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The entry in Jodi's diary for 5 March reads:

"Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about
‘Weser Exercise.' Field Marshal in a rage because not con-
sulted till now. Won't listen to anyone and wants to show
that all preparations so far made are worthless.
“Result: (a) Stronger forces to Narvik.
(6) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in
"(c) Christiansand can be left out at first.
"(d) Six divisions envisaged for Norway.
(e) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen."

(1809-PS) The entry for 13 March is one of the most remarkable in the documentation of this case.

"Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W' (Weser Exercise).

He is still looking for an excuse.” (1809-PS) The entry of the next day, 14 March, shows a similar preoccupation on the part of Hitler with the search for an excuse for this aggression. It reads:

"English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans. Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for ‘Weser Exercise.''

(1809-PS) The entry for 21 March reads:

"Misgivings of Task Force 21 [Falkenhorst's Force, detailed to conduct the invasion] about the long interval between taking up readiness positions at 05.30 hours and close of diplomatic negotiations. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken. The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military

measures taken, and even exaggerate them.” (1809-PS) The entry of 28 March reads:

"Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning
the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst
and the other two commanders are worrying about matters
which are none of their business. Franke sees more disad-
vantages than advantages.
“In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly
declares that he won't stand for the Navy clearing out of the

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Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo

will have to remain occupied by naval forces.” (1809-PS) The entry for 2 April reads:

"Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm preparations completed. Fuehrer orders carry

ing out of the Weser Exercise for April 9th.” (1809-PS) The entry for 4 April reads:

"Fuehrer drafts the proclamation. Piepenbrock, Chief of Military Intelligence 1, returns with good results from the

talks with Quisling in Copenhagen.” (1809-PS) From the large number of operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, two may be cited to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and deception that was used by the conspirators in the course of that aggression. The first dated 4 April 1940, reads in part:

The barrage-breaking vessels (Sperrbrechers) will penetrate inconspicuously, and with lights on, into Oslo Fjord, disguised as merchant steamers. "Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not

giving away the operation before zero hour." (C-115) An order for reconnaissance forces, dated 24 March 1940, entitled “Behavior during entrance into the harbor," reads in part:

“The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as pos-
sible. All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will be an-
swered in English. In answer to questions a text with some-
thing like the following content will be chosen:
“Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.
“Challenges to be answered with names of British warships:

H.M.S. Cairo “Koenigsberg

H.M.S. Calcutta “Bromso

H.M.S. Faulkner “Karl Peters

H.M.S. Halcyon “Leopard

British destroyer “Wolf

British destroyer “E-boats

British motor torpedo boats “Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke." (C-115)

An order dated 24 March 1940, classified "Most Secret," provides:

"Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft. To challenge in case of the ‘Koeln' H.M.S. Cairo. Then to order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal. (2) Impossible to understand your signal. In case of a warning shot: Stop firing. British ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as to destination and purpose: Going Bergen.

Chasing German steamers." (C-115) Doenitz's order in connection with this operation is headed "Top Secret, Operation Order 'Hartmut.'

"Occupation of Denmark and Norway. This order comes
into force on the codeword 'Hartmut.' With its coming into
force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose
their validity.
“The day and hour are designated as ‘Weser-Day' and 'We-
ser-Hour', and the whole operation is known as 'Weserue-
"The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the
rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously
Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land

The naval force will as they enter the harbor fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.” (C-151)



E. Nazi Justification of Invasion.

On 9 April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun, a German memorandum was handed to the governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action (TC-55). That memorandum alleges that England and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of international law; that Britain and France are making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway; and that the government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation. The memorandum further states:

“The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, so long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France. German military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting

the north against proposed occupation of Norwegian strong

points by English-French forces." (TC-55) In connection with that statement it may be recalled that in his operation order on 1 March Hitler had given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for air warfare against Britain. That was on 1 March. And this is the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on 9 April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to Norway and Denmark are a classic Nazi combination of diplomatic hypocracy and military threat:

"The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German forces employed, and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops can take place without friction and difficulty. In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Nor

way now or in the future.” (TC-55) What the Nazis meant by "protection of the kingdom of Norway" was shown by their conduct on 9 April.

A report by the Commander in Chief of the Royal Norwegian Forces states :

The Germans, considering the long lines of communications and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In order to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend their country and at the same time to prevent allied intervention it was planned to capture all the more important towns along the coast simultaneously. Members of the Government and Parliament and other military and civilian people occupying important positions were to be arrested before organized resistance could be put into effect and the King was to be forced to form a new government with Quisling as the head."



"The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan with only slight losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser 'Blucher', carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his division, technical staffs and specialists who were to take over the control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture the King and members of the Government and Parliament failed in spite of the surprise of the attack; resistance was organized

throughout the country.” (TC-56) What happened in Denmark is described in a memorandum prepared by the Royal Danish Government (D-628). An extract from it reads:

"Extracts from the Memorandum concerning Germany's at-
titude towards Denmark before and during the occupation,
prepared by the Royal Danish Government.
“On the 9th of April, 1940 at 4.20 hours the German Minis-
ter appeared at the private residence of the Danish Minister
for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Air Attache of the
Legation. The appointment had been made by a telephone
call from the German Legation to the Secretary General of
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 4.00 o'clock the same
morning. The Minister said at once that Germany had posi-
tive proof that Great Britain intended to occupy bases in
Denmark and Norway. Germany had to safeguard Denmark
against this. For this reason German soldiers were now
crossing the frontier and landing at various points in Zea-
land including the port of Copenhagen; in a short time Ger-
man bombers would be over Copenhagen; their orders were
not to bomb until further notice. It was now up to the Danes
to prevent resistance as any resistance would have the most
terrible consequences. Germany would guarantee Denmark's
territorial integrity and political independence. Germany
would not interfere with the internal government of Den-
mark, but wanted only to make sure of the neutrality of the
country. For this purpose the presence of the German Wehr-
macht in Denmark was required during the war.
“The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the
allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was
completely without foundation; there was no possibility of

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