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ing war against France and Great Britain. The Nazi conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side. of the world.
The nations against whom the German-Japanese collaboration was aimed, at various times, were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America.
(1) Exhortations to Attack the British Commonwealth. At least as early as 23 February 1941 the Nazi conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British Commonwealth. Again the figure of Ribbentrop appears. On that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible. (1834-PS)
As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation of the report of that conference, Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers for their "strictly confidential and purely personal information,” with the further note that "these statements are of fundamental significance for orientation in the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.” The report stated, in part:
“Extract "from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.”
"After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM [Reich Foreign Minister] declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He [the RAM] regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.
Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance
the question of its further development now stands in the
foreground. How is the situation in this respect? (1834-PS) Ribbentrop subsequently proceeded to shape the argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and U-boat warfare against England, he said:
* * Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.'
"The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would en-
carry through this policy.” (1834-PS) The subtlety of Ribbentrop's argument is noteworthy. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless, he suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan's aid and that the moment was propitious for Japan's entry. Then, referring to the spoils of conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would have to earn her share of the booty.
The remainder of Ribbentrop's argument shows something of the real nature of the German-Japanese alliance:
"The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indo-China). England too was considerably weakened; Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both
nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea. “Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with
this thought." (1834-PS) The instigation to war by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, is clear. The participation of the German military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of wars of aggression is shown in a Top Secret order signed by Keitel as Chief of the OKW and entitled "Basic Order No. 24 Regarding Collaboration with Japan” (C-75). It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop's conference with Oshima, just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as to the Foreign Office. Two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten notations presumably made by the recipients, were turned up by the prosecution. Document C-75 is Copy No. 2 of the order, distributed to the Naval War Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (the OKM). Copy No. 4, designed for the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab—the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces—was found in the OKW files at Flensburg. The head of this Operations Staff was Jodl.
Basic Order No. 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration with Japan (C-75). It reads:
“Only by Officer
Joint Operations Staff, Branch L (I Op.)
5 March 1941 Various handwritten notations and stamps]
"Basic Order No. 24
regarding collaboration with Japan "The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan: "1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific. "The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. [Marginal note "slightly exaggerated"] "2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available. “For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.