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thing, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party
members in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the
very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring
help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in
Austria. As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht
finally gave the authorization that from then on 200,000
marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support
of National Socialists in Austria). The control and the
supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to
Engineer Reinthaller, who, through the fact that he alone
had control over the money, would have a definite influence
on the Party followers. In this way it would be possible to
end most quickly and most easily the prevailing difficulties
and division in the Austrian National Socialist Party.
"The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that
the recently authorized foundation of German “Orts-
gruppen" of the National Socialist Party in Austria
(made up of German citizens in Austria) would be so
arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is
planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs.'”

(1760-PS) The report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Buerckel in July 1939, outlines the further history of the party and the leadership squabbles following the retirement of Reinthaller. In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentions some of the contacts with the Reich Government in the following terms:

“In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleaders, also Globocnik and Rainer. SCHATTENFROH then claimed, because of an instruction received from the imprisoned LEOPOLD, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer RAFFELSBERGER had at this time also established connections with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German Racial Agency, etc.) and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a pro

gram for the fighting movement of Austria." (812-PS) The Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in 1936:

“The principles of the construction of the organization were: The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner, and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal


chances should be used without revealing any ties with the
illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the
illegal party organization and the legal political aides was
anchored at the top of the party leadership. All connections
with the party in Germany were kept secret in accordance
with the orders of the Fuehrer. These said that the German
state should officially be omitted from the creation of an
Austrian NSDAP; and that auxiliary centers for propa-
ganda, press, refugees, welfare, etc. should be established in
the foreign countries bordering Austria.
"Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart,
who had connections with Dr. Wachter which originated
from Seyss-Inquart's support of the July uprising. On the
other side Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field
and especially well-established relations with Christian-So-
cial politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of
the 'Styrian Heimatschutz' and became a party member
when the entire 'Styrian Heimatschutz' was incorporated
into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good posi-
tion in the legal field was Col. Glaise-Horstenau who had
contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was
strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons. Pa-
pen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the Fuehrer as being a

trusted person.(812-PS) The Rainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting developments. They were maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using "front” personalities such as GlaiseHorstenau and Seyss-Inquart. The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and could be referred to as “Nationalists". They presented, supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by out-and-out Nazis like Captain Leopold. Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was made Councillor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of the Styrian-Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of 11 July 1936.

That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust Seyss-Inquart, is indicated by a letter, dated 14 July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Goering (2219-PS). The letter ends with the "Heil Hitler" close and is not signed, but it was undoubtedly written by Seyss-Inquart. It was found among Seyss-Inquart's personal files. On the first page of the letter there

appears a note in ink, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading: "Air Mail. 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Goering's office.”

The main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession in behalf of one Muehlmann, who unfortunately got in Buerckel's bad graces. An extract from the letter, which shows Seyss-Inquart as one whose loyalty to Hitler and the aims of the Nazi conspiracy led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his disposal, reads:

At Present In Vienna, 14 July 1939 “To the General Field Marshal Sir:


"If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism (Aktivismus) this will certainly be regarded as a fault in my personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe. That is Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland) and the FUEHRER. And if some people are already tired out from the struggle and some have been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938. Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of the party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my membership dues the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931. I probably would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party member of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my friends had to fight against the whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my party comrades. I followed it calmly and would with

out hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve the FUEHRER as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which the FUEH

RER and the men close to him have of me." (2219-PS) A letter from Papen to Hitler dated 27 July 1935 shows how Papen thought the doctrines of National Socialism could be used to effect the aim of Anschluss. It consists of a report entitled "Review and Outlook, One Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss." After reviewing the success that the Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as a martyr and his principles as the patriotic principles of Austria, Papen stated:

“National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is only a centralized Reich German party and therefore unable to transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups of people of a different political makeup, the answer must rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not have been brought about in a different way. But when the creation of the people's community in the Reich will be completed, National socialism could, in a much wider sense than this is possible through the present party organization—at least apparently-, certainly become the rallying point for all racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become possible to effect a break-through into the front of the New Austria. A Nurnberg Party Day designated as "The German Day' as in old times and the proclamation of a national socialistic peoples' front, would be a stirring event for all beyond the borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the legitimistic Count Dubsky wrote in his pamphlet about the 'Anschluss': The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all. National Socialism must win it or it will perish, if it is unable to solve this task

*." (2248-PS) Other reports from Papen to Hitler, hereinafter mentioned, show that he maintained covert contact with the National Socialist groups in Austria. From the very start of his mission Papen was thinking of ways and means of using the principle of National

Socialism for “National Germans" outside the borders of Germany. Papen was working for Anschluss, and although he preferred to use the principles of National Socialism rather than rely on the party organization, he was prepared to defend the party organization as a necessary means of establishing those principles in the German Reich.

(d) Assurances and Reassurances. The German Government did more than keep up a pretense of noninterference with Austrian groups. It employed the psychologieal inducement of providing assurances that it had no designs on Austria's independence. If Austria could but hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the granting of concessions, and obtain relief from the economic and internal pressures.

A letter from Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated 17 May 1935, indicated that a forthright, credible statement by Germany reassuring Austria would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and the improvement of relationships between Austria and German groups in Austria (2247-PS). Papen had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Social-Christian forces against Starhemberg, the Vice-Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. He hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Papen indicated that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists. His letter states in part:

I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian-social Forces, who are opposed to a home front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him, in such way that he would submit the offer to the government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Capt. Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian-elements which favors the Greater Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition, then as a result of such a compromise the Austrian government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces. A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube pact, which


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