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General, we are glad to have you here. I have already given you a word of welcome and I will say for those who have come in since, this is your first time here as a witness in behalf of the Marine Corps and the budget, so, we give you that special welcome. We will be glad to hear you now.

General CUSHMAN. I am pleased to have this opportunity to present my first report on the posture of the Marine Corps.

The full statement which I submitted for the record discusses the role of the Marine Corps in supporting national policies under the Nixon doctrine and the associated strategy of realistic deterrence.

Our force structure and deployments are discussed in terms of the readiness of our Active and Reserve Forces to meet our commitments. Our manpower situation is reviewed in light of our efforts to recruit and maintain a top-quality force as we approach the all-volunteer environment.

Finally, the statement outlines our initiatives in modernizing our equipment and support systems to meet the challenges of the approaching years. It supports our fiscal year 1973 budget requests. These requests total $2.109 billion of Marine Corps money.

The Navy in direct support of the Marine Corps has $779.4 million. This supports a force of 198,000 Regulars, 45,000 Reservists and 16,800 civilian personnel. This completes my summary of the prepared

statement.

(Prepared statement follows:)

Mr. Chairman . . . members of the committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to present my first report on the posture of the Marine Corps. At the outset of my stewardship, I am firmly convinced that this remarkable military organization is one of America's soundest security investments, and I am confident it will remain so-both in terms of its inherent quality and its potential returns. Fire can have a tempering, as well as a destructive effect. The Marine Corps has emerged from the crucible of Vietnam tougher and more resilient than ever, despite combat losses. Our standards are untarnished, and we are prepared to resume our role as this Nation's amphibious ready force of combined arms.

Before I begin detailed discussion of the Marine Corps itself, I would like to touch upon our role in supporting National policies, from the standpoints of both our amphibious capability and our readiness to respond to crisis-anywhere, anytime.

Under the Nixon Doctrine and its supporting National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, a requirement exists to provide the President a range of capabilities that will permit the selective application of force to deter armed conflict or to stabilize crises early in their development.

Navy-Marine Corps amphibious task forces, strategically located in international waters, can provide a credible peacetime deterrent by maintaining continuous presence in critical areas, without risking automatic involvement when crises develop. Combat power can remain afloat, as either a demonstration of U.S. concern or a show of force, depending upon the circumstances. It can be projected ashore, with a precision consistent with tactical and political aims, and, significantly, the combat power of amphibious forces can be disengaged and re-embarked on order, in low and mid-intensity conflict situations. Thus, positive control is provided for the level and duration of U.S. military involvement.

As our military presence overseas continues to diminish the possibility of unopposed reinforcement becomes more and more remote. In considering the alternative of forcible entry, we must regard our amphibious forces as uniquely capable of initiating and sustaining operations independent of fixed supply lines and local overseas facilities.

Since amphibious forces can establish U.S. presence without U.S. commitment, they can provide a peaceful means of supporting diplomatic undertakings. If we desire, we can mask our intent from potential opponents, while our options for action remain open.

After four decades of primary involvement in the development of amphibious doctrine, we Marines appreciate the subtleties of amphibious power. And we continually seek new refinement, both in concepts and techniques. Seabasing, with its associated Seaborne Mobile Logistic System, is such a refinement currently under study by the Navy and Marine Corps. Its aim is to minimize landing force dependence upon command-and-control and support facilities based ashore. This will further enhance control of the level and duration of amphibious force involvement in crisis situations, and minimize the need for offensive combat power to be fragmented to defend shore facilities.

The potential returns of investment in an amphibious ready force are many and varied. But this force must be truly ready, if it is to influence fast-breaking crisis situations.

That is why readiness is our raison d'etre. It has become a way of life for the Marine Corps. America cannot afford to be without an amphibious force-inreadiness, and we are dedicated to provide that force.

Against this background, I shall discuss our active and reserve forces in terms of our commitments and our readiness to meet them, touching, as well, upon our initiatives in force modernization to meet the challenges of the approaching years. I shall go into our manpower situation in some detail, for this will become an increasingly critical focus of interest as we approach an All Volunteer environment.

Let us begin with the "muscle" of the Marine Corps-our Fleet Marine Forces.

THE FLEET MARINE FORCES

As operating components of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, the Fleet Marine Forces include a total of three active duty Marine Divisions and Aircraft Wings, together with the combat and combat service support units required to support them. There is an additional Division/Wing Team, and supporting units, in the Marine Corps Reserve which can be deployed to combat 60 days after mobilization.

Active Fleet Marine Forces are currently deployed from the Western Pacific eastward to the Mediterranean Sea. The bulk of these forces are assigned to the Fleet Marine Force. Pacific (FMFPAC) which is organized to include two each of the three active divisions and three active wings and appropriate supporting units.

The Western Pacific forces include those division and wing forces on Okinawa and Japan, organized as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). This organization includes the 3d Marine Division (-) (reinforced), the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and supporting units. The III MAF is the principal [deleted] for Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) with a primary area orientation for use in major contingencies in Korea or Southeast Asia as well as for minor contingencies and/or security assistance throughout the Pacific Command (PACOM) area. [Deleted.]

III MAF provides a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), composed of a battalion landing team (BLT) and a helicopter squadron, for continuous forward afloat deployment with the Seventh Fleet. An additional BLT, and necessary amphibious lift, are available for immediate deployment when needed. If more helicopter platforms become available within PACOM assets, the standby BLT will be upgraded to a MAU.

The mid-Pacific forces consist of a Marine Brigade in Hawaii, which is composed of a headquarters, an infantry regiment (minus one battalion), an aircraft group, and necessary supporting units. These ground and aviation elements are, essentially, part of the Marine Corps forces stationed in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC).

Most of FMFPAC's forces in the continental United States are based in California and are organized as the I MAF: a Marine Division at Camp Pendleton; a Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro (and Yuma, Arizona); and the combat support and combat service support elements under Force Troops Pacific command at Twentynine Palms. This West coast division/wing team MAF, also [deleted] has the capability to respond to contingency requirements.

Most of the major components of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT) are based in North Carolina. An East coast Marine Division and the Force Troops are stationed at Camp Lejeune; the Marine Aircraft Wing is stationed at Cherry Point and New River with two of its Marine Air Groups based at Beaufort, South Carolina. From these East coast units are provided the reinforced industry battalion designated as the Guantanamo Ground Defense Force; a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) continuously deployed afloat with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean; and, the Caribbean Ready Force [deleted].

FMFLANT units constitute the II Marine Amphibious Force (II MAF), which is committed to support of a myriad of contingency plans ranging from crisis-control operations operations on the littorals of the Atlantic to general war [deleted].

The Navy's amphibious force is one of the most modern "mission forces" in the Fleets. On the other hand, the amount of amphibious lift capability available in 1973 will be at its lowest point since 1950. [Deleted.]

READINESS

Consistent with their force-in-readiness role, the Fleet Marine Forces are manned at the highest possible level with trained Marines. Over half our total strength is assigned to the operating forces. Residual personnel turbulence associated with our draw down and our redeployment from Vietnam causes us to project an overall manning level of 85% for our division/wing forces during FY 72. We are maintaining 90% manning in our forces assigned to the Western Pacific and the Atlantic regions. Our FY 73 budget requests support 90% manning across the board for our division/wing forces.

The basic and continuing objective of Fleet Marine Force training is to maintain and improve combat readiness. Training is oriented toward refining the unique capability of the Fleet Marine Forces to conduct landing force operations as part of the Navy-Marine Corps team. This amphibious orientation is fundamental and continuous, pervading all aspects of unit training, which begins with small-unit operations ashore and progresses through battalion and larger unit exercises ashore and afloat. Training is conducted in varying methods of amphibious assault, but stresses those in which both helicopters and surface assault means are employed.

Additionally, environmental training is required in varied conditions of climate, weather, terrain, and visibility. Training exercises are conducted in desert, jungle, and mountain terrain, as well as areas of snow and extreme cold. Adequate quantities of supplies and new equipment are being procured to ensure that our logistic system is responsive to our force-in-readiness role. The Marine Corps operates an integral logistic support system designed for effective operation in both peace and war, and is capable of rapid transition from one to the other. The system, which makes the Marine Corps essentially selfsufficient in logistics operations, is structured to be responsive to the needs of operating and supporting forces, and to provide optimum support to the individual Marine in combat. It is characterized by centralized management and decentralized distribution. It is a dynamic system, undergoing continuing refinement and improvement.

MARINE AVIATION

Marine aviation units in Vietnam ceased combat operations in May, 1971. Our withdrawal was accompanied by a reduction in aviation force levels. Our reduced aircraft inventory is modern and combat capable in all respects.

Our fighters are all F-4 Phantoms. Modernization is planned through acquisition of the F-14. We have introduced the AV-SA into the Fleet Marine Forces, and are currently evaluating this versatile V/STOL aircraft in light of its potential contributions to Landing Force doctrine. We are looking at the feasibility of an all-V/STOL light attack force for the 1980s, hinging upon the development and production of a second-generation V/STOL aircraft. We will continue to modernize our light attack and all-weather medium attack capabilities through procurement of the A-4M and A-6E, respectively.

Marine helicopter assets are modern and well-balanced, and are programmed to remain so through this decade. Our transport support force, on the other hand, had low priority during the Vietnam years, and requires modernization. Programming action has been initiated toward this end.

We are maintaining our combat crew replacement training groups. These will ensure our continued capability to provide trained air crews for rapid emergency deployment of tactical squadrons.

Marine fixed-wing squadrons are augmenting Navy carrier air wings during CVA deployments to WESTPAC and the Mediterranean. Helicopter squadrons, organic to the landing forces, are also maintained aboard LPHS assigned to Amphibious Ready Groups continually deployed to these regions. An additional East coast helicopter squadron remains in standby status to react to Caribbean emergencies. The Caribbean fighter alert posture is enhanced by Marine F-4s, assigned to Key West on an alternate basis with Navy aircraft. Finally, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing remains deployed in Japan and Okinawa.

With the transition from its wartime posture to the restructured, combat ready Wings nearing completion, Marine aviation is prepared to support our ground components wherever and whenever they may be committed.

THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The major component of the Marine Corps Reserve is the combat ready 4th Marine Division/Aircraft Wing team, designed to meet the Marine Corps' priority mobilization requirements. This team, the IV Marine Amphibious Force (IV MAF), is trained, organized, and equipped in the same manner as the MAFS of the Regular Establishment. This force remains in a high state of readiness, with the exception of a few recently restructured units. Current training programs, including the Five Year Cyclic Training Plan, will improve the readiness of these units in the near fuure, and continue to maintain the high state of readiess of all other units.

We began 1972 with 42,000 officers and men in the Organized Marine Corps Reserve, and approximately 210,000 individual Reservists available for service in the Class III Ready and Standby Reserve pool.

Equipment for the 4th Marine Division and units which support the Division/ Wing team is on hand or identified for priority procurement.

The aircraft status of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing has been significantly improved, but certain deficiencies remain-both in the number of aircraft assigned and their capabilities.

By the end of FY 72, all helicopter squadrons will be equipped with, or transitioning to, the same jet-powered models that are flown by the active forces. Although improved versions of the F-8 and A-4 aircraft have upgraded our

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