APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICK SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank you for this opportunity today to hear from this panel of experts and Under Secretary Bolton about the course of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

The world's attention may be currently focused on whether or not we uncover Saddam Hussein's hidden weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Though a failure to recover such weapons would raise troubling questions about our intelligence capabilities, it would do nothing to diminish the legitimacy of our actions. The international community gave the Saddam Hussein regime numerous opportunities to show that it had disarmed and it repeatedly failed to do so. Regardless of what we find in Iraq, and there is additional evidence to uncover, Saddam Hussein's actions and weapons were a dangerous threat to the Free World. They were a threat that Saddam Hussein perpetuated and that representatives of the Free World finally had to address. Terrorists and tyrant dictators now know that it will not be to their advantage to develop weapons of mass destruction in order to intimidate or blackmail. We must now explore what our actions in Iraq say about our more general strategies for nonproliferation. Even after the removal of Saddam Hussein, the world is still a very dangerous place. North Korea has taken very brash, very confrontational steps to re-establish its nuclear weapons programs. Though less overt, Iran is working to possess a nuclear threat that similarly impacts regional stability and gives terrorist groups unimaginable lethality.

What from our experience with Iraq can be applied to these other scenarios? Does a rogue regime that defiantly asserts its possession of weapons of mass destruction to intimidate neighbors require a different response from one that builds them in a shroud of official denial? After Iraq, does the UN have less credibility to control WMD proliferation? Can the Iraq example of preventing weapons proliferation by forcing regime change be generalized as an "effective" or at least "justifiable" policy option? To state it differently, will the U.S. continue to consider use of military force a viable option? Unless weapons of mass destruction are discovered in Iraq, public support for any military invasion will require better verified evidence that such weapons exist.

I am sure that the witnesses before us will help shed light on these issues and answer at least some of my questions. I look forward to benefiting from their insight and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. I yield back the balance of my time.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Whether or not we want to admit it, we still live in the nuclear age. Perhaps we will always live in it. A dozen years after the Soviet Union disintegrated, nuclear weapons have not receded from the margins of our interest, as many expected, but remain at the heart. They still govern our foreign policy as never expected. Nuclear proliferation is at the heart of our confrontations with North Korea and Iran. It is also a central justification our nation used to engage Iraq in a preemptive strike, despite the fact that weapons of mass destruction have yet to be found.

Even more disquieting, the taboo of using nuclear weapons appears to have worn thin. India and Pakistan, our ostensible ally in the war on terrorism, instead of hiding their acquisition of nuclear weapons revel in their discovery. Other nations (83)

openly and eagerly seek to acquire them not just for status or preemptive purposes. No longer are they viewed as weapons of last resort, but are now seen by their masters as a means to fight wars. Sadly, the threshold for the use of WMDs is quickly being eroded.

The argument can be made that the Administration's threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has also been lowered as is evidenced by its cavalier attitude towards testing, the production of new battlefield nuclear weapons, and international agreements. The old arms control regimes-SALT, ABM-have been torn down. But nothing has been erected in their place, except for the future and still very questionable promise of a defensive shield that will protect Americans from nuclear first strikes. However, deployment of a credible defensive shield could very well have the unintended consequence of contributing to the wider proliferation of WMDs.

The war in Iraq represents perhaps the most important change in our nation's arms control posture in the last 50 years. What I and I believe others in this room fear is that this Administration relies too heavily on strong rhetoric and the threat of the use of force and undervalues arms control diplomacy. It has abandoned the ABM Treaty, calling it an anachronism, and has dismissed the Chemical Weapons Convention as unverifiable. To date, however, it has not offered up any alternatives, except the dubious proposition of preemptive first strikes.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony presented by Mr. Bolton as well as our other distinguished panelists and look forward to their comments on some of the issues I have raised.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY THE HONORABLE BETTY MCCOLLUM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, AND MR. BOLTON'S RESPONSES Question:

What steps is the Administration taking to focus intensive, sustained leadership on the issues of threat reduction in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union? What challenges do you face from the Russian government in this regard?

Answer:

The Administration is committed to robust nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.

The Departments of Energy, Defense, and State have collaborated under the Cooperative Threat Reduction and other authorities, to lock down threats that arose from the former Soviet arsenal. This Administration has funded these programs at historically high levels, although there remains much more still to do, and we must continue boldly down this path. The United States is spending about one billion dollars a year on nonproliferation and weapons reduction projects in former Soviet states, including to improve security at Russian storage facilities, to consolidate stored fissile materials, to stop new production, and to purchase or down-blend former nuclear weapons material to reduce supply.

In March, Energy Secretary Abraham signed an amendment to the U.S.-Russian Federation Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, as well as an implementing agreement between DOE and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, which together should lead to permanent closure of Russia's three plutonium production facilities. The State Department provides funds for the International Science Centers in Russia and Ukraine, which implement peaceful, commercial projects that employ former Soviet weapons scientists to reduce the temptation for those scientists to hire themselves out to proliferators.

We have also taken important steps to encourage stronger contributions by other countries. U.S. leadership resulted in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which was launched by G-8 leaders at the June 2002 Kananaskis Summit. It represents a major milestone in international commitment to nonproliferation. G-8 leaders pledged to raise up to $20 billion over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety projects in Russia to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists or states that sponsor them.

Since the Kananaskis Summit, we have continued strong efforts to ensure_the success of the initiative. Over the last year, our challenge has been to persuade Russia to take concrete actions to meet donor concerns about implementation obstacles in order for projects to move forward. This is our greatest current challenge in working with Russia, and we and our partners are working hard with Moscow and Russian regional authorities to find appropriate resolutions.

Question:

What efforts are you making to establish relationships with other key states like India or Pakistan whose nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists? Answer:

We are vigorously pursuing strong policies and programs to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation worldwide. We want to reduce the availability of dangerous nuclear materials and know-how, as well as reduce the demand for them. We have established, and are strengthening, partnerships with a large number of key states worldwide and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose safeguards program aims to ensure that civilian nuclear facilities remain exactly that— civilian-and to enable the IAEA to ferret out covert weapons efforts. We are prepared to back tough safeguards with increased funding. We are constantly working to make the international nuclear nonproliferation regimes more effective. We are aggressively engaged in multinational efforts to strengthen export control partnerships such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

We also are impressing upon other governments, such as India and Pakistan, the importance that they protect their security interests as well as ours by exercising greater scrutiny over their exports and to use their diplomacy more actively to dissuade proliferators.

We believe India and Pakistan are well aware of the importance of securing any nuclear material, components, and weapons they have. We are also confident that they are taking steps to assure the security of their nuclear assets.

Question:

What additional efforts are needed from Congress to ensure that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union are safe and secure from potential terrorists?

Answer:

Continued strong support from Congress for nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts, in the states of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, is vitally important. We share your support for the President's request for nonproliferation and threat reduction appropriations and authorities. This will ensure the continuation and, in some cases, the planned expansion of important ongoing work and provide increased flexibility in the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds. The CTR program has been a vital and very effective component of our efforts to advance U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction goals in the former Soviet Union and could also be a helpful tool in taking advantage of new opportunities.

The Administration has expressed concern about provisions in the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 04 (HR 1588) that would hinder DOD's and DOE's ability to implement more rigorously and effectively CTR and other nuclear nonproliferation activities and would limit the President's flexibility to apply CTR resources to the most pressing non-proliferation challenges in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

Strong ongoing support from Congress has also allowed the Department of State to undertake programs like the Science Centers, Bio-Redirect and Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS). It has also allowed the vigorous pursuit of DOE's Defense Nonproliferation programs and DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction effort. We ask your continued support for these efforts, as set forth in the President's budget request.

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