that dual-use equipment bought on the international black market was critical to Saddam's subsequent WMD rearmament efforts.

In countering this growing threat, Mr. Chairman, I am afraid we are woefully unprepared. Although we have the military means of disarming potential proliferating states, as our victory in Iraq clearly shows, we cannot rely on armed force alone. A stronger international legal framework for preventing and punishing proliferation is urgently needed.

Our current legal framework is riddled with gaps and lacks enforcement mechanism. Its shortcomings became abundantly and embarrassingly clear last December during an absurd incident involving a North Korean shipment of scud missile parts to Yeman. As you will recall, at the Administration's urging our Spanish allies courageously stormed the North Korean vessel on the high seas, and seized its deadly cargo, only to release it and the scuds to Yemen a day later, again at our request. Why one must ask. The North Koreans, according to the White House, were doing nothing illegal.

This is an outrage, Mr. Chairman, but one this Committee has begun to address.

In the wake of that December debacle, I introduced the Missile Threats Reduction Act, which you co-sponsored, and I agreed to include it in the State Department authorization bill approved by this Committee last month. Our legislation declares, it declares it to be the policy of the United States to seek multilateral authority to stop the trade in destabilizing offensive ballistic missiles. Our legislation urges the President to seek a U.N. Security Council resolution prohibiting any missile trade with North Korea in particular, and authorizing the interdiction of North Korean vessels carrying such cargo. These measures would go a long way toward filling the gap.

The United States currently imposes stringent export controls, . but few other nations have control systems of similar scope.

To this day, some of our so-called allies even refuse to see that Iran is becoming a nuclear threat, and they continue to export dual-use equipment to Iran, aiding and abetting the ayatollahs' WMD and missile programs.

I am pleased to learn that the Administration shares our concerns, and has followed our lead in calling for change. Earlier this week the President announced a new proliferation security initiative which apparently seeks the same multilateral authority to stop proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction as we propose for the illicit missile trade.

The Administration has yet to share the details of this initiative with Congress, and I hope that Under Secretary Bolton will do so today.

I invite the Administration to work with us in ensuring the State Department authorization_bill due to be debated on the House Floor later this month reflects our shared nonproliferation priorities.

Mr. Chairman, we achieved a major victory for the cause of nonproliferation in defeating the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Let us now secure this victory by strengthening the international legal

framework for confronting the continuing weapons proliferation threats.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Lantos, for your statement and for your initiative, which I was pleased to join you in. All Members' opening statements will be made a part of the record.

I would like to proceed to our witnesses so we do have adequate time for questions before Secretary Bolton joins us. I am going to introduce the panelists successively just before their testimony.

So, first, I would like to welcome Henry D. Sokolski, the Executive Director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote the better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues for academics, policymakers and media.

Mr. Sokolski previously served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993. Prior to this employment, he worked in the Secretary's office of net assessments on proliferation issues, and he has served as a military aide or special assistant to U.S. Senators.

Mr. Sokolski, you are free to proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER Mr. SOKOLSKI. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. As the time keeper, I said 6 minutes, not 5, so adjust the clock please.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your Committee for inviting me here to testify. My general message today is this: Against the world's Irans and North Koreas, we will not only have to develop country-specific strategies-such as cutting off North Korean military's access to illicit flows of hard currency and building regional security arrangements to hedge against Tehran going nuclear-but we will also need to establish new, enforceable country-neutral rules and policies.

Which rules need pushing? Those required to fill the most disturbing loopholes in our current nonproliferation efforts. President Bush highlighted some of these gaps in his proposal last week to work with other nations to interdict weapons of mass destruction.

North Korea recently threatened to export its nuclear arms. Yet, because Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or the NPT, it is now free to export its nuclear capabilities legally.

If North Korea or Pakistan redeployed some of their nuclear weapons to another NPT member's soil claiming these weapons were still under their control, the NPT member recipient, let's say a Libya or a Saudi Arabia, could actually take delivery, just as Germany did from the United States during the Cold War, withoutI repeat-without violating any rule.

Then there is the problem of Iran. My center recently released a study I hope to place some items into the record with the consent of the Committee-that determined that in less than 3 years Tehran will have all the peaceful nuclear material it needs to breakout with scores of nuclear arms in a matter of weeks.

Iran acquired most of this nuclear capability covertly, and, yet, was able to do so, for the most part, without violating the NPT. Now other nations, like Syria and Egypt, see Iran as a possible model for legally acquiring a nuclear weapons option of their own. Any nation, including China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Iraq or Iran, can export many items critical to make weapons of mass destruction again without violating any international law.

Trying to close these loopholes country by country, I fear, will be a prescription for failure. We know determined proliferators will cheat or refuse to cooperate, after all. That is why an enforceable common international usage against trafficking in weapons of mass destructions needs to be created like that already in effect against piracy and slave trading.

Any nation's attempt to redeploy chemical, nuclear, or biological warheads outside of their borders or to ship the key means to make them should be deprived of the protection of international law. In short, they should be declared outlaws. This would allow any nation, and particularly the United States and its allies, to search or seize the illicit freight of violators with or without their consent, wherever they might be, including, and I emphasize, including the high seas.

How? The key ingredients needed to make strategic weapons are already internationally recognized. The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, lists all special nuclear materials. The Australia Group catalogs key chemical and biological weapons-related items. The Nuclear Suppliers Group identifies critical dual-use nuclear gear and prohibits the export of enrichment and reprocessing plants, and the Missile Technology Control Regime does much the same for cruise and ballistic missiles.

Meanwhile, U.S. law-and this is something most people do not know-currently requires American businesses to preannounce most of these exports publicly. Several friendly nations have similar laws. These practices should help in creating the international common usage that is required.

As the President suggested in its Krakow speech May 31, the best way to get started is to work with like-minded nations. What should be considered?

First, no nation should be allowed any longer in peacetime to redeploy nuclear, chemical or biological weapons outside of their borders. Any move violating this rule should be subject to interdiction.

Second, all nations ought, at a minimum, to give prior public notification of their export of the nuclear, chemical or biological weapons-related items noted above. Any transfer that is not preannounced or that is improperly posted, again, should be subject to interdiction.

Finally, if there is support for strong action, and I hope there is, exports made outside of the procedures of the IAEA, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group and, perhaps, the MTCR might be banned and targeted for interdiction.

Assuming agreement is reached on one or more of these rules, the U.S. or a like-minded nation should submit them to the U.N. Security Council for adoption. It should be made clear, however, that if any nation learns of an export that violates the proposed

rules before the U.N. chooses to put the proposal to a vote, that nation should try to block the export or at least pass on the information to nations that can act.

What other new rules or policies would be helpful? At least three. First, the United States and its friends should announce that states that withdraw from the NPT have no right to the atomic technology they have accumulated since they acquired it under the false pretence of it being dedicated to peaceful purposes. This is immediately relevant to the North Korean and Iran cases, and in the long run to any of their possible imitators.

Second, the U.S. should restrain its own nuclear transfers. We can hardly complain about Iran's power reactors, if we continue, as we are, supporting construction of nearly identical U.S. machines for Pyongyang, an NPT violator. Nor should Congress fund the Energy Department's request this year to share uneconomical breeder reactor and fuel recycling technology—all useful to master weapons plutonium production-with states that only recently renounced their own nuclear weapons themselves.

Finally, the U.S. should reconsider the wisdom of disposing of nearly 68 tons-that is 17,000 crude bombs worth of U.S. and Russian weapons-grade plutonium by fabricating it into what is called mixed oxide fuel for use in civilian reactors.

If we begin building the multi-billion dollar fuel plants needed here and in Russia to implement this plan, and there is money in this budget now to do that, U.S. efforts to discourage commercialization of nuclear weapons usable fuels will be undermined. Global transport, fabrication, and use of hundreds of tons-that is tens of thousands of crude weapons worth of already separated civilian plutonium, which is almost impossible to keep track of to guard against theft-will likely follow.

Recent legislative efforts to allow weapons-grade uranium to fuel research reactor applications raise similar policy questions and should be blocked.

These are the most important points I would like to raise. I will be happy to discuss what else we should be doing to check proliferation in places like Iran and North Korea during the question and answer period.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement and additional materials submitted for the record by Mr. Sokolski follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER

U.S. NONPROLIFERATION AFTER IRAQ: TOWARD MORE ENFORCEABLE RULES Mr. Chairman I want to thank you and your committee for inviting me to testify. My general message is this: Against the world's Irans and North Koreas, we will not only have to develop country-specific strategies such as cutting off the North Korean military's access to illicit flows of hard currency and building regional security arrangements to hedge against Tehran going nuclear-but new, enforceable country-neutral rules and policies.

Which rules need pushing? Those required to fill the most disturbing loopholes in our current nonproliferation efforts. President Bush highlighted some of these gaps in his proposal last week to work with other nations to interdict weapons of mass destruction. North Korea recently threatened to export its nuclear arms. Yet, because Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), it is now free to export its nuclear capabilities legally. If North Korea or Pakistan rede

ployed some of their nuclear weapons to another NPT member's soil claiming these weapons were still under their control, the NPT recipient-a Libya or a Saudi Arabia-could actually take delivery (just as Germany did from the U.S.), without violating any rules.

Then, there is the problem of Iran. My center recently released a study that determined that in less than three years Tehran will have all the peaceful nuclear material it needs to breakout with scores of nuclear arms in a matter of weeks. Iran acquired most of its nuclear capabilities covertly, and, yet, was able to do so, for the most part, without violating the NPT. Now, other nations, like Syria and Egypt, see Iran as a possible model for legally acquiring a nuclear option of their own. Any nation, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Iraq or Iran, can export many items critical to make weapons of mass destruction without violating any international law.

Trying to close these loopholes country by country is a prescription for failure. We know determined proliferators will cheat or refuse to cooperate. That's why an enforceable common international usage against trafficking in weapons of mass destruction needs to be created like that already in effect against piracy and slave trading. Any nation's attempt to redeploy chemical, nuclear or biological warheads outside their borders or to ship the key means to make them should be deprived the protection of international law. This would allow us to search or seize the illicit freight of violators with or without their consent, wherever they might be, including the high seas.

How? The key ingredients needed to make strategic weapons are already internationally recognized. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) lists all special nuclear materials. The Australia Group catalogs key chemical and biological weapons related items. The Nuclear Suppliers Group identifies critical dual-use nuclear gear and prohibits the export of enrichement and reprocessing plants and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) does the same for cruise and ballistic missiles Meanwhile, U.S. law currently requires American businesses to preannounce most of these exports publicly. Several friendly nations have similar These practices should help in creating the international common usage that's

laws.

required.

As the President suggested in his Krakow speech May 31st, the best way to get started is to work with like-minded nations. What should be considered? First, no nation should be allowed any longer in peacetime to redeploy nuclear, chemical or biological weapons outside their borders. Any move violating this rule should be subject to interdiction. Second, all nations ought, at a minimum, to give prior public notification of their export of the nuclear, chemical or biological weapons-related items noted above. Any transfer that is not preannounced or that is improperly posted, again, should be subject to interdiction. Finally, if there is support for strong action, exports made outside the procedures of the IAEA, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group and (perhaps) the MTCR might be banned and targeted for interdiction.

Assuming agreement is reached on one or more of these rules, the U.S. or a likeminded nation should submit them to U.N. Security Council for adoption. It should be made clear, however, that if any nation learns of an export that violates the proposed rules before the UN puts the proposal to a vote, it should try to block the export or pass the information it has on to a nation that can.

What other new rules or policies would be helpful? At least three. First, the U.S. and its friends should announce that states that withdraw from the NPT have no right to the atomic technology they have accumulated since they acquired it under the false pretense of it being dedicated to peaceful purposes. This is immediately relevant to North Korea and Iran and, in the longer term, to possible imitators.

Second, the U.S. should restrain its own nuclear transfers. We can hardly complain about Iran's power reactors, if we continue to support construction of nearly identical U.S. machines for Pyongyang, an NPT violator. Nor should Congress fund the Energy Department's request to share uneconomical breeder reactor and fuel recycling technology-all useful to master weapons plutonium production—with states that only recently renounced their own nuclear weapons programs.

Finally, the U.S. should reconsider the wisdom of disposing of nearly 68 tons (17,000 bombs worth) of US and Russian weapons-grade plutonium by fabricating it into mixed oxide fuel for use in civilian power reactors. If we begin building the multi-billion dollar fuel plants needed here and in Russia to implement this plan, U.S. efforts to discourage commercialization of nuclear weapons usable fuels will be undermined. Global transport, fabrication, and use of hundreds of tons of already separated civilian plutonium-almost impossible to keep track of to guard against theft-will likely follow. Recent legislative efforts to allow weapons grade uranium