Mr. BEREUTER. My time has expired, but a brief comment from one or both of you. Mr. Sokolski.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Well, yes. I remember studying law for 4 years at the University of Chicago, and the first thing they taught us was laws are meant to be broken, and that was not because you were supposed to break them, but because you were supposed to catch people breaking them and enforce the law.

So the problem is that the laws that we have or the rules we have are so loose that you do not break them often enough, and when you do, we are not doing enough about the violation. So we need to do some more homework.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Mr. PERKOVICH. Just really quickly on this, my focus on the utility of treaties is primarily on nuclear weapons, so I think biological weapons are a very different story.

Nuclear weapons, there are 191 parties to the NPT, and right now there are two states that we're prosecuting, as it were, for violations. Name me another endeavor in life where you have that percentage of compliance and that few problems that you then have to prosecute.

If you do not have that framework of law, of verification, and of enforcement, you do not have warrants to go in and do your search and your enforcement, and you are in a much worse situation.

So, yes, things, need to be improved, but you have to have the framework.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I hope the question was general utility to Members.

Mr. Lantos, you are recognized. Well, we will get him when he comes back.

Mr. Berman in his absence.

Mr. BERMAN. First, do I understand a portion of both Henry Sokolski's and Dr. Iklé's testimony to be that the goals of nonproliferation should trump U.S. and international efforts to develop nuclear energy; and that we should cease, since the policy which encourages the export of things which facilitate countries developing their own peaceful nuclear energy capabilities?

Mr. IKLÉ. We should proceed with great caution and more analysis so we do not spread, as we did with the Atoms for Peace Program, we did that, unfortunately, the capability to build bombs.

If we go through the states that are now threatening to develop weapons or have done so against the NPT, those are the states that received help under the Atoms for Peace Program.

Mr. BERMAN. Well, what about things like centrifuges and—
Mr. IKLÉ. So we do not want to repeat that.

I will let Mr. Sokolski to go into more detail.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. You are lucky. There is no need to do the things that are as dangerous as what we are doing. Cut it out. You can have nuclear power, and certainly right now the demand for it is not that great, and it will not be very great for at least, at least another 20 or 30 years. You certainly can maintain what you have where you have it without spreading things that are uneconomical and dangerous.

Mr. BERMAN. Okay.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. So make some distinctions. It is not a black and white thing, and that is the reason why I think Mr. Iklé's testimony was precise in spotting programs, and I raised some myself. Cut those out.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Perkovich, you made a reference, I tried to write it down but perhaps not fast enough, that you saw signs that Iran is now thinking about dealing with U.S. concerns.

With respect to its development of nuclear weapons, what signs have you seen from Iran that it is thinking about doing anything other than going full force ahead? I am curious. Tell me those signs.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Perkovich, can you answer briefly, difficult as that may be?

Mr. PERKOVICH. There are private discussions and some public discussions from Iran that they are prepared to talk about all of their security requirements as well as U.S. demands on them. They are not specifically saying we are going to give this all up. They are insisting it is peaceful, but they are looking for a dialogue. They are afraid of what is going to happen next, so we do have their attention. They know they would have to address this concern if they are going to go forward in a secure relationship and be unthreatened.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I will remind Members, unless it is for clarification, to restrict it to one question what the unanimous consent agreed to.

Mr. Tancredo, the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to also just concentrate on the Iranian part of this issue, and specifically your paper, the paper that you handed to us, although I did not get a chance, of course, to read it all. But you suggest that sanctions have never persuaded Iran's revolutionary leaders to forego a nuclear weapons option. A better strategy would be to demonstrate the benefits of economic cooperation from U.S. for new economic engagements from its nationalistic framework.

What tells you, however, that holding out that particular kind of stick, or carrot I guess I should say, is the actual ultimate motivating force that we could actually apply here? Economic development inside Iran would what, change the political environment, change the ideological complexion of the country? What?

Mr. PERKOVICH. Sir, it is by no means a silver bullet, but its dynamic is part of a solution. What we have to avoid and what may be happening now is that we are creating a nationalist attachment to nuclear weapons in Iran, so it becomes not the attachment of a specific regime, but a badge of nationalist honor because Persian nationalism can be quite a force.

In order to do that, you have to mix up the story. If they think all we are doing is blocking them everywhere, blocking their development, you fuel that kind of nationalism. So you have to start picking off people by suggesting that the relationship can be somewhat positive, first of all.

Secondly, the people who are supporting Ayatollah Khamenei and the most reactionary elements are the bazaar class which do

not want international economic engagement. They benefit from a closed economy. They are small traders.

If you open up their economy, they are worried they are going to lose economically as Iran modernizes. So they are trying to keep

us out.

Last point, we object to their entering the WTO. We are trying to get everybody else to enter the WTO because we think it actually leads to reform and other benefits, but with Iran we say no, we do not want you to come into the WTO. Removing that objection seems to me cost-free and can do these other things that I am alluding to.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you very much.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

The gentlelady from California, Ambassador Watson.
Ms. WATSON. Thank you.

I am concerned with North Korea and also Iran, and possessing all the necessary ingredients for nuclear weapons, and I am not clear of what our policy is in terms of North Korea; in Iran; I know what the policy was toward the suspicion that Iraq had weapons. But what do you see, what are the options that would be open to us? Let us just focus on North Korea at the time. Dr. Iklé, can you respond? What would be the options we would have? And the others can kick in the response too if you choose?

Mr. IKLÉ. For a definitive solution, Congresswoman Watson, you probably have to look toward the different types of regime. Now, I refer here to a statement made by Secretary of State Powell and Condoleezza Rice about a month or two ago is referring to countries that really gave up nuclear weapons. Those countries were Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South Africa.

What do these countries have in common? Only one thing, and that is change in the regime; and that is really only what eventually leads, I think, to abandonment of the nuclear weapons ambition.

Now, that may not be near term, so you want to do things in the near term. In Korea, we tried to induce the neighbors of Korea to join us in certain economic sanctions, to moderate the Korean pressure for nuclear weapons. Iran has been discussed by Mr. Perkovich, what options there would be. But in the long term I think you have to realize that it is the change in the political attitude of the country.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Next we go to Mr. Rohrabacher, the gentleman from California. Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. There are several things being left out of this discussion that I find rather disturbing. We have not heard one word about democracy and what relationship freedom has to do with this issue, nor have we heard anything about missile defense and defensive systems, and the development of those systems, what that has to do with this issue, and it seems to me that both of these concepts play a role here. For example, we may not want to be training nuclear physicists in our education system in this country if they come from countries that are non-democratic. I mean, maybe the panel can correct me, but it seems to me that we have been training high-level scientists

to go back to dictatorships that may pose a threat to our country. Is not this part of the equation? Maybe we want to train only people from democratic countries.

And in terms of missile defense, is this not something that we need to focus on even more now considering the proliferation problems and the challenges we face?

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Two points. First, I think what Dr. Iklé was referring to when he said "regime change" goes to your point about democracy. Second, you do want to bring folks in if they are not studying how to make bombs even from some countries that are not democratic. Your point, on the other hand, is one that has to be driven home with the educational institutions, and it is a real battle, but you are absolutely right.

Finally, in the case of Iran, let us not be overly optimistic. My center is doing a 2-year study in conjunction with Andy Marshall on Iran with a number of experts. They are evenly divided as to whether or not Iran going democratic will immediately mean that the nuclear weapons program dies. Just as likely it will not. And, therefore, against those kinds of problems you are going to need not just missile defenses, but something even more important—security arrangements with your friends.

We need to brush up on that in that region. I do not know what is possible, but that is something this Committee would do well to look into.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania,

Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

How important are strong verification protocols?

We have a new Moscow Treaty with very little verification provided in it. The House voted last week for my amendment requiring the Administration to report each year on how many warheads are actually dismantled as opposed to perhaps stored or put in the moth balls or whatever, and attempt to have an annual report to strengthen verification. But that treaty requires none of what President Reagan talked about, trust but verify.

How important is that as we move forward in nonproliferation? Mr. IKLÉ. Well, I have been involved in this a bit when I was Director of the Arms Control Agency. We had verification. We had violations. We sat on these violations because we did not want to disturb detente.

In the 1980s, we knew about the violation by the Soviet Union of the AMB Treaty. We shoved that under the carpet because we did not want to stir up additional complications relating to the Soviet Union.

At the present time in our relations with Russia I think verification is not that important. It is our own national means that let us monitor enough.

On the other hand, when it comes to nuclear installations under the NPT, like those owned by North Korea or Iran, verification can make a real good difference.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Does the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Harris have questions? The gentlelady is recognized.

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand that my questions are better suited for Secretary Bolton, but I wanted to

thank the panel for a really enlightening and providing us information that we realize that we must address today. I want to thank you. I look forward to the Secretary's comments.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, wish to be recognized now? You are in order if you are. You are in order if you wish to be recognized.

Ms. LEE. May I yield my time and then come back to me, please? Mr. BEREUTER. Yes.

Ms. LEE. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Next we will move to Mr. Delahunt. Ms. Napolitano, the gentlelady from California.

Ms. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I apologize for being a little late getting here, so I did not hear a lot of the discussion.

When we have heard in the past few years of what is happening to us in America with the threats of terrorism, and we look at what other countries are doing, amassing, if you will, whether it is weapons of mass destruction or other means of threatening the rest of the world, including the United States. I am wondering why we are still with Pakistan giving them $73 million in military equipment, and continue to tolerate entities that engage in international trade of weapons of mass destruction, and the missiles that are capable of carrying that.

We have seen that the countries do not live up to their international treaties. They just ignore them. They just do not feel that it applies to them anymore for whatever reason. Why is it that we are not able then to have the ability to take the money away from them and hold that money hostage until they concede that they are not going to be doing that kind of trading anymore? It just escapes me why we continually with most countries, North Korea, Pakistan, and all. I would like for somebody to address that.

Mr. BEREUTER. Any volunteers?

Mr. PERKOVICH. I spend more time in India and Pakistan than the others, I guess, so I will try to answer it.

First of all, Pakistan has not signed a treaty, so this is another point where treaties matter in the sense of you have got three states that have not signed and you have a little less leverage.

Be that as it may, what has happened with Pakistan historically, and it happened in the Reagan Administration, it is happening now is there is always something we care more about-fighting Afghanistan, fighting the war of terrorism.

Ms. NAPOLITANO. Priorities.

Mr. PERKOVICH. The Pakistanis tend to bank that, and say, all right, we are going to give you help on the thing that you care the most about, and they do not necessarily do what we ask on the other matters like proliferation.

The problem is you used the word "hostage." It is a hostage relationship. I am not defending it. Secretary Bolton should answer the question. But we feel that if we deny ourselves or they choose to deny us help in hunting Al Qaeda, that matters a great deal to us, and so we cannot pull the money because we want them to help. It is debateable but this is the hard thing that happens every time we deal with Pakistan.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Congressmen, keep it up.