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Poland was staggering. The Nazis' own statistics show that as of 31 May 1943, a total of 693,252 estates, comprising 6,097,525 hectares, had been seized, and 9,508 estates, comprising 270,446 hectares had been confiscated by the Estate Offices Danzig-West Prussia, Poznan, Zichenau, and Silesia (R-92). This, it will be noted, represented the seizures and confiscations which were effected by only four offices. Figures are not available at this time for other offices maintained by the conspirators for these purposes.


The conspirators had given much thought to their plans to Germanize Bohemia and Moravia. Three plans, each characterized by severity, were discussed, and finally the Fuehrer decided on plan (c), which involved the assimilation of about one-half the Czech population by the Germans and the extermination of the other half. Moreover, this plan envisaged a large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to the Fuehrer was unquestioned.

These matters appear from a top secret report dated 15 October 1940, written by General Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia and Moravia. On the face of the document, it appears that only four copies were made. The original document bears the handwritten letters "K" and "J" on the first page on the left side, and the handwriting is unquestionably that of Keitel and Jodl. The report states:

"On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector
held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt.
General K. H. Frank spoke about the following: [SS Grup-
penfuehrer K. H. Frank was Secretary of State under Von
Neurath, who at the date of this report was the Protector
of Bohemia and Moravia).
"Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the
central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the
solution of the Czech problem.
"After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his
views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this
way, three ways of solution were indicated :
"a. German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the
Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia. This solution is
considered unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even
if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.
b. Many arguments can be brought up against the most
radical solution, namely, the deportation of all, the Czechs.
Therefore, the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it
cannot be carried out within a reasonable period of time.
"c. Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e., absorption of about half
of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of
importance by being valuable from a racial or other stand-
point. This will take place, among other things, also by in-
creasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich terri-
tory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border dis-
trict), in other words, by dispersing the closed Czech nation-
“The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived
of its power, eliminated and shipped out of the country by
all sorts of methods. This applies particularly to the racially
mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual
class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologically and
would represent a burden by constantly making claims for
the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfer-
ing with a rapid assimilation.
“Elements which counteract the planned Germanization
ought to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.
"The above development naturally presupposes an increased
influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protec-
"After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution (c) (As-
similation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech prob-
lem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the
Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to
be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich
Protector for years to come.
From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the
armed forces. This is the direction which has always been
represented from here. In this connection, I refer to my
memorandum which was sent to the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file num-
ber 6/39, top secret, entitled: “The Czech Problem." (At-
tached as annex.)
"The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich
Protector in Bohemia and Moravia."


Infantry Lt. General.” (862-PS) Solution (a), as outlined in the foregoing report, would have called for German infiltration into Moravia and the forcible removal of the Czechs from that area to Bohemia. Moravia lies


between Bohemia and Slovakia. Thus, solution (a) would have involved the erection of a German state between Bohemia and Slovakia, and would have prevented effective inter-communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In this manner, the historic desire for unity of these two groups of people and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have been frustrated. Solution (a) was rejected because the surviving Czechs, even though compressed into a “residual Bohemia,” would have remained to plague the conspirators.

Solution (b), which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs, was rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic but rather because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired.

Solution (c) was regarded as the most desirable, and was adopted. This solution first provided for the assimilation of about one half of the Czechs. This meant two things: (a) enforced Germanization for those who were deemed racially qualified, and (6) deportation to slave labor in Germany for others. "Increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory”, as stated in the report, meant, in reality, slave labor in Germany.

Solution (c) further provided for the elimination and deportation "by all sorts of methods” of the other half of the Czech population, particularly intellectuals and those who did not meet Nazi racial standards. Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators well know, had a conspicuous record of resistance to the Nazi ideology. They were, therefore, to be exterminated. That section of the report which stated, “elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated," meant that intellectuals and other dissident elements were either to be thrown in concentration camps or immediately exterminated.

In short, the provisions of solution (c) were simply a practical application of the conspirators' philosophy as expressed in Himmler's speech referred to above:

“Either we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves

or we destroy this blood." (L-70)

3. THE U. S. S. R.

(The Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet Union has assumed the task of introducing detailed evidence showing the results of the execution of this program. The American prosecution confined itself to showing the plan.)

The evidence, individual items of which will be discussed hereafter, shows the following:

A. The conspirators planned to remove to Germany all foodstuffs and raw materials from the south and southeast of the Soviet Union, over and above the needs of the Nazi invading forces and the absolute minimum necessary to supply the bare needs of the people in these particular regions who produced the materials which were to be removed to Germany. This region had previously supplied the northern area of the Soviet Union, which the conspirators called the "Forest Zone". The latter zone embraced some of the leading industrial areas of the Soviet Union, including Moscow and Leningrad.

B. They deliberately and systematically planned to starve millions of Russians. Starvation was to be accomplished by the following means:

(1) As indicated under A above, products from the south and southeast of the Soviet Union which ordinarily were sent to the industrial regions of the north were to be forcibly diverted to Germany. Moreover, all livestock in the industrial regions was to be seized for use by the Wehrmacht and the German civilian population. The necessary consequence was that the population of the northern regions would be reduced to starvation.

(2) They established the following order of priority in which food produced by the Russians would be allocated:

First, the combat troops.
Second, the remainder of troops in enemy territory.
Third, troops stationed in Germany.
Fourth, the German civilian population, and

Lastly, the population of the occupied countries. Thus, even Russians in the food surplus area of the Ukraine, who were not essential to the production of products for the German war machine, were systematically to be starved.

C. They planned the permanent destruction of all industry in the northern area of the Soviet Union in order that the remnants of the Russian population would be completely dependent upon Germany for consumer goods.

D. They planned to incorporate a part of Galicia and all of the Baltic countries into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an area north of the Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district around Baku, into German colonies.

By a directive issued by Goering's office for "The Operation of the Economy in the newly-occupied Eastern Territories," there was established the Economic Executive Staff, East, which was directly responsible to Goering, under which was created the

Economic Staff, East. The Economic Staff, East, in turn was subdivided into four groups: the Chief of the Economic Staff, Group LA, Group W, and Group M. The functions of Group LA were stated to be as follows:

“Group LA. (Functions: nutrition and agriculture, the economy of all agricultural products, provision of supplies for the Army, in cooperation with the Army groups concerned.)”

(EC-472.) A report was made on 23 May 1941 (which was before the invasion of the Soviet Union) on the subject, "Economic Policy Directives for Economic Organization, East, Agricultural Group.” (EC-126). It was prepared by the Economic Staff, East, Group LA, the Agricultural Group, which (as shown by EC-472) was an important part of the organization which Goering had established to formulate plans for the economic administration of Russia. The report begins by a recitation of figures pertaining to the production of agricultural products in the Soviet Union. It states that the grain surplus of Russia is determined by the level of domestic consumption and that this fact affords the basis upon which the planners must predicate their actions and economic policy. The report continues:

“The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district (that is in the south and southeast) and in the Caucasus. The deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the north. Therefore, an isolation of the black soi. areas must, in any case, place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg."


“This (the cessation of supplies) means:
"1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the manu-
facturing industries in the Moscow and Petersburg regions
as well as the Ural industrial regions will be abandoned.
It may be assumed that these regions today absorb an an-
nual five to ten million tons from the food production zone.
"2. The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be ex-
cepted, although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cot-
ton, manganese, copper, silk, and tea must continue to be
supplied with food in any case, for special political and
economic reasons.
“3. No further exceptions with a view to preserving one or

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