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The original plaque is now rubble. But a photograph of it was found in The National Library in Vienna. [The photograph was offered in evidence at the trial. See 2968-PS.] The plaque reads: “154 German men of 89 SS Standarte stood up here for Germany on July 26, 1934. Seven found death at the hands of the hangman". The words chosen for this marble tablet, and it may be presumed that they were words chosen carefully, reveal clearly that the men involved were not mere malcontent Austrian revolutionaries, but were regarded as German men, were members of a para-military organization, who stood up here "for Germany." In 1934 Hitler repudiated Dr. Rieth because he "dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason". In 1938 Nazi Germany proudly identified itself with this murder, took credit for it, and took responsibility for it.

(3) The Program Culminating in the Pact of July 11, 1936. In considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in Austria between 25 July 1934 and November 1937, there is a distinct intermediate point, the Pact of 11 July 1936. Accordingly, developments in the two-year period, July 1934 to July 1936, will first be reviewed.

(a) Continued Aim of Eliminating Austria's Independence -Conversation and Activities of von Papen. The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect the independence and sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of Anschluss stated in Mein Kampf. But in truth and in fact they were working from the very beginning to destroy the Austrian State.

A dramatic recital of the position of von Papen in this regard is provided in Mr. Messersmith's affidavit. It states:

“When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with 'Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the South and Southeast. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards

that end. He said that he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic. “The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between us and that he would of course, not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.”

"On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and others, and replace them by a few ‘nationally-minded' Austrians, which of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring about Anschluss. "In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, BergerWaldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the latter had remarked 'Yes, you have your

French and English friends now and you can have your inde-
pendence a little longer'. The Foreign Minister, of course,
told me this remark in German but the foregoing is an accu-
rate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had
replied to von Papen 'I am glad to have from your own lips
your own opinion which agrees with what your Chief has
just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains
to deny.'
Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particu-
larly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had
long favored the 'Grossdeutschum' idea, but who neverthe-
less had been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic
Church. Without conscience or scruple, von Papen exploited
his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout
Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this

respect.” (1760-PS) (6) Continued Existence of Nazi Organizations with a Program of Armed Preparedness. The wiles of von Papen represented only one part of the total program of the Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi activities in Austria, forced underground during this period, were carried on.

Mr. Messersmith's affidavit discloses the following: The Nazi organization, weakened in the events following the putsch, began reorganization work. An informant furnished the Austrian Government with a memorandum of a meeting of Austrian Nazi chiefs held in Bavaria, September, 1934. The memorandum shows that they agreed to prepare for new terroristic acts, to proceed brutally against persons cooperating with the Schuschnigg Government when the next action against the Government took place, and to appear disposed to negotiate but to arm for the struggle. A copy of this memorandum was furnished to Mr. Messersmith. At the same time the Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. This large, organized hostile group constituted a continuing menace for Austria. (1760-PS)

The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi party in Austria is corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis, Rainer (812-PS). (812-PS contains three parts. First there is a letter dated 22 August 1939 from Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to Seyss-Inquart, then Reich Minister. That letter encloses a letter dated 6 July 1939, written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Buerckel. In that letter, in turn, Rainer inclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to 11 March 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria.)

The letter from Rainer to Buerckel indicates that he was asked

to prepare a short history of the role of the party. He states that after the Anschluss Hitler and the general public gave Seyss-Inquart alone credit for effecting the Anschluss. It is Rainer's belief that credit belongs to the entire Party, the leaders of which had to remain underground. And so Rainer writes his report to show that the Party as a whole is entitled to "the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart”.

Apparently Seyss-Inquart heard from Buerckel what Rainer said, and wrote to Rainer asking for an explanation. To avoid misunderstanding, Rainer prepared for Seyss-Inquart a copy of his letter to Buerckel and his report.

The Rainer report tells of the disorganization of the Nazi party in Austria and of its reconstitution. The second and third paragraphs of the report state:

"Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with
the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was
right, the execution of it was faulty. The result was a com-
plete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire
groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the
‘Alt-Reich'; and with regard to the political relationship of
Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the exist-
ence of the Austrian State by the German Government.
With the telegram to PAPEN, instructing him to reinstitute
normal relationships between the two states, the Fuehrer
had liquidated the first stage of the battle; and a new method
of political penetration was to begin. By order of the Fueh-
rer the Landesleitung Munich was dissolved, and the party
in Austria was left to its own resources.
"There was no acknowledged leader for the entire party in
Austria. New leaderships were forming in the nine Gaus.
The process was again and again interrupted by the inter-
ference of the police; there was no liaison between the for-
mations, and frequently there were two, three or more rival
leaderships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of
almost all the Gaus in Autumn 1934 was engineer REIN-
THALLER (already appointed Landesbauernfeuhrer (lead-
er of the country's farmers) by Hess). He endeavored to
bring about a political appeasement by negotiations with the
government, with the purpose of giving the NSDAP legal
status again, thus permitting its political activities. Simul-
taneously Reinthaller started the reconstruction of the ille-
gal political organization, at the head of which he had

placed engineer NEUBACHER.(812-PS) (c) Secret Contacts Between German Officials, Including

Papen, and the Austrian Nazis: the Use by the Austrian Nazis of "Front" Personalities. Two cardinal factors about the Nazi organization in Austria should be borne in mind. First, although the Fuehrer had on the surface cast the Austrian Nazis adrift, in fact German officials, including Papen, maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis, in line with Hitler's desires. German officials consulted and gave advice and support to the organization of the Austrian Nazis. In the second place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal organization, organizing for the eventual use of force in an "emergency.” But in the meanwhile they deemed it expedient to act behind “front” personalities, such as Seyss-Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality.

Mr. Messersmith relates in his affidavit that he obtained a copy of a document outlining this Nazi program.

“For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch,
the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few
terroristic acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as
I recall in 1935 and most of 1936; this inactivity was in ac-
cordance with directives from Berlin as direct evidence to
that effect, which came to my knowledge at that time,
proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister,
Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I con-
sidered accurate in all respects and which stated:

'The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion
of his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by
Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations, and he
also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and von Neu-
rath. In these conversations the following instructions
were given to him:
‘During the next two years nothing can be undertaken
which will give Germany external political difficulties. On
this ground, everything must be avoided which could
awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the
internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, there-
fore, also for this reason not endeavor to intervene in the
present prevailing difficult crisis in the National So-
cialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that
order could be brought into the Party at once through a
word from him. This word, however, he will, for foreign
political reasons, give all the less, as he is convinced that
the, for him, desirable ends may be reached also in another
way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared to the German
Minister here, this does not indicate any disinterestedness
in the idea of Austria's independence. Also, before every-

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