UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF (E) The Combined Bomber Offensive (Unless disposed of separately) (F) Planning Date for the End of the German War 2. The War Against Japan (A) Strategy in Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) Draft directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff. (B) Allocation of Resources between SEAC and China (C) Pacific Operations Proposals tabled by the United States Chiefs of Staff. (D) Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War 3. Review of Cargo Shipping Consideration of report in the light of discussions on strategy. 4. Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic Concept SUBJECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUÉ EUR Files The Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1945. About the draft we discussed over the phone this noon.1 1 Draft not found. It seems to me the communiqué might well begin with a restatement of Allied war aims, in which it would be declared that our purpose was not the destruction of a nation or of a people, but the destruction of the military might of our enemies and preventive measures which would assure the world that our enemies would not be able to renew their threat to the peace of the world. These objectives will be attained by the unconditional surrender of the German armies, the disbanding of those armies, the destruction or removal of military equipment, the neutralization, so far as military production is concerned, of German industry, the punishment of war criminals, and the termination of the propaganda of international hatred and of racial superiority to which the German people had been subjected. This list of the measures to be taken is, of course, incomplete. I put it here merely to suggest the desirability of restating the unconditional surrender principle in a context which will make its meaning clear— viz, the fact that unconditional surrender is a means to obtain the liquidation of the German military menace rather than a means to destroy the German nation or its people. This can best be done, in my opinion, by an affirmative statement rather than a negative statement. The communiqué would then go on to state the Allied peace aims, putting first among those aims the completion of the world organization discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, but referring, at the same time, to the negotiation of bilateral agreements, such as were contemplated in and by the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. This part of the communiqué should reaffirm, in the most emphatic language possible, the purpose of the Allies, not merely to win a peace, but to create one UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF and, above all, their purpose to create the peace in terms of international organization. The references to international organization should not be limited to the security organization only, but much should be made of the intention to remove the causes of war in the economic and social field and to improve the lot of humanity through advances in education, in health, in food, etc., in living standards generally, etc. etc. This part of the communiqué would gain great strength if it included an announcement of the date of the next United Nations meeting for the purpose of the continuation of the conversations begun at Dumbarton Oaks. The point should be made that actions taken with reference to Germany will be taken by the three principal belligerents in their capacity as nations allied for the prosecution of the war, whereas the creation of the peace will be the work of the three allied powers acting in concert with the United Nations. A third part of the communiqué would deal with the policy of the Allies toward liberated areas. It would be a blessing to the world if we could walk straight up to this question. If the Allies are agreed on the two points which have been repeatedly made by the President and the Secretary of State, and if the two points could be stated in conjunction, it would go far to clear up one of the most potentially dangerous spots in the whole public opinion picture. The two points are, first, that the peoples of the liberated areas are to have an opportunity, when conditions permit them to express their will, to decide for themselves what kind of government they want; second, that they can have any kind of government they want, so long as it is not a government, the existence of which would endanger the peace of the world-and a fascist government, in our opinion, does endanger the peace of the world by its mere existence. ARCHIBALD MACLEISH [This memorandum was discussed with Mr. Dunn on January 23. Mr. Dunn suggested the inclusion of the brief paragraph inserted as the first full paragraph on Page 2 of the memorandum. Otherwise Mr. Dunn approved the document for the purpose for which it was prepared.] A MACL[EISH] Brackets appear in the original. UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF 3. THE STETTINIUS "RECORD", DECEMBER 1, 1944JANUARY 23, 1945 Editorial Note The Department of State has the typewritten ribbon copy (Top Secret) of what is entitled "Record of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State". Mr. Stettinius' prefatory note contains the following pertinent remarks on the nature of this Record: "While I was Secretary of State I maintained a Record of my principal official activities in Washington, believing that a view of the immediate past can be a guide for the future. This record is based on personal conversations, letters, cables, press reports and considerable other material. It is a straight factual account, omitting any personal comments except for my own conversations. "In order to focus important features of the wide panorama of world affairs, the Record is for the most part divided into weekly Sections, with these Sections further divided into topical subsections. In the course of developing the Record, Sections One to Five were set down in the third person, while the first person has been used in the remainder of the narrative. . Since the Record was maintained only for the period during which Stettinius was in Washington, it contains no entries for the conferences at Malta and Yalta, for which Stettinius left the Department on January 23, in preparation for taking off by plane early on January 25, 1945. The excerpts from this Record which are reproduced on the following pages represent those portions from the period December 1, 1944January 23, 1945 which concerned preparations for the conferences at Malta and Yalta or dealt with negotiations on subjects that came up for discussion at those conferences. (As noted in the foreword, the Stettinius papers for these conferences have not been made available to the Department of State.) The Record contains a considerable number of references to sources from which the Record was compiled, such as "Secretary's appointments", "Summaries of Telegrams", and "News Digests". In the portions of the Record presented herein, these source references have been omitted and have been replaced, wherever appropriate, by cross-references to pertinent documents contained in this volume. Week of 1-9 December 1944 TROUBLE IN ITALY AND GREECE A statement of "Special Information for the President" which I had signed December 1, carried the following item:1 "The British Ambassador has clearly stated to Bonomi that the appointment of Sforza as Foreign Minister would be unacceptable. Kirk considers this an undue interference in Italian internal affairs UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF which, since Italy is a theatre of combined operations, to some extent involves the United States." On Monday, December 4, according to Mr. Byington's memorandum to Mr. Savage, "the Department of State was deluged with questions from correspondents in regard to reports from London that the United States supported the British opposition to the appointment of Count Sforza in the Italian Government." 2.I took these • Points appear in the original. • Byington. questions up." . . . "I submitted the draft of the statement thus prepared to Mr. McDermott who approved it and I then took it up with Mr. Matthews who suggested some changes." "The next morning I informed the Secretary of State by telephone in regard to the great number of queries now pending before the Department and read him the statement as drafted for his approval with the suggestion that it be released prior to the Press Conference in order that he would not be subjected to the very embarrassing questions which were being put to the Department by the correspondents. The Secretary after hearing the statement, which he had me repeat several times, instructed me to take it to Mr. Dunn, have him go over it and after it received Mr. Dunn's approval, he authorized me to release the statement. I took the statement up with Mr. Dunn and then after receiving his approval, I gave it to the press at about 10:45 on the morning of December 5."4 • At this point the Record contains the text of the press release printed ante, p.-. Questioned at his noon press conference shortly afterward, Secretary Stettinius said there was nothing he could say on the Italian situation in addition to the statement. He received a phone call from Dr. Matthews Office of European Affairs, that good reports were coming in on the statement. A letter dated December 5 from Ambassador Halifax reached Mr. Stettinius next day enclosing a "personal telegram" which Halifax had received on the night of December 4, from Prime Minister Churchill." Churchill said that he felt "fully entitled to make the 8 Ante, p. -. Italian Government aware of our view upon this matter because we had been accorded command in the Mediterranean, as the Americans have command in France, and therefore we have a certain special position and responsibility," and attributing the loss of "all confidence in Count Sforza's letter to Berle dated September 23, 1943." • Cf. ante, p. —. Churchill felt that, if necessary, he would defend himself in Commons by saying that he considered Sforza "not only a man who has broken his word, but also an intriguer and mischief maker" and that he was chiefly motivated by "consideration for his own advancement." Finally Churchill had made proposals to the President at Quebec, "all of which have been carried out and some improved upon, for easing the Italian situation, especially before the Presidential elections." On the morning of Wednesday the 6th, Mr. Stettinius phoned Mr. UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF Dunn that "in view of the big splash" which the Italian statement had made in London, Mr. Matthews should call Mr. Michael Wright at the British Embassy. Mr. Dunn said that Eden had made a statement saying that his position was unchanged in the light of everything that had been said up to that moment and assured the Secretary that the position he took in the statement was the President's policy. Nevertheless, the Secretary said a wire should have gone out to the President on the 5th telling of the statement, that he was asking that a memorandum be sent to the President immediately. Meanwhile Prime Minister Churchill had cabled the President 7 asking permission to quote "Count Sforza's letter to Mr. Berle of September 23, 1943," because it was on the basis of this letter that the British had allowed Sforza to return to Italy. He had later broken "a gentleman's word of honor" according to Churchill, in repudiating this position which had been personally discussed with Churchill. The Prime Minister continued "I was much astonished at the acerbity of the State Department's communiqué to the public, and I shall do my best in my reply to avoid imitating it." He then reminded the President of his support during "the Darlan affair," during the proposals to divide the Italian Navy and in general in proposing "mitigation for Italy." He was, therefore, hurt that the State Department should "attempt to" administer a public rebuke to His Majesty's Government. 8 The President in replying to Churchill permitted him to quote from 8 Ante, p. -. Sforza's letter to Berle since it "merely transmitted Sforza's message to Badoglio and in no way involved this Government." While deploring any difference, the President pointed to the "untenable position in which we were put" by Eden's statement in the House and that in spite of Italy being "an area of combined AngloAmerican responsibility" the disapproval of Sforza as Premier or Foreign Minister "was made without prior consultation with us in any quarter." On inquiring of Dr. Matthews whether he had seen the above wire from the Prime Minister to the President, Mr. Stettinius learned that Mr. Michael Wright of the British Embassy "is bringing in a document from Eden which he must present to ERS personally." The Secretary agreed to see him late that afternoon. Mr. Wright was Counselor of the British Embassy and handled the situation because Lord Halifax was compelled to be out of town. Indicating that the British reaction had been prompt and violent, he said that the Italian statement "had caused great embarrassment and that the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden were aroused." He particularly feared the application of the statement to other "liberated territories" especially Greece. Wright had a message from Eden which he would not leave with the Secretary because it was "very personal" and "too unpleasant." After supporting "our position on Italy following Quebec, which was hard for them," Wright said the British felt that they should have been consulted and that in view of a Parliamentary debate the following Friday "it would be most helpful if we could make a statement promptly." |