restore a semblance of order to their lives. The return of major cities to Kurdish control, such as Dahuk and Suleimaniya, enabled most refugees from last spring's sudden exodus to return to their homes and resume their lives, albeit generally under harsh conditions.

In many instances, Kurds were rebuilding makeshift homes with the stone rubble of their former homes destroyed during the massive violence of the 1987-88 period or, in some cases, in the 1970's. Many were three- and four-time refugees, having fled Iraqi attacks and "Arabization" and collectivization programs over the past two decades.

Newly cultivated farm lands were evident as we traveled in Kurdish areas of Iraq, particularly in the west. We were told that the Dahuk-Zakho area of northwestern Iraq had achieved a 34,000 ton wheat and barley harvest, and that Kurds had actually sold 19,000 tons to Baghdad over the summer. However, despite this harvest, Kurds reported shortages of rice and other staples of the Kurdish diet.

A vigorous Turkish petroleum smuggling operation from Mosul through northern Iraq and into Turkey was greatly benefiting both the Turkish and Kurdish economies in the area. Kurds extracted transit fees from Turkish truckers, and the regime of Saddam Hussein benefits from the sale of its petroleum. The trade, primarily in diesel fuel, is a clear violation of the international sanctions against Iraq, and it is estimated to total as much as 1 million liters per day. The oil-trucking traffic is so extensive that a large portion of the highway from Mosul in Iraq to Diyarbakir in Turkey, is a giant oil slick. Many international relief workers, including American citizens, have been injured in traffic accidents along this route. In addition to the Turkish violation of the sanctions, the delegation also heard numerous reports of smuggling of goods from Iran and a steady flow of goods into and from Jordan. Iraqi goods were evident in Amman and Iranian gasoline is widely available in northern Iraq. The failure of the international community to abide by the sanctions is undermining the international effort to isolate Saddam Hussein and is assisting his effort to remain in power.

In addition, the failure of the Iraqi Government to comply with the terms of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 712 is enabling Saddam Hussein to use food and medicine as a weapon to remain in power. The prices of goods in Iraq, when available, are exorbitant, and there are reports of severe shortages of critical humanitarian goods. If implemented, Resolution 712 would enable the Iraqi regime to sell $1.6 billion in oil in order to purchase urgently needed food and medicine, and pay the costs of the U.N. operation and compensation to other nations. The international community must prevail on Saddam Hussein to accept the terms of this resolution as soon as possible. A raising of the current cap of $1.6 billion should also be considered, so that the proceeds of such a sale will provide adequate resources to meet current needs. While recent U.N. negotiations with Iraqi authorities are showing the first signs of progress in gaining Iraqi compliance, clearly additional pressure on Iraq to abide by the resolution is required.

While the long-oppressed Kurds are encouraged by the prospect of rebuilding their ancestral homes, their hope for a secure future

is clouded by well-founded apprehension over the tenuous supply of food and fuel for the winter months and by the possibility that Iraqi forces will once again destroy their already fragile existence with military force.

The living conditions of the Kurdish population, particularly in the east, are tenuous at best. International relief officials estimate that 480,000 people remain at risk in the Suleimaniya area, 280,000 in the Irbil vicinity, and 130,000 around Dahuk. While these vulnerable families are not starving at the present, a change in the security situation could bring drastic results, since these populations are clearly living on the edge.

The United Nations has taken important steps to prepare for a sudden new crisis by implementing a contingency plan under which 500,000 tons of food will be stockpiled, to feed the Kurdish population in northern Iraq for 2 weeks the time period estimated for the international community to mobilize a new relief effort, should one become necessary.

Since the staff mission in May 1991,1 the Kurds, with the generous assistance of the international community, have accomplished dramatic gains in rebuilding their lives. The Allies participating in "Operation: Provide Comfort" deserve high praise for their own extraordinary efforts to provide relief and security for the Kurds. The handful of Allied military personnel who remain in northern Iraq, backed by additional forces stationed in Turkey and the periodic overflights of Allied aircraft, provide a strong sense of security to the Kurds living within the security zone as well as important assistance to the continuing U.N. and voluntary agency programs throughout the Kurdish-controlled areas of northern Iraq.

The agencies of the United Nations, notably the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, have performed ably to assist refugees with the construction of homes, despite initial startup difficulties. The World Food Program has provided extensive food assistance. The International Organization for Migration bore much of the logistical burden of transporting refugees back to their homes. UNICEF and others also played a vital role in meeting the health and other needs of the population.

As is the case in virtually every refugee emergency, voluntary agencies played an essential, life-saving role. We were greatly impressed by the work of Medecins sans Frontieres in setting up field hospitals under harsh conditions and providing for the health of the refugees, as well as the overall Kurdish population. The International Rescue Committee was actively involved in assisting refugees with the construction of housing and other needs. CARE, Global Partners, and many other voluntary agencies performed outstanding tasks against considerable obstacles.

Finally, the Kurds themselves demonstrated what they have shown the world for generations. Their extraordinary resilience and ingenuity have enabled them to survive despite seemingly insurmountable odds.

1 "Aftermath of War: The Persian Gulf Refugee Crisis," Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, S. Prt. 102-31, May 20, 1991.

B. SADDAM'S ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

A new threat to the Kurds emerged following the capture of the city of Suleimaniya by the Kurdish rebels in early October. On October 26, the Iraqi Government imposed an economic blockade on goods flowing to Kurdish-controlled areas throughout northern Iraq. The ban includes major food items, medicines, and other critical supplies and is imposing hardship on the Kurdish population. Unlike the international embargo on Iraq, which is being violated openly by virtually all of Iraq's neighbors on a daily basis, Saddam's embargo has placed tight and effective controls on the flow of traffic northward to Kurdish-controlled areas. The flow of goods from the south is now less than a quarter of its prewar level. Food, already expensive when obtained from Baghdad over the summer, now must be bought from Iran and Turkey at even higher prices. The price of gasoline, much of which is smuggled from Iran, now exceeds $2 per gallon, compared to only 7 cents before the war. As long as Saddam's embargo is allowed to continue, the Kurds will be forced to live on the edge.

C. NEW REFUGEE POPULATION

The military push by the Kurds into the Kurdish cities of Suleimaniya and those to the south, such as Kalar and Kifri, succeeded in freeing these cities from control of Iraqi forces and permitted the 500,000 Kurds from the region to return home. But Iraqi military action against the towns along the front continues to threaten the Kurdish population in that region. Small scale offensive military actions by Iraqi forces continue and have prompted a new flight of 300,000 Kurds. In the refugee camps visited by the staff mission, we found refugees from Khalikhan, Kifri, Chamchamal, Kalar, and even Kirkuk-all saying they fled out of fear of a renewed assault by Iraqi troops.

Officials of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees stationed in northeastern Iraq report frequent shelling over the last 2 months of 1991 along the military frontier between Iraqi-controlled areas and those under Kurdish control, running from Irbil to the Chamchala/Kifri area. Kirkuk remains under the control of the Iraqi forces and the Kurds will not return to Kirkuk under current conditions.

While no one has an accurate count of the number of refugees displaced by these recent offensive actions, UNHCR officials estimate that over 300,000 new refugees have fled since October 1. At least 145,000 of these new refugees are known to be in the Suleimaniya area and 160,000 in the Irbil area.

The staff mission viewed refugee encampments in Said Sadiq, Halabjah, and Penjwin, all in far eastern Iraq. Already, freezing winter rains had set in signaling the imminent arrival of the bitter cold of January and February. In Penjwin, located in the high, heavily mined mountains bordering Iran, heavy, wet snow had already begun to fall.

Most of the refugees we interviewed had recently fled from towns south of Suleimaniya along the military frontier under constant threat of attack from Iraqi forces. Most families had tents, provided by the United Nations, and had packed their large fami

lies inside in a futile effort to stay warm and dry. But others, more recently arrived, simply had blankets and shards of cloth to drape over their families in makeshift shanties or were huddled in the rubble of homes previously destroyed by Iraqi forces.

At the time of our visit, approximately one-fourth of this new group, roughly 12,000 families, were in need of emergency housing for the winter. U.N. officials had not planned for this unexpected new flood of refugees and are scrambling to provide even rudimentary shelter for these families. Officials estimate they have the material to provide housing for roughly two-thirds of these families through a combination of prefabricated materials already on hand and the use of hotels, old military bases, and university buildings. Prefab housing for the remaining 3,300 families is on order from Turkey.

While prefab housing for these families can be delivered from Turkey on short notice, the biggest obstacle to the rapid construction of the new housing is a shortage of available and affordable labor. The United Nations cannot afford to hire large-scale construction crews. The housing erected in the summer and early fall for the refugee groups from last spring's exodus was constructed by the families themselves over the course of several months. But the current housing must be built at a far more rapid pace, as winter has already arrived.

Reports since our visit suggest some progress on the housing issue. However, as of the first week of January, 2,000 families still had not been accommodated. Kurdish political parties reportedly played a helpful role in the past month in recruiting workers to construct emergency housing.

In addition to these new refugees, some 8,000 families-about 60,000 refugees-who had fled Kirkuk earlier in the year were in the process of returning to Kirkuk this fall when the shelling began. These families now remain in the Suleimaniya and Irbil governorates and are in urgent need of housing and international

care.

In the two frontier towns visited by the staff mission, Kalar and Kifri, there was clear evidence of occasional Iraqi shelling. In Kifri, Iraqi tanks were easily visible along a ridge no more than 2 to 3 km away, and their guns were trained directly on the town. A few buildings showed evidence of concentrated, heavy-caliber fire, said to be the work of Iraqi helicopter gunships. And with each night comes random rifle fire from Iraqi forces stationed literally across the street from the town's edge. Their targets included a hospital (now closed due to the absence of medicines), an orphanage, and a playground.

Kurdish forces cannot resist occasionally firing on the adjacent Iraqi forces. But the aggressive harassment exhibited in recent weeks by Saddam's troops is similar to past actions which preceded massive assaults and gassing of Kurdish civilians. Such harassment is the direct cause of the most recent flight of the 300,000 Kurdish refugee population most at risk. While the Allied forces have forbidden the use by Iraqi forces of fixed-wing aircraft, Saddam has not hesitated to use other forces in his power against the Kurdish population.

While there was some activity in the marketplaces, the residential areas of Kalar and Kifri were virtual ghost towns. We estimate that more than half of the residents have fled. The remaining residents we interviewed all had their bags packed for a quick escape. Many also had obtained tents, which they kept in their cars should events suddenly require them to join the ranks of their neighbors already in refugee camps further north. The thought of a winter in a refugee camp without adequate shelter or supplies-and memories of last winter in the mountains-had caused them to risk remaining behind. But it was clear that even the smallest escalation in violence could precipitate their flight in a matter of minutes.

III. CURRENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

An Allied force of 1,750 is stationed in southeastern Turkey to carry out the assistance program to the Kurds. A 5,000 personnel carrier battle group is stationed off the coast of Turkey. The Turkish authorization for the extension of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort II was provided on January 2, 1992, and extends until June 30, 1992. Currently, the international community has banned all fixed-wing Iraqi military aircraft from the skies, and all helicopter traffic above the 36th parallel. This ban is enforced by constant overflights over Iraq by Allied fighters and AWAC's.

In addition, the Allies have established a security zone in the northwest corner of Iraq. The zone is staffed by a small group of Allied troops based in Zakho, who are led by an able and well-informed American Army colonel, and who daily survey the zone for humanitarian and security needs.

Other parts of Iraq are patrolled by U.N. guards. They are responsible for ensuring the protection of civilians and Baghdad's adherence to the various U.N. Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iraq. However, in a number of instances, these guards have proven to be an ineffective deterrent to offensive actions by Iraqi forces. The presence of U.N. guards in the Kalar and Kifri area did not prevent Iraqi forces from shelling those towns. And, in fact, the lightly armed U.N. guards 2 fled the area once the shelling began. On the other hand, Iraqi forces have respected the presence of Allied forces and avoided any conflict with them. There has been no shelling or any other major violation by Iraqi forces in the Allied security zone. When problems emerge with Iraqi forces or government officials related to the zone, they are handled directly with Iraqi military commanders stationed immediately south of the security zone. Reportedly, these problems-heretofore all relatively minor-have all been satisfactorily resolved. In fact, some security threats to civilians within the security zone have been from Turkish forces said to be in hot pursuit of Kurdish PKK terrorists.

This security arrangement has proved extremely effective in protecting the Kurds within the Allied security zone and has effectively solved the refugee crisis in that area. Serious problems remain, however, in Kurdish areas outside the Allied security zone where Saddam Hussein continues to use helicopter gunships, artillery,

2 Pursuant to agreements with the Iraqi Government, U.N. guards only bear sidearms provided by the Iraqi Government.