tanks, and other military force against the Kurds. Simply expanding the zone to all areas currently under Kurdish control would resolve the current refugee problem, provide the Kurds the security they need to begin rebuilding their lives and help lay the groundwork for a long-term political solution once Saddam Hussein is out of power.

In negotiating the terms of the current security arrangements, the Allied forces did not ban the use by Iraqi forces of helicopters which Saddam has used to attack the Kurds. Extending the threat of Allied retaliation against any Iraqi attack on areas currently under Kurdish control would in all likelihood bring about an immediate halt to all such attacks and help enable the vast majority of Kurds to return home.

IV. KURDISH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE FUTURE OF THE IRAQI

KURDS

At present, Kurdish political and tribal leaders enjoy de facto governmental control of most areas of northern Iraq traditionally inhabited by Kurds. Only four minimally functioning Iraqi ministries remain in the area (water, food, fuel, and health). The remaining Iraqi civil servants (as well as all military) have been withdrawn.

Kurdish parties have organized into an Iraqi Kurdistan Front. While there are clearly great differences between the parties—and some, in fact, have historically been mortal enemies-we were encouraged by the political debate emerging in the Kurdish population. There was widespread talk of elections to a "mini-parliament," and the party leaders were negotiating the terms of those elections. We briefly attended a meeting of the Front at which party leaders developed common platforms regarding elections, assistance to refugees and others in need, and conditions for negotiations with Baghdad.

The two leading political groupings are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Massoud Barzani. In addition, there are a variety of other political factions, as well as some 4C tribal leaders who continue to exert major influence over the people. Clearly, any political solution involving self-government for Iraqi Kurds must involve these factions.

Both Mr. Talabani and Mr. Barzani see clearly the evaporating attention of the international community toward the Kurdish people. Each is looking for ways of assuring the security and prosperity of Iraqi Kurds in the event international support fades.

The key issue dividing the two major parties is whether to negotiate an autonomy agreement with Saddam Hussein. Those aligned with Mr. Talabani and the PUK are more opposed to efforts to conclude an agreement with Saddam Hussein and believe he will quickly ignore it. They believe that once international attention has faded, he will gradually resume his past practice of oppressing Kurds. The better course for the Kurds, in their view, is for all of the Iraqi opposition-Kurds, Shiites, Assyrians, Chaldeans, disaffected Sunnis-to unite to overthrow the Ba'athists. Mr. Talabani

seeks modest international assistance, including military supplies, to assist in that task.

Those aligned with Mr. Barzani and the KDP believe that the proper course for the Kurds is to negotiate the best possible agreement with Saddam before the international community pulls out of the region. Mr. Barzani has conducted negotiations with Baghdad to that end. He does not expect that the international community will pressure Saddam to accommodate Kurdish demands for autonomy, so Kurds must make the best arrangements possible with Baghdad while international attention remains. A number of tribal chiefs have also sought arrangements with Baghdad for the protection of their people.3

The agreement under discussion, as outlined by Mr. Barzani, is based on a past autonomy agreement achieved in 1970 in which Saddam Hussein, not yet President of Iraq, was his government's principle negotiator. That agreement has never been fully implemented or respected by the Iraqi Government. The current agreement under discussion would allow the Kurds to return to their ancestral villages, and provide compensation for those uprooted by past Iraqi policies. The Kurdish Peshmerga guerrillas would be dismantled as a military force, but would be reorganized into new police and security units. Substantial lawmaking and executive powers would be shifted to new Kurdish political organs, and free elections would be conducted in Kurdish areas. The economic blockade of Kurdish areas would be lifted during the negotiation and implementation of the agreement.

A number of contentious issues remain in the negotiations, most notably joint administration arrangements for the oil-rich Kurdish city of Kirkuk, the precise arrangements for the demilitarization of the Peshmerga, and curbs on the Iraqi secret police. It is far from clear that the negotiations will be successful. Some suggested that Saddam may stall any negotiations until after the international community has left the region, and then resume his past repression of the Kurds, forsaking any efforts to negotiate with them.

Given the record of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Government of consistently violating agreements with the Kurds in the past, it is unlikely that the current agreement under negotiation will be respected by Saddam without strong international pressure and oversight. If the international community makes clear that it is prepared to monitor and enforce compliance with such an agreement, it is possible that an agreement could be used as a specific standard for judging Baghdad's actions in the future, and could be an instrument for crying "foul" should any violations occur. If the Kurdish leadership decides to move forward with an agreement, the international community must be prepared to act as that agreement's guarantor. Such assurances could help bring the two parties together and lay the foundation for a long-term political solution for Iraqi Kurds.

3 Over a numbers of years, Kurdish tribal leaders have reached agreements with Saddam Hussein's Government in which Baghdad essentially "bought" their neutrality and guaranteed the security of their tribes. While these chieftains are sometimes called "collaborators," we detected very little if any animosity toward them by Kurds or Kurdish political leaders. In fact, most tribal chiefs joined forces with the uprising early in 1991 in an effort to overthrow Saddam.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 provides a means for the international community to play the role of guarantor. That resolution found that the Iraqi repression of the Kurdish population represents a threat to the "international peace and security in the region." It demands that Iraq "immediately end this repression" and expressed the hope * that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected."

66* *

V. SHORTSIGHTEDNESS OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

While the United States is actively promoting democracy in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other areas of past con flict such as Angola and Cambodia, our efforts are less substantia in Iraq. There appear to be no serious efforts to encourage Iraqi op position leaders, especially the Shiites, in order to promote demo cratic change in Iraq, or to lay the groundwork for such a goal once Saddam leaves power.

Little is known about political factions and leaders within the Iraqi Shiite community. We were informed that they are not a pro Iranian monolith. Many are aligned with and supported by Iran but many are not-estimates we heard were that 30 percent of the Shiites are aligned with Iran, and the rest have no real alignmen with any outside factions. Iran has alternately harassed and assist ed Iraqi Shiites over the years, and it was suggested to us tha many Shiites may be open to dialog with the United States of other Western nations. Testing this possibility is essential if the United States is genuinely interested in promoting democratic gov. ernment for the people of Iraq.

The current strategy of relying solely on the violent ouster of Saddam leaves the international community with few alternatives if no such coup materializes. The United States would be well advised to begin establishing a framework for political arrangements among all factions in Iraq to develop the beginnings of democratic elements. Such a strategy would include discouraging continued Kurdish military operations against the Iraqi forces once security within areas currently under Kurdish control is established.

VI. THE ROLE OF TURKEY

Last spring's report of the staff mission on the Kurdish refugee crisis noted the critical role of Turkey in facilitating refugee relief efforts. The dramatic success of Operation Provide Comfort would not have been possible without the assistance of the Government of Turkey. The report also outlined several ways in which the government impeded efforts to assist the Kurds, and suggested constructive steps the government could take.

Once again, the delegation commends the Government of Turkey for its important role in making the ongoing relief efforts possible and for hosting the Allied presence inside Turkey. But once again, we must underscore areas in which the Government of Turkey is obstructing, rather than facilitating, international relief efforts.

During our visit to the region, the authority of the Allied forces under Operation Provide Comfort to remain in Turkey was under review. Turkish authorities suggested the possibility that it would

not be renewed, despite the clear need to do so. Only at the last moment did the government finally agree to extend the authority another 6 months. Such stalling places the international relief efforts at risk and prevents necessary long-term planning.

We heard numerous reports of the Government of Turkey's reluctance to extend the agreement permitting Allied forces to remain in its territory, and were told that at times Turkish officials demonstrated outright hostility toward international assistance efforts on behalf of the Kurds. We were told of increased bureaucratic obstacles placed on relief supplies transiting Turkey, Turkish officials extracting bribes from those transporting goods in and out of northern Iraq, and other efforts to harass international relief workers. The violations of the sanctions against Iraq from the Turkish side have been noted.

Much of Turkey's reluctance to permit Allied forces and international relief efforts on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds stems from the serious terrorism with which Turkey daily contends. The Turkish Kurds' Communist terrorist group-the PKK—is a constant security menace; its guerrilla operations are based primarily in Syria, but also in Iraq and Iran. The Turkish military is concerned that the stability and progress which the international presence provides to Kurds in Iraq also provides protective cover for PKK operations out of northern Iraq.

Turkey's heightened concern about PKK terrorism is evidenced by the fact that its counterterrorism has included numerous heavy bombing raids into Kurdish areas in northern Iraq. These air raids in recent weeks included napalm and cluster bombs and claimed the lives of at least 100 Kurdish civilians. Since last August, an estimated 100 such attacks, mostly air strikes but also including some ground forces, have been conducted by Turkish forces in northern Iraq. We also heard reports of relief workers being fired on despite the clear display of a white flag. While these forces are said to be in hot pursuit of PKK terrorists, the indiscriminate attack on the civilians is a serious threat to the population.

International and Kurdish efforts, including negotiations to bring an end to the terrorist activities of the PKK must be augmented. Similarly, efforts to address the legitimate concerns of the Kurdish population in Turkey must also be increased. Recent statements by the new Government in Turkey indicating a willingness to address those concerns is an important step forward.

However, it is also essential for Turkey to assure the international community, including the Allied governments, that humanitarian assistance and a security presence for the Iraqi Kurds will be permitted to continue for as long as is necessary.

Such an indefinite mandate is needed for two reasons. First, it is a signal to Saddam that the Allies are prepared to wait him out. We will not precipitously withdraw, and it is in his best interest to accommodate, and not violate, Iraqi Kurds.

Second, it is also an important signal to the Kurds that they will not be quickly forgotten. They can confidently begin to build their future and even reach agreements with Baghdad-and the international community will still stand firm to guarantee them. A premature withdrawal of the Allied presence in the region could re

verse the important gains of the last year and invite renewed attacks against the Kurds by Iraqi forces.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS: A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

A precondition by Saddam Hussein for negotiation of an autonomy agreement with the Kurds was that there be no outside parties to it. Baghdad wants to view it as an agreement between Iraqi citizens, not as an international agreement. More likely, Saddam wants to be able to violate any agreement without international interference.

However, this "precondition" should not preclude international parties from recognizing any appropriate agreement which is achieved, and acting to ensure Iraqi compliance. The international community, through the United Nations, should play the role of guarantor, as in the case of agreements achieved in Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.

A Kurdish autonomy agreement should be formally recognized by the Security Council as part of Iraqi fulfillment of the requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, adopted last April to demand humane treatment of the Kurds and the Iraqi population generally. In effect, a violation of Kurdish autonomy would become a violation of the U.N. resolution, and subject Iraq to further international actions.

The administration should begin working now with U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to signal to the Baghdad Government that an appropriate autonomy agreement with the Kurds will be viewed as fulfilling key provisions of Resolution 688. A similar message should be delivered to the Kurdish leadership, with assurances that the international community, through the United Nations, is prepared to stand as guarantor of an agreement within the context of the U.N. resolution.

In addition, the administration, together with our Allies, should act to solve the immediate refugee problem by expanding the Allied security zone to encompass all areas currently under Kurdish control. While such a step will not resolve the contentious issue of disputed areas such as the oil-rich centers in Kirkuk and Mosul, it would prevent further Iraqi repression of the Kurdish population and bring stability to the region, pending a long-term solution in all of Iraq.

Just as there have been no significant security violations-no shelling or gunship activity, for example-in the current zone, which is staffed by less than a dozen Allied troops, there is reason to expect that security violations in military border districts around Kalar and Kifri would also cease, if those areas are included in an expanded zone staffed by an additional 5 to 10 soldiers. This expansion would solve the dilemma of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and enable them to return to their own homes for the winter.

Finally, it should be made clear that the expansion of this security zone is indefinite. Our mandate should be to remain until stability and movement toward democracy in Baghdad are achieved.