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"a. Possibility of supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen,
provisions.
. Repair opportunities for overhaul work after an encoun-
ter.
"c. Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews.
d. Flak protection, L.A. armament, petrol and M/S units.
"Secondly, establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel

in Narvik as an alternative." (C-5) In October 1939 Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian aggression and had not yet committed himself to it. Raeder persevered in pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this stage he found a powerful ally in Rosenberg.

C. Use of the Fifth Column: Quisling.

The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery as a political weapon are now proven historical facts. Should further proof be required, it is found in a “Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party (Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP) from 1933 to 1943" (007-PS). This was Rosenberg's Bureau. The report reads:

“When the Foreign Affairs Bureau (Aussenpolitische Amt)
was established on the 1st of April 1933, the Fuehrer directed
that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency,
but should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative
and suggestions.
Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude
adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the be-
ginning, the newly-established Bureau devoted particular at-
tention to internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as
to the effects of World Bolshevism primarily in other Euro-
pean countries. It entered into contact with the most varie-
gated groups inclining towards National Socialism in com-
batting Bolshevism, focussing its main attention on Nations
and States bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one hand,
those Nations and states constituted an Insulating Ring en-
circling the Bolshevist neighbor; on the other hand they
were the laterals of German living space and took up a flank-
ing position towards the Western Powers, especially Great
Britain. In order to wield the desired influence by one means
or another, the Bureau was compelled to use the most vary-
ing methods, taking into consideration the completely differ-
ent living conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history
of the movements observed by the Bureau in those countries.

“In Scandinavia an outspokenly pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based on economic consideration, had become progressively more dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the Bureau put the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic Society in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely political cooperation in Sweden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very close relations were established with its founder, which led to further conse

quences.” (007-PS) There follows an account of the activity of Rosenberg's Bureau in various parts of the world. The last paragraph of the main body of the report reads in part:

"With the outbreak of war, the Bureau was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections in many lands can be resumed under a

different guise." (007-PS) The Annex to the report shows what the "exploitation of personal connections" involved. Annex One to the document is headed, “To Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.” The subheading is "The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway During the War Years 1939-1940". The annex reads:

As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scan-
dinavia, only 'Nasjonal Samling', led in Norway by the for-
mer Minister of War and Major of the Reserve, Vidkun
Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a
fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater
Germanic Community. Naturally, all ruling powers were
hostile and attempted to prevent, by any means, its success
among the population. The Bureau maintained constant
liaison with Quisling and attentively observed the attacks he
conducted with tenacious energy on the middle class, which
had been taken in tow by the English.
"From the beginning, it appeared probable that without rev-
olutionary events, which would stir the population from their
former attitude, no successful progress of Nasjonal Samling
was to be expected. During the winter 1938-1939, Quisling
was privately visited by a member of the Bureau.
"When the political situation in Europe came to a head in

1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention of the
Nordic Society in Luebeck in June. He expounded his con-
ception of the situation, and his apprehensions concerning
Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopoliti-
cally decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian
area, and to the advantages that would accrue to the power
dominating the Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between
the Greater German Reich and Great Britain.
"Assuming that his statement would be of special interest to
the Marshal of the Reich Goering for aero-strategical rea-
sons, Quisling was referred to State Secretary Koerner by
the Bureau. The Staff Director of the Bureau handed the
Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmis-

sion to the Fuehrer." (007-PS) This document is another illustration of the close interweaving between the political and military leadership of the Nazi State. Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann, admitted his collaboration with Rosenberg (C-66). The second paragraph of the Raeder report, headed “Weseruebung," reads as follows:

"In the further developments, I was supported by Commander Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-Chief personally-in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me—with the approval of Reichsleiter

Rosenberg." (C-66) The details of the manner in which Raeder made contact personally with Quisling are not clear. In a report from Rosenberg to Raeder, however, the full extent of Quisling's preparedness for treachery and his potential usefulness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed to Raeder. The second paragraph of this report reads as follows:

"The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing (the Norwegian Parliament) had, in defense of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter, Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that, if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished.” (C-65)

Then came the details of a plot to overthrow the government of
Norway by the traitor Quisling, in collaboration with Rosenberg:

"A plan has been put forward which deals with the possi-
bility of a coup, and which provides for a number of selected
Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed
for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and pro-
vided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who
are practiced in such operations. These trained men should
then proceed with all speed to Norway, where details would
then require to be further discussed. Some important cen-
ters in Oslo would have to be taken over immediately, and at
the same time the German Fleet, together with suitable con-
tingents of the German Army, would go into operation when
summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a
specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no
doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with instan-
taneous success—would immediately bring him the approval
of those sections of the Army with which he at present has
connections, and thus it goes without saying that he has
never discussed a political fight with them. As far as the
King is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an
accomplished fact.
“Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops re-

quired which accord with German calculations." (C-65) Subsequent developments are indicated in a report by Raeder of his meeting with Hitler on 12 December 1939 at 1200 hours, in the presence of Keitel, Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler. The report is headed “Norwegian Question", and the first sentence reads:

“C-in-C Navy” (Raeder) “has received Quisling and Hagelin.

Quisling creates the impression of being reliable.” (C-64) There then follows, in the next two paragraphs, a statement of Quisling's views. The fourth paragraph reads:

“The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so
that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see
Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known
Quisling for a long while. C-in-C Navy" [Raeder] "suggests
that if the Fuehrer forms a favorable impression, the OKW
should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the
preparation and carrying out of the occupation.
(a) By peaceful means; that is to say, German forces sum-
moned by Norway, or
(6) To agree to do so by force." (C-64)

It was at a meeting on 12 December that Raeder made the above report to Hitler. Raeder's record of these transactions reports the next event:

"Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me, with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosen

berg." (C-66) A note at the bottom of the page states:

"At the crucial moment, R" (presumably Rosenberg) "hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of

the 14th of December." (C-66) That is Raeder's note, and it indicates the extent of his contact in this conspiracy. The report continues:

"On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling
and Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December, the
Fuehrer gave the order that the preparations for the Nor-
wegian operation were to be made by the Supreme Com-
mand of the Armed Forces.
“Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part
in the development of the Norwegian question, and continued
to be somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations, which
were undertaken by Captain Kranke in the Supreme Com-
mand of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a

memorandum of the Naval War Staff.” (C-66) Raeder's note referring to the "crucial" moment was an appropriate one, for on the same day that it was written, 14 December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Rosenberg's report on the activities of his organization deals with further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December. The extract reads:

"Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer
on 16 December, and once more on 18 December. In the
course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly
that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude
of Norway, as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did
not intend to enlarge the theatre of war and to draw still
other nations into the conflict.
“Should the enemy attempt to extend the war however, with
the aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of

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