. In addition, the committee would like to have specific justification for the requirement of headquarters of commanding chief of the U.S. naval forces in Europe and a discussion of the reasons why the functions of that headquarters cannot be carried out by either U.S. naval command for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia or commander for the Mediterranean in Naples, Italy.

Would you rather defer on that one?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, located in London, is the naval component commander of the unified command under the Commander in

Chief, U.S. European Command. His mission is to conduct operations to ensure control of the seas and air in and around the U.S. European Command area and to provide forces (including administrative, logistic and planning support) to the Commander in Chief Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in order to support and assist in establishing control of contested areas in Europe. His forces include the Sixth Fleet and other U.S. Navy forces at sea and ashore in the European and Middle East areas.

Additionally, Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe has the area command of the U.S. Eastern Atlantic Command under the Atlantic Fleet Commander. This area is one of the most strategically important areas in the world. (Deleted). The sheer volume of this logistics task makes it necessary that the U.S. Navy, and the Atlantic Fleet Commander have an area commander in the United Kingdom who is on the spot, and immediately responsive to events in this area and who can fulfill wartime tasks in logistic support, anti-submarine warfare and offensive mining.

Further Navy responsibilities include the provision of timely, (deleted) support (deleted) as senior U.S. naval commander in the Europe and Middle East areas he is responsible for coordination of all Navy components to achieve economy and efficiency. As such, he represents the Chief of Naval Operations for U.S. naval matters in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. His location in London is the ideal headquarters site for fulfillment of the integrated Naval Forces, Europe responsibilities.

The above responsibilities of Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Force Europe/ U.S. Commander Eastern Atlantic emphasizes the requirement for the present location of his headquarters. In discussing the reasons why these functions cannot be assumed by the Atlantic Fleet Command in Norfolk, you will recall that Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet is the naval component commander under the unified Atlantic Command. As such the Atlantic Fleet Commander provides forces to the Atlantic Command and the NATO Allied Command Atlantic. The primary mission of these forces during a NATO conflict is the successful reinforcement of resupply of U.S. forces in the Central Region of Europe from ports in the United States. [Deleted.] Through his type commanders, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet also directs the training and readiness of all Atlantic Fleet naval forces preparing for overseas movement from the U.S. to Europe, especially for peacetime operations with the United States Sixth Fleet. In addition, he has continuing responsibilities in the Atlantic and the Caribbean for surveillance of Soviet naval acitvities in these areas. These requrements are met with U.S. based forces. All of these functions are exercised from Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. Few of these functions could be performed efficiently from any headquarters in Europe. Conversely, the assumption of the CINCUSNAVEUR function by CINCLANTFLT in Norfolk would be inefficient due to moving USCINCEUR's naval component commander so far from his area of geographic responsibility.

The other aspect of your question is the assumption of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe functions by the U.S. Commander in the Mediterranean (Sixth Fleet commander). The Sixth Fleet command is primarily concerned with tactical naval operations and exercises designed to improve the combat effectiveness of his forces against the Soviet submarine, surface and air threat in the Mediterranean. For him to assume the Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe functions would broaden the scope of his responsibilities beyond that normally assigned a combat commander and would not enhance the effectiveness of his command. [Deleted.] To be effective in a support role and to give credible assistance in the Northern Europe area, a naval headquarters presence is required in that region.

In summary, the present headquarters located in London, provides a dual purpose staff for Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe/U.S. Commander Eastern Atlantic in order to effectively accomplish their dual missions. These missions are the provision of naval forces to the European command and the maintaining of control of the sea lines of communication to Europe in strategic eastern portions of the Atlantic Command.

BREAKDOWN OF HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL

The CHAIRMAN. The material submitted to the committee shows that each service has between 11,000 and 14,000 men in headquarters

which are below the departmental level and above the level of division or corps. This comes to a total of nearly 40,000 men in these high-level headquarters. The committee would like to have a listing of each such headquarters, a description of its function and responsibilities, and the number of men assigned to each. The number of general officers and other officers by grade should also be listed as should the location of each such headquarters. I ask that in the form of a question and ask you to supply that for the record.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I will.

(The information follows:)

HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES

The accompanying list of headquarters and the manner in which they are categorized differs significantly from the Headquarters Activities information which is provided annually by OSD (Comptroller) to the Congress. Headquarters contained in this list which are also a part of the OSD (Comptroller) Headquarters categorization are indicated by a footnote containing a lower case letter. When a footnote appears after a headquarters category title in this list, all organizations in the associated category are in the same OSD (Comptroller) category. The OSD (Comptroller) Headquarters categories and their designators in this list of Headquarters are:

(a) Department Level
(b) Field Headquarters

(c) Systems Command Headquarters

(d) Major Command Headquarters

(e) Naval District Headquarters

(f) Unified Command Headquarters (not used in this list)

The headquarters included herein are Service headquarters only. The number of Service personnel in Unified Headquarters and Defense and Federal Agencies is addressed in a separate response.1

HEADQUARTERS CATEGORIZATION

Due to organizational differences between the Services, it is difficult to categorize organizations so that comparable responsibilities and functions are solely and entirely contained in the same category for all Services. The following categories are intended to show for all Services the illustrative relationship of organizations and is not necessarily the categorization system used by the Services. Each of the categories contains at least two echelons of organizations, as described below.

Departmental Headquarters

This category contains the organizations responsible for overall policy formulation, determination of resource requirements, allocation of resources, and long range planning of the Service programs. Contained herein are the Service secretariates and the staffs of the Service chiefs.

Major Headquarters

This category contains organizations which are responsible for the planning, resource management, and execution of operations for a primary mission (i.e., strategic operations) or a principal geographic area (i.e., Europe). Subsidiary headquarters of many of the major organizations are included in this category. This is done because they are primarily administrative rather than tactical (or deployable) in nature. Examples include: Theater and Field (Numbered) Armies, Fleet Commands and Force/Type Commands, AMC and Commodity Command, NAVMAT and Systems Command, AFLC and AMAS.

Intermediate Headquarters

This category contains organizations which are responsible for the direct operational control of tactical (deployable) units. These hearquarters are tactical (deployable) in nature and their location changes as subordinate units are relocated. Examples of the echelons included are: Army Corps and Divisions, Numbered Air Forces and Air Divisions, and Ship Squadrons and Ship Divisions.

1 Refer to insert to record, page 398, line 7, 15 February 1972.