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exception of Russians, who eventually can be used as ad-
visors for the administration of the various nationalities.
Continuous discussions about this subject are under way
with representatives of the OKW, the propaganda ministry,
etc. Secondly a department of economic-political coopera-
tion has been founded under direction of Oberbereichsleiter
Malletke. A department of 'Law, Finance, and Administra-
tion' has been taken over by Regierungspraesident Runte.
A department for Culture and Science is as yet unoccupied
since the development of this question does not appear ur-
gent. Also the department 'Enlightenment and Press'. It
is occupied by Major of the Air Force Carl Cranz, deputy
Job Zimmermann. Integrated here are co-workers who
command the Russian, Ukrainian, and other languages. The
wishes of the Reich Press Chief (Reichspressechef) for set-
ting up one press chief for each Reichskommissar are under
discussion in order to decide them in that sense if possible.
"Thus I hope that when, after preliminary conclusion of the
military action the Fuehrer has the possibility for a report
from me, I shall be able to report to the Fuehrer far reach-
ing preparations, up to those points of special and personal
nature which the Fuehrer alone can decide." (1039-PS)

(As a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff, it will be shown how all this planning and preparation for the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor were actually carried out. The planned execution of intelligentsia, and other Russian leaders was, for example, but a part of the actual operation of the program to destroy the Soviet Union politically and make impossible its early resurrection as a European Power.)

Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out their plans and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the borders of the U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the world, Hitler issued a proclamation on the day of the attack, which declared: “I have therefore today decided to give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers."

This announcement told the world that the die had been cast: that the plans darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly and continuously developed since then, had now been brought to fruition. The Nazi conspirators, having carefully and completely planned and prepared this war of aggression, now proceeded to initiate and wage it.

F. The Motives for the Attack.

It should first be pointed out that not only was Germany bound by solemn covenant not to attack the U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period from August 1939 to the invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union was faithful to its agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions toward the territories of the German Reich. General Thomas, for example, points out in his draft of "Basic Facts for a History of the German War and Armaments Economy" (2353-PS), that insofar as the German-Soviet trade agreement of 11 August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliveries thereunder up to the very end. Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually made quickly and well, and since the food and raw material being thus delivered was considered essential to the German economy, efforts were made to keep up their side too. However, as preparations for the campaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about maintaining their obligations. At page 315 of his book Thomas says:

“Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished,
as preparations for the campaign in the East were already
under way.
"The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right
up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days,
transports of India-rubber from the Far East were com-

pleted by Express transit trains." (2353-PS) Again at page 404, Thomas brings this point out even more forcefully:

"In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June, 1941, the negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries, when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous individual negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the

equipment to go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.”

(2353-PS) Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to its treaty obligations with Germany, but she had no aggressive intentions toward German territory. A file on Russo-German relations found in the files of the Naval High Command, covering the entire period from the treaty to the attack (C-170), demonstrates this point conclusively. It will be sufficient to quote a few entries, which include reports from the German ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. Entry 165 reads:

"165 A 22,29 4 June
“Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia.
Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian gov-
ernment is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict

with Germany." (C-170) Entry 167 reads:

167 A 22.53 6 June
Ambassador in Moscow reports

* Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly—as far as can be recognized only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany as

good.” (C-170)
Entry 169 also reiterates this point:

"169 A 22.65 7 June
“From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow
All observations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone
are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing every-
thing to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior
of the Government, as well as the attitude of the press, which
reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indis-
putable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of
the economic treaty with Germany proves the same thing.”

(C-170) The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet Union could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. No doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the materials presented on planning and preparation, more than one motive entered into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression against the U.S.S.R. All of them, however, appear to

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blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these varied reasons fall is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version of an earlier imperial imperative, Drang Nach Osten," had been a cardinal principle of the Party almost since its birth, and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement. Politically, such action meant elimination of the powerful force to the East, which might constitute a threat to German ambition, and acquisition of Lebensraum. Economically, it offered opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies. Undoubtedly the demands of the German War economy for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness of the economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent.

As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in Mein Kampf, where he stated, at page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin English edition:

“There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a spe-
cial examination the relation of Germany to Russia:
“1. Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive con-
cern of all German foreign affairs; and
"2. This question is also the touchstone for the political ca-
pacity of the young National Socialist movement to think

clearly and to act correctly."
Again, at page 654 of the same edition:

"And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line be-
neath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We
take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop
the endless German movement to the south and west, and
turn our gaze toward the land in the east. At long last we
break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war
period and shift to the soil policy of the future.
“If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have

in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.” The political portion of this dichotomy of purpose is clearly reflected in the stated purposes, previously discussed, of the organization, which Rosenberg set up to administer the occupied Eastern Territories. In a speech which Rosenberg delivered, two days before the attack, to the people most interested in the problem of the East, he restated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its interrelationship with

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the economic goal (1058-PS). A short extract from that speech reads as follows:

"The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there (Wagon Factories, etc.). The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years. For the Russian soul has been torn in the struggle of the last 200 years. The original Russians are excellent artistic craftsmen, dancers and musicians. They have certain hereditary talents, but these talents are different from these of the Western people. The fight between Turgenjew and Dostejewsky was symbolic for the nation. The Russian soul found no outlet, either way. If we now close the West to the Russians, they might become conscious of their own inborn, proper forces and of the area to which they belong. An historian will maybe see this decision in a different light, in hundreds of years than it might appear to a Russian today.”

(1058-PS) As has been indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat Britain had served further to strengthen them in their belief in the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of Europe.

The economic motive for the aggression was disclosed in the previous discussion of the organization set up under Goering and General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of the territory to be occupied. The purely materialistic basis for the attack was unmistakable. If any doubt existed that at least one of

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