most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will. [signed] The Compiler". (C-156)

The summary of the contents indicated in the chapter titles is significant:

"I. First, defensive action against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the Ruhr, 1923)..

"1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction to removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons.

"3. Limitation of destruction in Heligoland.

"II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lomann case in 1927).

"1. An attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich Navy.

"2. Contributing to the strengthening of patriotism among the people.

"3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.

"4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat

arm.

"5. Building up of the air force.

"6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm (Die Mine).

"7. Economic rearmament.

"8. Miscellaneous measures.

"a. The Aerogeodetic, and;

"b. Secret evidence.

"III. Planned armament work countenance by the Reich government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1927 to the seizure of power, 1933.

"IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in camouflage (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935)." (C-156)

The following is a passage from Chapter IV:

"The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of the decisive influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.

"While the second chamber, Reichsrat, approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which could only take a one-sided

attitude toward the rearmament of the armed forces. The government took over the management of the rearmament program upon this foundation.

"Development of the Armed Forces."

"This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the armed forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General von Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the armed forces, received farreaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the armed forces. The whole organization of the Reich was included in this way. In view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duty of the accounting office of the German Reich.

"Independence of the Commander in Chief of the Navy" "The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary doctor, had received the help of a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the public budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schussler, afterwards Commodore Foerster. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.

"Declaration of Military Freedom"

"When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strength of the armed forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the lastmentioned limitation on rearmament works namely, the external camouflage, was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in the air for one and a half decades, and carried by the newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the armed forces, and as part of it, the navy, can lead with full strength towards its completion the rearmament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world." (C-156)

An interrogation of Raeder concerning this book went as follows:

"Q. I have here a document, C-156, which is a photostatic
copy of the work prepared by the High Command of the
Navy, and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Ver-
sailles Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether
you are familiar with the work?

"A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.
"Q. Was that an official publication of the Germany navy?
"A. This Captain Schuessler, indicated there, was Com-
mander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was
an idea of these officers to put all these things together.
"Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the author-
ization to prepare such a work was given to him?

"A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he
told us here in the foreword.

"Q. In the preparation of this work he had access to the official naval files, and based his work on the items contained therein?

"A, Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, and he would have had the files, which were necessary. "Q. Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment?

"A. No, I don't think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published.

"Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?

"A. It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it.

"Q. It was not circulated outside of the naval circles?

"A. No.

"Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty?

"A. I don't remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They didn't belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an Industrialist; in Finland, too, and

they were built much later when we began to act with the English government about the Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but tried to have advantages. "Q. Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although actually avoiding it?

"A. That was their endeavor".

Raeder had his explanations:

"Q. Why was such a policy adopted?

"A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us; it was nonsense to them of attacking the Poles in this state, and for the Navy a second aim was to have some defense against the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, or East Sea, because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles from ships that came into the Ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. Quite defensive aims.

"Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in official circles in Germany would you say?

"A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don't know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German government ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers, Groner and Noske.

"Q. Then those views in your opinion were generally held existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the First World War?

"A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things."

The same kind of aims and purposes are reflected in the table

of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy (C-17). Although a copy of the book itself has not been found, the project was written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler's special military historian. The table of contents however, is available. It refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes in the documents, which evidently were intended as working material for the basis of the chapters to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The title of this table of contents fairly establishes the navy planning and preparations that were to get the Versailles Treaty out of the way, and to rebuild the navy strength necessary for war. Some of the headings in the table of contents read:

"Part A (1919-The year of Transition.)

"Chapter VII.

First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects.

"Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-JadeCanal, etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934; "Noskos' proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; "Formation of the "Naval Arsenal Kiel".

"(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.

"1. North Sea. Strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission-information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts."

"2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemunde;

"Salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable guns and mortars there.

"3. The beginnings of coastal air defense.