I 1. The Yalta voting formula recognizes that the Security Council, in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, will have two broad groups of functions. Under Chapter VIII, the Council will have to make decisions which involve its taking direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to the peace, removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of breaches of the peace. It will also have to make decisions which do not involve the taking of such measures. The Yalta formula provides that the second of these two groups of decisions will be governed by a procedural vote-that is, the vote of any seven members. The first group of decisions will be governed by a qualified vote-that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members, subject to the proviso that in decisions under Section A and a part of Section Ĉ of Chapter VIII parties to a dispute shall abstain from voting. 2. For example, under the Yalta formula a procedural vote will govern the decisions made under the entire Section D of Chapter VI. This means that the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, adopt or alter its rules of procedure; determine the method of selecting its President; organize itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; select the times and places of its regular and special meetings; establish such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; invite a member of the Organization not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when that member's interests are specially affected; and invite any state when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute. 3. Further, no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention under paragraph 2, Section A, Chapter VIII. Nor can parties to such dispute be prevented by these means from being heard by the Council. Likewise, the requirement for unanimity of the permanent members cannot prevent any member of the Council from reminding the members of the Organization of their general obligations assumed under the Charter as regards peaceful settlement of international disputes. 4. Beyond this point, decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement under Section B, Chapter VIII. This chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation, or determines that the time has come to call upon states to settle their differences, or makes recommendations to the parties. It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso, referred to above, for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute. 5. To illustrate: In ordering an investigation, the Council has to consider whether the investigation-which may involve calling for reports, hearing witnesses, dispatching a commission of inquiry, or other means might not further aggravate the situation. After investigation, the Council must determine whether the continuance of the situation or dispute would be likely to endanger international peace and security. If it so determines, the Council would be under obligation to take further steps. Similarly, the decision to make recommendations, even when all parties request it to do so, or to call upon parties to a dispute to fulfil their obligations under the Charter, might be the first step on a course of action from which the Security Council could withdraw only at the risk of failing to discharge its responsibilities. 6. In appraising the significance of the vote required to take such decisions or actions, it is useful to make comparison with the requirements of the League Covenant with reference to decisions of the League Council. Substantive decisions of the League of Nations Council could be taken only by the unanimous vote of all its members, whether permanent or not, with the exception of parties to a dispute under Article XV of the League Covenant. Under Article XI, under which most of the disputes brought before the League were dealt with and decisions to make investigations taken, the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of the parties to a dispute. 7. The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Under this system non-permanent members of the Security Council individually would have no "veto". As regards the permanent members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right, namely, the right to veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Council always had. The formula proposed for the taking of action in the Security Council by a majority of seven would make the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity. 8. It should also be remembered that under the Yalta formula the five major powers could not act by themselves, since even under the unanimity requirement any decisions of the Council would have to include the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members. In other words, it would be possible for five non-permanent members as a group to exercise a "veto". It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their "veto" power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council. 9. In view of the primary responsibilities of the permanent members, they could not be expected, in the present condition of the world, to assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred. Therefore, if a majority voting in the Security Council is to be made possible, the only practicable method is to provide, in respect of non-procedural decisions, for unanimity of the permanent members plus the concurring votes of at least two of the non-permanent members. 10. For all these reasons, the four sponsoring governments agreed on the Yalta formula and have presented it to this Conference as essential if an International Organization is to be created through which all peace-loving nations can effectively discharge their com mon responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. II In the light of the considerations set forth in Part I of this statement, it is clear what the answers to the questions submitted by the Subcommittee should be, with the exception of question 19. The answer to that question is as follows: 1. In the opinion of the delegations of the sponsoring governments, the draft Charter itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council. 2. In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Report of Subcommittee III/2/C on Procedure for Considering Proposal of the Sponsoring Governments Relative to Chapter VIII, Section A, WD 38, May 26 Paragraph 7 At the seventh meeting of Committee III/2 on May 19, 1945 the decision was taken, on the motion of the Delegate of the United States, that the Chairman be authorized to appoint a subcommittee of seven members to meet with a subcommittee of seven members from Committee I/1, for the purpose of preparing a joint report on the proposal of the sponsoring governments to transfer paragraph 7 of Chapter VIII, Section A, to Chapter II, and to report back to the Committee, and report to Committee III/3 for its information. Subsequent to the meeting of Committee III/2 at which this action was taken, the Chairman named as members of the Subcommittee the following: Australia, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, Peru, and the United States. The Secretary of the Committee communicated to the Secretary of Committee I/1 the action which had been taken by this Committee and received from him the information that Committee I/1 was prepared to cooperate with Committee III/2 in this matter. He suggested, however, that since Committee I/1 had already set up a subcommittee (Subcommittee I/1/A) to consider other matters falling within the terms of reference of the Committee that that Subcommittee might represent Committee I/1 in the proposed joint discussion. The Subcommittee appointed by the Chairman (Subcommittee III/2/C) met on Wednesday, May 23, at 2:30 p.m., for purposes of organization and preliminary discussion. There were present at this preliminary meeting the Delegates of Australia, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Peru, and the United States. The Delegate of Czechoslovakia was invited to act as Chairman. After a short preliminary exchange of views the Subcommittee adjourned to meet with Subcommittee I/1/A in joint session. The Delegate of Bolivia was present at the joint session. The Representative of the United Kingdom on Subcommittee I/1/A made the following formal proposal: It is resolved that: The amendment of the sponsoring powers (new paragraph, Chapter II, Principles) be regarded as falling within the competence of Committee I/1 but that if after consideration by Committee I/1 such amendments shall have been made as to remove the amendment (as amended), from the competence of Committee 1/1 into the competence of Committee III/2, Committee I/1 shall then remit the amendment (as amended) to Committee III/2, in order that the whole matter may be reconsidered by Committee III/2. The Chairman of Subcommittee III/2/C, the Delegate of Czecho slovakia, presented what had appeared to be the general consensus of opinion of this Subcommittee as follows: (1) that the proposal of the sponsoring governments for the insertion of a new paragraph in Chapter II relating to domestic jurisdiction should be referred to Committee I/1 for consideration and decision; (2) that the amendments proposed by other governments to paragraph 7 of Chapter VIII, Section A, should also be sent to this Committee for consideration; and (3) that Committee III/2 reserved the right to consider consequential questions relating to the content of Chapter VIII, Section A, which might arise as the result of the action taken by Committee I/1, but that such consideration should be postponed until Committee I/1 had completed its action on the proposal of the sponsoring governments to insert a new paragraph in Chapter II. After a further exchange of views, the formal proposal of the Delegate of the United Kingdom was unanimously accepted by the members of the two Subcommittees. There was also general acceptance of the ideas expressed by the Chairman of Subcommittee III/2/C (the Delegate of Czechoslovakia). Following the joint session of the two Subcommittees, the Secretary of Committee III/2 communicated to the Secretary of Committee I/1 the text of proposals submitted for the amendment of paragraph 7, Section A, Chapter VIII, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, as follows: Bolivia (Doc. 2, G/14 (r), p. 8)* Czechoslovakia (Doc. 2, G/14 (b), p. 3)' France (Doc. 2, G/7 (o), Part II, p. 4)' 12 Greece (Doc. 2, G/14 (i), p. 3) 1o 16 Copies of Doc. 207, containing the texts of these proposals, were given to the Secretary of Committee I/1. Assurance was given that these proposals would be considered by Committee I/1 and that the governments presenting them would have the opportunity to be heard. Report of Rapporteur of Committee III/2 to Doc. 1027, June 16 By the decision taken in plenary session on the organization of the work of the Conference (Doc. 42, P/10(a)) Committee III/2 was assigned the following functions: |