Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB
[ocr errors]

134), 15 i 2.2. VEE 2: A:12: presented the Greek Goters

* *? but on the expirados of ich 12:25 STUPE were recy irragibe so of Greece.

Then* *28 TEETH OF tbe British Virger at A:bers in Este sis:

"Toe president of the ordeal tas assured traf as oct#20z piest in Grok kistory and staterer the future 1.ay bring. tis foresight in zietis preparing his country for sarad bis es rage in rejecting without decur the latan

irratum when delivered in the strall hours of that October morning, wil ere; outain an honorable mention in the story of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is comBetely deivatsi ard this reflects the purpose of the whole

Greek nation." A letter from Hiter to Mussolini, which is undated but which - this is clear from the contents-must have been written shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 November 1940, contained these sentirrents:

Jugoslavia must become disinterested, if possible however
from our point of view interested in cooperating in the
liquidation of the Greek questicn. Without assurances from
Jugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in
the Balkans.
Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war
in the Balkans before March is impossible. Therefore, any
threatening move towards Jugoslavia would be useless, since
the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before
March is well known to the Serbian general staff. There-
fore, Jugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by

other means and other ways." (2762-PS) It was at this time that Hitler was making his plans for the offensive in the Spring of 1941, which included the invasion of Greece from the north. It was an integral part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to cooperate in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude towards the liquidation of the other Balkan States. These facts are disclosed in a "Top Secret Directive" issued from the Fuehrer's Headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by Jodl, and dated 12 November 1940. This order reads, in part:

"Directive No. 18.
“The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecu-
tion of the war in the near future are to be made along the
following lines.*

*" (444-PS)

After sections dealing with operations against Gibraltar and an offensive against Egypt, the order continues :

Balkans
“The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make prepara-
tions for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean
Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus
make possible the use of German air force units against tar-
gets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against
those English air bases which are threatening the Rumanian
oil area.
"In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep
Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approxi-
mate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the
planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be
possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia,
for moving these forces into position.
“So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, prepa-
rations will be made for an early increase in the German
Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be
submitted to me.
The commander-in-chief of the Air Force will make prepa-
rations for the use of German Air Force units in the South
East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern
border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground

operations." (444-PS)
The positions of the Italian invading forces in Greece in
December 1940 may be summarized in the words in which the
British Minister reported to Foreign Secretary Eden:

“The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the highest, and our own naval and land successes at Tarento and in the Western Desert have done much to maintain it. With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equipment and modern facilities they have driveno back or captured superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that they are not unworthy of the ancient tradition of their country and that they, like their distant forbears, are prepared to fight against odds to maintain their free

dom.” In fact, the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time that Hitler came to the rescue with the order for the German attack on Greece.

This Directive of 13 December 1940, which is Top Secret Directive number 20, dealing with Operation Marita, bears a

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO AGGRESSION AGAINST BELGUIM,

THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

Document

Description

Vol.

Page

*1809-PS

377

*2329-PS

1037

*3054-PS

801

*C-10

817

*C-62

880

*C-72

893

*L-52

Entries from Jodi's diary, Febru-
ary 1940 to May 1940. (GB 88)...IV
Order by Commander in Chief of
the Army, 7 October 1939. (GB
105)...

IV
"The Nazi Plan", script of a mo-
tion picture composed of captured
German film. (USA 167)..

V
OKW directive, 28 November
1939, signed by Keitel, subject:
Employment of 7th Flieger Divi-
sion. (GB 108)..

VI
Directive No. 6 on the conduct of
war, signed by Hitler, 9 October
1939; directive by Keitel, 15 Octo-
ber 1939 on Fall "Gelb”. (GB 106). VI
Orders postponing "A" day in the
West, November 1939 to May
1940. (GB 109).

VI
Memorandum and Directives for
conduct of war in the West, 9 Oc-
tober 1939. (USA 540). ...

VII
Minutes of conference, 23 May
1939, "Indoctrination on the poli-
litical situation and future aims”.
(USA 27).....

VII
Hague Convention (3) Relative to
opening of Hostilities. (GB2)..... VIII
Hague Convention (5) Respecting
Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in War on
Land. (GB 2)....

VIII
Arbitration Convention between
Germany and Belgium at Locarno,
16 October 1925. (GB 15).....

VINI
Convention of Arbitration and
conciliation between Germany and
the Netherlands, signed at The
Hague, 20 May 1926. (GB 97).. VIII

800

*L-79

847

*TC-3

279

*TC-4

282

*TC-13

320

*TC-16

337

distribution list which shows that copies went to the Commander of the Navy (Raeder), to the Commander of the Air Force (Goering), to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Keitel), and to the Command Staff (Jodl). The first two paragraphs state:

“The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive.
Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly
necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create air
bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would
be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian
oil fields.
"My plan, therefore, is (a) to form a slowly increasing task
force in Southern Rumania within the next months. (6)
After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in
March, to send the task force for the occupation of the
Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary
to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita).

The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.” (1541-PS) The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and paragraph 4 deals with the operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5 states:

“The Military preparations which will produce exceptional
political results in the Balkans demand the exact control of
all the necessary measures by the General Staff. The
transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania
will be reported step by step by the General Staff of the
Armed Forces, and are to be explained at first as a strength-
ening of the German Army mission in Rumania.
"Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which
may point to our intentions as well as notification of the
Italians are each subject to my consent, also the sending

of scouting missions and advanced parties.” (1541-PS) Another “Top Secret Directive” carries the plan a little farther. It deals with decisive action in support of the Italian forces in Tripoli and in Albania. The first short paragraph reads:

“The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations demands for strategical political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by

England against our allies." (448-PS) Paragraph three, after dealing with the forces to be transferred to Albania, sets out what the duties of the German forces will be:

"a. To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there.

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »