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violated, and Czechoslovakia invaded by Germany on 15 March 1939.

Another captured document, a file kept by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant, reveals the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggressions against Czechoslovakia (388-PS). The file was found in a cellar of the Platterhof at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. It consists of a work-file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. The German title is "Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen", (Basic Principles for "Case Green"), "Green" being a codeword for the aggression against Czechoslovakia. Item No. 2 in this file is dated 22 April 1938. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler and Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates to "Case Green". This meeting occurred within approximately one month following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the "Plan Green", to take into account changed conditions, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. Item 2 reads:

"Berlin, 22 April 1938.

"Bases of the Dissertation on Gruen.

"Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:

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"1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

"2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

"3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for example, assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration.)

"Military Conclusions.

"1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.

“2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail-which is unavailable, but should be cut down as far as possible-must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.

"3. 'Separate thrusts' are to be carried out immediately

with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

"The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

"4. Politically, the first four days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize 'Gruen.'

"Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)

"5. If possible, separation of transport movement 'Rot' from 'Gruen'. ['Rot' was the code name for their then plan against the West.] A simultaneous strategic concentration 'Rot' can lead 'Rot' to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to put 'Case Rot' into operation at any time. "C. Propaganda.

"1.

Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland.)

"2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).

[Initialled by Schmundt]" (388-PS)

Particular attention should be drawn to paragraph 3 of this document, under the heading "Political Aspect", which reads as

follows:

"Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (example: Assassination of German ambassador as an up-shot of an anti-German demonstration)." (388-PS)

The document as a whole establishes that the conspirators were planning the creation of an incident to justify to the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes that consideration was being given to assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident.

C. Formulation and Execution of the Plan to Invade Poland. The next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland, resulting in the initiation of aggressive war in September 1939. Here again the careful and meticulous record keeping of Hitler's adjutant, Schmundt, has provided a document in his own handwriting which throws down the mask (L-79). The document consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the Fuehrer's Study in the New Reich Chancellery. Goering, Raeder and Keitel were present. The subject of the meeting was, "Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims."

The authenticity and accuracy of Schmundt's record of the meeting of 23 May 1939 has been admitted by Keitel in a pretrial interrogation. The minutes read as follows:

"Top Secret

"To be transmitted by officer only

"Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39"

"Place: The Fuehrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.
"Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

"Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Ad-
miral Raeder, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel,
Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Boden-
schatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt. Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek,
Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. En-
gel (Army), Lieut-Commd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).
"Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future
sims

"The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:
"1. Analysis of the situation.

“. Perinition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising
from the situation.

"Fxposition of the consequences of those tasks.

4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

"Server is the first essential for success.

"The Fuehrer's observations are given in systematized form below

Our present situation must be considered from rve points

The actual development of events berveen 1988 and The permanent and unchanging situation in vich Ger*** the period 1988-1508 progress was made in all felds.

Our military situation improved enormously.

"Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

"Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

"This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany reemerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as 'Encroachments'. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. "A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

"Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that. "We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan. "The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

“After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

"The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood. "The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance. "The Pole is no 'supplementary enemy'. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated

areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-going
German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.
"There is no other possibility for Europe.

"Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does
not solve the food problem. Remember-blockade.

"If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon
record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of
war than in peace.

"The population of nonGerman areas will perform no mili-
tary service, and will be available as a source of labour.
"The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the
West.

"Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is
doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier
against Russia.

"It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

"The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

"There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

"To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. [This sentence is underscored in the original German text.]

"We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

"Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers [France and England].

"If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France.

"Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland-beginning
with an attack on Poland-will only be successful if the
Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then
it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland
at the same time.

"The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.
"Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various
reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat

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