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Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication and said: "We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September 1939.” What does this new event mean?

In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy—much too easy-to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered. Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive. December 4. Thursday "Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of provoking America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it. December 5. Friday “A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackenson to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do

so, and the latter was very glad I hadn't * *" (2987-PS) It appears from the last entry that some sort of agreement was reached. On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan without previous warning or declaration of war commenced an attack against the United States at Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth of Nations in the Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 December, four days after the Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German Government declared war on the United States. (2507-PS)

The same day, 11 December 1941, the Congress of the United States resolved that “the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared". (2945-PS)

It thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions and declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi conspirators in their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the United States. While maintaining their preference that the United States not be involved in the war at the time, they nevertheless foresaw the distinct possibility, even probability of such involvement as a result of the actions they were encouraging; they were aware that the Japanese had prepared plans for attack against the United States; and they accepted the consequences by assuring the Japanese that they would declare war on the United States should a U.S.-Japanese conflict result. In dealing with captured documents of the enemy, the completeness of the plan is necessarily obscured. But those documents which have been discovered, and introduced into evidence before the Tribunal, show that the Japanese attack was the proximate and foreseeable consequence of their collaboration policy, and that their exhortations and encouragement of the Japanese as surely led to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself had been mentioned.

The entry in the Ciano Diary for 8 December 1941 gives an interesting sidelight on Ribbentrop's reaction to the Japanese sneak attack:

December 8.
A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed
about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about
it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about
the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now
certain: that America will enter the conflict, and that the
conflict will be so long that she will be able to realize all her
potential force. This morning I told this to the King who
had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting
that in the “long run” I may be right. Mussolini was happy
too. For a long time he has favored a definite clarification

of relations between America and the Axis.” (2987-PS) A conference was held between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop. The subject matter was the Pearl Harbor attack. The top secret notes of this conference read in part:

First the Fuehrer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his serv


ices in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation,
which has now obtained its culmination in a close brother-
hood of arms.
“General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor
and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms
has now come about between Germany and Japan.
"The Fuehrer continues: “You gave the right declaration of
war!” This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it
formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to
negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees that the other
is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humili.
ating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then
one should strike-as hard as possible, indeed—and not waste
time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear of
the first operations of the Japanese. He himself negotiated
with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and
also with Russia. When he then realized, that the other did
not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and
without formalities. He would continue to go this way in the


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number indicates that the docu-
ment was referred to during the
trial but was not formally received
in evidence, for the reason given in
parentheses following the descrip-
tion of the document. The USA
series number, given in paren-
theses following the description of
the document, is the official exhibit
number assigned by the court.






Top secret memorandum signed
by Major Falkenstein, 29 October
1940, concerning current military
questions, including question of
occupation of Atlantic Islands re-
ferring to the United States. (USA

Report from German Military At-
tache in Tokyo to Office Foreign
Intelligence, 24 May 1941. (USA

Report on conference between
Ribbentrop and Oshima, 23 Feb-
ruary 1941. (USA 129)...

Record of conversation between
Reich Foreign Minister and the
Duce, 13 May 1941. (GB 273).... IV
Report on conversation between
Ribbentrop and Matsuoka in Ber-
lin, 29 March 1941. (USA 152).... IV
Notes on conference between Hit-
ler and Matsuoka in presence of
Ribbentrop, in Berlin, 4 April
1941. (USA 33)....

Notes on conference between Rib-
bentrop and Matsuoka in Berlin,
5 April 1941. (USA 153)..










526 Document


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File memorandum on conversation
with Oshima, 31 January 1939,
signed Himmler. (USA 150)...... IV
Protocol of Adherence by Italy to
Anti-Comintern Pact, 6 Novem-
ber 1937, published in Documents
of German Politics, 1940, 4th edi-

Note from Ribbentrop to U. S.
Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, 11 De-
cember 1941, containing German
Declaration of War on United
States, published in Documents of
German Politics, Vol. IX, Part 1,
No. 74, pp. 497-9. (USA 164)... V
German-Japanese Agreement
against the Communist Interna-
tional, 25 November 1936, signed
by Ribbentrop. Documents of
German Politics, Vol. 4. (GB 147). V
Announcement concerning Three-
Power Pact between Germany,
Italy and Japan, 27 September
1940, signed by Ribbentrop for
Germany. 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part II, No. 41, p. 279. (USA 149). V
Telegram from Ribbentrop to Ger-
man Ambassador in Tokyo, Ott,
10 July 1941. (USA 155).....

Telegram from German Ambassa-
dor in Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop,
13 July 1941. (USA 156).....

Telegram from German Ambassa-
dor to Tokyo, Ott, to Ribbentrop,
30 November 1941. (USA 163).... V
Notes on conversation between
Ribbentrop and Oshima, 9 July
1942. (USA 157).....

Notes on conversation between













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