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The entry in Jodi's diary for 5 March reads:
"Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about
(1809-PS) The entry for 13 March is one of the most remarkable in the documentation of this case.
"Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W' (Weser Exercise).
He is still looking for an excuse.” (1809-PS) The entry of the next day, 14 March, shows a similar preoccupation on the part of Hitler with the search for an excuse for this aggression. It reads:
"English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for ‘Weser Exercise.''
(1809-PS) The entry for 21 March reads:
"Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst's Force, detailed to conduct the invasion] about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military
measures taken, and even exaggerate them.” (1809-PS) The entry of 28 March reads:
"Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning
Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo
will have to remain occupied by naval forces.” (1809-PS) The entry for 2 April reads:
"Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carry
ing out of the Weser Exercise for April 9th.” (1809-PS) The entry for 4 April reads:
"Fuehrer drafts the proclamation. Piepenbrock, Chief of Military Intelligence 1, returns with good results from the
talks with Quisling in Copenhagen.” (1809-PS) From the large number of operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, two may be cited to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and deception that was used by the conspirators in the course of that aggression. The first dated 4 April 1940, reads in part:
The barrage-breaking vessels (Sperrbrechers) will penetrate inconspicuously, and with lights on, into Oslo Fjord, disguised as merchant steamers. "Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not
giving away the operation before zero hour." (C-115) An order for reconnaissance forces, dated 24 March 1940, entitled “Behavior during entrance into the harbor," reads in part:
“The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as pos-
H.M.S. Cairo “Koenigsberg
H.M.S. Calcutta “Bromso
H.M.S. Faulkner “Karl Peters
H.M.S. Halcyon “Leopard
British destroyer “Wolf
British destroyer “E-boats
British motor torpedo boats “Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke." (C-115)
An order dated 24 March 1940, classified "Most Secret," provides:
"Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft. To challenge in case of the ‘Koeln' H.M.S. Cairo. Then to order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal. (2) Impossible to understand your signal. In case of a warning shot: Stop firing. British ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as to destination and purpose: Going Bergen.
Chasing German steamers." (C-115) Doenitz's order in connection with this operation is headed "Top Secret, Operation Order 'Hartmut.'”
"Occupation of Denmark and Norway. This order comes
The naval force will as they enter the harbor fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.” (C-151)
E. Nazi Justification of Invasion.
On 9 April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun, a German memorandum was handed to the governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action (TC-55). That memorandum alleges that England and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of international law; that Britain and France are making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway; and that the government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation. The memorandum further states:
“The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, so long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France. German military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting
the north against proposed occupation of Norwegian strong
points by English-French forces." (TC-55) In connection with that statement it may be recalled that in his operation order on 1 March Hitler had given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That was on 1 March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on 9 April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocracy and military threat:
"The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German forces employed, and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops can take place without friction and difficulty. In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Nor
way now or in the future.” (TC-55) What the Nazis meant by "protection of the kingdom of Norway" was shown by their conduct on 9 April.
A report by the Commander in Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces states :
The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their country and at the same time to prevent allied intervention it was planned to capture all the more important towns along the coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament and other military and civilian people occupying important positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new government with Quisling as the head."
"The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser 'Blucher', carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the surprise of the attack; resistance was organized
throughout the country.” (TC-56) What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the Royal Danish Government (D-628). An extract from it reads:
"Extracts from the Memorandum concerning Germany's at-