ment, and the two governments therefore had been undertaking conversations between each other. On 31 March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons. He explained the results of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments:

"As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their power. They have given the Polish government an assurance to this effect.

"I may add that the French government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government." (TC-72 No. 17) On 6 April, a week later, a formal communique was issued by the Anglo-Polish governments, which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before, and in which Poland assured Great Britain of her support should Great Britain be attacked. (TC-72 No. 18)

The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and Great Britain were feeling at that time appears to have been justified. During the same week, on 3 April, an order, signed by Keitel, emanated from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3 April 1939. The subject is "Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40." The order reads:

"Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued.

"Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

"Part II 'Fall Weiss' [the code name for the operation against Poland] is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will be appended later.

"The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to 'Fall Weiss':

"1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards.

"2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for 'Fall Weiss' and to arrange by conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches of the armed forces.

"3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of May, 1939." (C-120)

This order was distributed to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. Another document, dated 11 April, and signed by Hitler, is annexed. It reads:

"I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war.

"Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:

"I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and protection against surprise air attacks.

"II. 'Fall Weiss'.

"III. The annexation of Danzig.

"Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development." (C-120)

Again, copies of that document went to the OKH, OKM, and OKW. Annex I to this order, which concerns the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich, declares:

Legal Basis: It should be anticipated that a state of Defense or State of War, as defined in the Reichdefense law of the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be based on the laws valid in peacetime." (C-120)

The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, followed by the Anglo-Polish communique of 6 April, was seized upon by the Nazi government to urge on the crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland.

On 28 April the German government issued a memorandum in which they alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934 Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. The following are pertinent passages from that memorandum:

"The German government have taken note of the Polish

British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there had been concluded between the Polish government and the British government a temporary understanding to be released shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two states being directly or indirectly threatened." (TC-72 No. 14)

The memorandum goes on to set out in the next three paragraphs the history of German friendship towards Poland. It continues:

**

** The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish government with the British government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy.

"Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement is intended as a regular Pact of Alliance, which, by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations, is directed exclusively against Germany. "From the obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration.”

"The Polish government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German government. In view of this, the German government are obliged to conclude that the Polish government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct, friendly discussion with the German government. The Polish government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 to the shaping of German-Polish relations." (TC-72 No. 14)

All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued

and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable.

The memorandum goes on to set out the history of the last negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st which the German government had made for the return of Danzig, the autobahn, and the railway. It mentions the promise by Germany of the twenty-five year guarantee, and continues:

"The Polish government did not avail themselves of the op-. portunity offered to them by the German government for a just settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent strengthening of the friendly, neighbourly relations between the two countries. The Polish government even rejected German proposals made with this object. "At the same time the Polish government accepted, with regard to another state, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish declaration of the 26 of January, 1934. Thereby, the Polish government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void." (TC-72 No. 14) In the last paragraph the German government says, that nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland.

On the same day that memorandum was issued, 28 April, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag, in which he repeated, in effect, the terms of the memorandum. He repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in March, and went on to say that the Polish government have rejected his offer. He expressed his disappointment:

"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish government. But that alone is not the decisive fact. The worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia, a year ago, believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me. This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people, by a truly unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond

all doubt, that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the International Press, led, as you know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an obligation on the part of the Polish government for mutual assistance.

(TC-72 No. 13)

The speech demonstrates how completely dishonest was everything that the German government was saying at that time. Hitler, who may very well have had a copy of the orders for "Fall Weiss" in his pocket as he spoke, announced publicly, that the intention to attack by Germany was an invention of "the International Press."

In answer to that memorandum and that speech, the Polish government issued a memorandum on 5 May. It sets out the objectives of the 1934 agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries; to solve difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish government states its awareness of the difficulties about Danzig and declares that it has long been ready to carry out discussions. The Polish government sets out again its part of the recent discussions. The Polish government states that it communicated its views to the German government on 26 March, and that it then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and German governments of the City of Danzig, based on the principles of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. The Poles stated their preparedness to examine the possibilities of a motor road and railway facilities. They received no reply to those proposals. The Polish position is summarized in one sentence:

"It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland" (TC-72 No. 16).

The Polish government proceeds to reject the German accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the 1934 German-Polish agreement. It states that Germany herself has entered into similar agreements with other nations, and lastly it announces that it is still willing to entertain a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so. (TC-72 No. 16)

The German answer was contained in a letter from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, is signed by Hitler, and dated 10 May (C-120). Copies went to the various branches of the OKW, and with them apparently were enclosed "Instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy."