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"In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself.

"3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command. "This will be subject to the following guiding principles: "a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.

"b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.

"c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.

"d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.

"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power-extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented-will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).

"A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.

"4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.

"The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.

"5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.

"The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command

"Signed in draft: Keitel

"Correctness certified by

JUNGE

Lieutenant Commander" (C–75)

It appears from this document that the Nazi conspirators' cardinal operational principle in their collaboration with Japan was, as early as March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other British Far Eastern bases.

A meeting was held on 18 March 1941, about two weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 (C-75) and was attended by Hitler, Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl. The top secret record of this meeting discloses that Raeder, then Commander in Chief of the Navy, made the following calculations:

"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

"Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible." (C–152)

The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. Another passage in the record of this meeting establishes this:

"Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England." (C-152)

Apparently the Nazis, were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the contract.

Meanwhile, Ribbentrop continued to make further efforts to

induce the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On 29 March 1941, he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. The following is a report of their conversations, found in the German Foreign Office Archives:

"REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM)
AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MAT-
SUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.
"The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Mat-
suoka about the latter's impending talks with the, Russians
in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion,
that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situ-
ation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far.
He did not know how the situation would develop. One
thing, however, was certain, namely, that Germany would
strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan.
He
was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that
Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, with-
out fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest
part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern fron-
tiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at
any time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia
would try to avoid development leading to war. Should Ger-
many however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR
would be finished off within a few months. In this case,
Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid than ever,
if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need
not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible
fears of Russia.

"He could not know of course, just how things with Russia
would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would
intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He
(the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case.
that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of
possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the
Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between
Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the
situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not
probable, would have to be considered possible."

"Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines, based on the Philippines, and of the

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intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the U. S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not bother about them at all.

“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

"The RAM replied that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this. reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American president, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

"In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore. "In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: "You open fire, then the nation will be united." The Japanese need to be

shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not."

"Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which, had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.

"The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer-who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time-could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately,

"Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications. "The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael. which he could make available to the Japanese.

"Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger, expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese raval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for six months. L. however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year. the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

“gat a" avoidable, he wou'd met touch the Netherland East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese arracs on this area, the of le'ds would be set aire. They would be brought the operation again only after 1 or 2 years. "The RAM aided that daran would gain fecisive infuence over the Netherland Fast Indies simultaneously with the capite of Sugapore." 1377-28

On 3 April, about a week ather the conference ust note. 38

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