dered the phase-out of HEU at licensed facilities. Also in 1986, the RERTR program began work on converting isotope production. And in 1992, the Schumer amendment was enacted. All of these far-sighted efforts were undertaken well in advance of the concrete manifestation of the terrorist intent to wreak mass destruction that our country experienced on September 11, 2001. For Congress now to undermine this longstanding U.S. effort to prevent nuclear terrorism flies in the face of the Bush Administration's stated determination to protect our country from weapons of mass destruction. Rather than ensuring the supply of medical isotopes, the main effect of the Burr and Bond amendments would be to perpetuate dangerous commerce in bomb-grade uranium and increase the risk that this material will find its way into terrorist hands. We urge you to reject these amendments. We also urge you to support a sense-of-the-Senate amendment rejecting the Burr language, which most likely will be offered by Senator Charles Schumer. Thank you for your attention to this important national security matter. We stand ready to provide further information upon request. Sincerely, (in alphabetical order) PETER BRADFORD, Former Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MATTHEW BUNN, Senior Research Associate, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University TOM COCHRAN, Director, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council DARYL G. KIMBALL, Executive Director, Arms Control Association ALAN KUPERMAN, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University PAUL LEVENTHAL, Founding President, Nuclear Control Institute EDWIN LYMAN, Senior Scientist, Union of Concerned Scientists JESSICA MATHEWS, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace MARVIN MILLER, Senior Scientist Emeritus, Center for International Studies, MIT IVAN OELRICH, Federation of American Scientists CHRISTOPHER PAINE, Natural Resources Defense Council HENRY SOKOLSKI, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center FRANK VON HIPPEL, Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Cc: Members of the U.S. Senate Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Sokolski. As mentioned earlier, all of your written statements will be made a part of the record, and the material to which you made general reference will, without exception, be made a part of the record. Mr. SOKOLSKI. Thank you. Mr. BEREUTER. That will be the case. Our next witness is Dr. Fred Iklé, Distinguished Scholar at The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Iklé previously served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1981 to 1988, and from 1973 to 1977 was a Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Presidents Nixon and Ford. He is Governor of the Smith Richardson Foundation, served 9 years as Director of the National Endowment for Democracy, and is Chairman of the U.S. Committee on Human Rights in North Korea. Welcome, Dr. Iklé. You may proceed as you with. STATEMENT OF FRED C. IKLÉ, PH.D., DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Mr. IKLÉ. Thank you, Congressman Bereuter, and I am honored to be invited to testify here. To do something useful in this complex area, we must start with the most urgent priorities. Nonproliferation policy is so complex, like the U.S. Tax Code, it is burdened by a long history, hobbled by conflicting interests, and almost impossible to simplify. I have three points to make regarding priorities. First, what should be our priority concerning different weapons of mass destruction? In my view, nuclear weapons are the highest priority. They are more attractive weapons for terrorist organizations as well as for states that want to plan a strategic attack. Biological weapons are unpredictable as to the area that they will affect and hence less suitable for premeditated attacks. They might be suitable for irrational attacks. Further, if an aggressor chose a biological weapon that has a wide impact because it is contagious, such as smallpox, it could boomerang against the aggressor, especially since our public health system is better than those of the most likely aggressors. Also, more defenses are possible against biological attack than against nuclear attack. After a biological attack, the victims can still defend themselves with masks, antidotes, vaccines. By contrast, after a nuclear detonation has been triggered, nothing, nothing can stop or reduce its destructive heat, blast, and immediate radiation. On the next priority question, I want to touch on the emphasis regarding countries. I agree with Congressman Lantos, North Korea should be on the top of the our list. It is opening a fundamental breach in the Nonproliferation Treaty. By having signed on to that treaty, it has received much technical assistance in the nuclear area, and now it is exploiting that assistance to defy all the treaty obligations. Such behavior cuts the NPT into shreds. Yet, as Mr. Sokolski mentioned, KEDO, the U.S. project to donate two nuclear reactors to North Korea, is still continuing. As long as this project continues, North Koreans will receive more technical reports on reactors and more training from us how to operate reactors. Thus, at the same time that we condemn North Korea for pursuing its nuclear weapons program, we are supporting, and with congressional approval, we are financing this build-up of North Korea's knowledge and engineering skills of nuclear technology. And keep in mind, if these two reactors are finished, their initial plutonium production could easily be diverted by North Korea to build dozens of bombs. These are not safe reactors that we tutor and support North Korea to build. So what on earth is going on here? This is an issue on which this Committee might decide to do something that would close the gaping hole against nuclear proliferation. The Committee may wish to lend support to an amendment to H.R. 6, the Energy Policy Act, that the House has passed, the amendment sponsored by Congressmen Markey and Cox that has been adopted by the House 247 to 175. It would, in essence, preclude the completion of these dangerous, dangerous reactors in North Korea by relying on existing congressional powers to control nuclear exports. The Senate has not yet made a decision on this to put it in the energy bill, but since the problems are clearly central for international relations, I would think this Committee may want to find a way to make sure that the amendment will become part of the bill, or failing that, that it can be included in other legislation. The third priority, the last one I have time for, concerns technological projects. Some technologies have a high priority and should be given more support in this area, in particular: Means to detect dangerous nuclear materials or weapons; to reduce the risk of theft from storage areas, research reactors; and above all, to provide tools for timely detection of attempts to smuggle a nuclear bomb into one of our cities. We do not have these tools now. Several Members of Congress have sought to push development of such detection devices, proposing to increase funding, but the effort did not make it into final legislation. So our current effort remains woefully inadequate in preparing and developing tools to detect bombs that may be smuggled into this country. We are naked to that possible attack. By contrast, other technology programs that ought to be discouraged and stopped include some that Mr. Sokolski already referred to. One is the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) (a particularly dangerous bomb-making material because it is easier to fashion into bombs than plutonium and harder to detect) for legitimate peaceful purposes, like producing pharmaceuticals, radioactive pharmaceuticals for medical purposes, where lower enriched uranium safer could be used instead. And again here a piece of legislation is making its way through the development of the energy bill that, instead of preserving or strengthening the current restrictions, would lift the restrictions to allow HEU export to foreign countries. The highly enriched uranium would be for presumably legitimate purposes, but purposes that do not need highly enriched uranium. Why make a hole in the dike we have built? And a similar program that could do great harm that I will skip over now since Mr. Sokolski has explained it also in his written testimony, the complex Mixed Oxide Fuel plutonium program. Let me just add that Congress is being asked to authorize hundreds of millions of dollars for these plutonium reactors and processing, and the Administration is proceeding to conclude various international agreements, or I should say probably Memorandums of Understanding because agreements would have to be submitted to you, and that may not be desirable on the part of the bureaucrats who are working on this. So these will be understandings of some kind that could commit us with foreign countries to proceed with this mixed oxide fuel, and in the long term I think this could mean the death knell for nuclear nonproliferation because of the spreading of the means to make bombs. It is a very complex subject. It has received little attention so far to my knowledge in congressional Committees. In concluding, Mr. Chairman, it is noteworthy that despite the intense efforts against proliferation that President Bush and his Administrations are engaged in-splendid efforts!-Congress could still make major contributions to strengthen that effort. Indeed, it seems some urgent steps only Congress could take. This is the essence of my testimony. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Iklé follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRED C. IKLÉ, PH.D., DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NEXT STEPS FOR US NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND WHAT THIS COMMITTEE MIGHT CHOSE TO ADDRESS Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be invited to testify at this hearing. I hope you won't consider it presumptuous if I advocate some specific actions without much elaboration. We need to attend to the most urgent and important priorities first since nonproliferation policies are so complex. Like the US Tax Code, these policies are burdened by history, hobbled by conflicting interests, and impossible to simplify. I have three points to offer on the question of priorities. First, what should be the priority among different weapons of mass destruction? In my view, nuclear weapons are of highest priority. For several reasons they are more attractive weapons for any nation or terrorist group that wishes to plan a purposeful campaign. • To begin with, biological weapons are unpredictable as to the area they will affect and hence less suitable for premeditated attacks. • Further, if the aggressor chose a biological weapon that has a wide impact because it unleashes a highly contagious disease, the resulting pandemic could easily boomerang against the attacker and his allies. The US public health system is superior to that of potential enemies. • Finally, more defenses are possible against biological attack than against a nuclear attack. After a biological (or chemical) attack, the victims can still defend themselves with masks, antidotes, vaccines. By contrast, once a nuclear detonation has been triggered, nothing can stop or reduce its destructive heat, blast, and immediate radiation. Second, which countries should receive priority in our nonproliferation policy? North Korea, I believe, now should be at the top of the list. It is opening a fundamental breach in the Nonproliferation Treaty. By having signed onto the NPT it received technical assistance and now it is exploiting this assistance while openly defying all the treaty obligations. Such behavior cuts the NPT into shreds. Yet, KEDO, the project to donate and build two nuclear reactors in North Korea, is still continuing. As long as this project continues, North Koreans will receive more and more technical reports on nuclear reactors and even receive training on how to operate our reactors. Thus, at the same time while we are correctly condemning North Korea for pursuing its nuclear weapons programs, we are supporting and with Congressional approval keep financing this build-up of North Korea's knowledge and engineering skills in nuclear technology. And keep in mind, when these donated reactors are completed, their initial plutonium production can easily be diverted to build dozens of bombs. What on earth is going on here? Mr. Chairman, this is an issue on which your Committee might decide to do something that would close a gaping hole in the dike against nuclear proliferation. This Committee could lend support to an amendment to HR 6 (the Energy Policy Act) that the House has passed. That amendment has been sponsored by Congressmen Markey and Cox and has been adopted by the House 247 to 175. It would, in essence, preclude the completion of these dangerous reactors in North Korea by relying on existing Congressional powers to control nuclear exports. But the Senate still needs to accept this provision in conference. Since the problem is so clearly a central issue for international relations, Mr. Chairman, a way might be found for this Committee to make sure the amendment will become part of the bill. Or failing that, the amendment must be included in other legislation. Third, which technological aspects or projects deserve top priority in our nonproliferation policy? Technologies that ought to be given a high priority are instruments and other means to detect dangerous nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, so as to reduce the risk of theft from storage areas, laboratories, or research reactors, and above all to provide the tools for timely detection of attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country. Several members of Congress have sought to push the development of such detection devices and have proposed increased funding, but their proposals have not been adopted and the current effort remains woefully inadequate. Other technology programs, by contrast, ought to be discouraged or stopped. In particular, further steps must be taken to halt and to reverse the use of highly enriched uranium in research reactors or for other ostensibly peaceful applications. Similarly, a new program that could do great harm to nonproliferation is the plan to use surplus weapons plutonium from Russia and also from the United States, to fuel power reactors throughout the world. This plutonium is to be converted into socalled mixed oxide fuel (MOX) by means of specially built reactors. The safety of the converted MOX fuel has to be questioned more carefully since the shipments of tons of plutonium could pose serious terrorist risks. Moreover, this worldwide project will encourage other expanding uses of plutonium, for instance breeder reactors. Over ten, twenty years, the world would thus increasingly adopt plutonium uses for energy production in facilities that would be scattered over thousands of locations with far-flung transportation requirements. This could well mean the death knell for non-proliferation. At this time, Mr. Chairman, Congress is being asked to authorize hundreds of millions of dollars for these uses of MOX type plutonium, and the Administration is proceeding to conclude various international agreements that will create political commitments to build a global plutonium economy. This "death knell project” for nuclear nonproliferation is enormously complex, based on many technical judgments that are highly contentious. Congress, and perhaps your Committee, ought to initiate a careful review before the momentum of committed bureaucracies and special interests becomes irreversible. Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Dr. Iklé. Next we will hear from Dr. George Perkovich, who is the Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Prior to serving at the Carnegie Endowment, Dr. Perkovich was Director of the Secure World Program at the W. Alton Jones Foundation from 1990 to 2001, and served as a Speech Writer and Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Joe Biden. Dr. Perkovich is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and International Institute for Strategic Studies. Welcome, Dr. Perkovich. You may proceed as you wish. STATEMENT OF GEORGE PERKOVICH, VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE Mr. PERKOVICH. Thank you. As the others said, it is an honor to be here before the Committee. I would also say, to simplify the deliberations, that I agree wholeheartedly with at least 90 percent of what Dr. Iklé and Mr. Sokolski said. I think that was very important testimony and the recommendations they both made were outstanding. Clearly from the previous testimony and your statement, the WMD nonproliferation regimes need to be strengthened. Existing rules need to be revised. New rules or initiatives need to be undertaken, and enforcement needs to be made sure. This cannot be done unilaterally or preemptively. The leading states in the international community must join with the U.S. if we are to succeed in any of these initiatives. I would argue that the events in Iraq actually give us an opportunity in many of the areas where reform is necessary. The first and most obvious is in the Persian Gulf. We know that prolifera |