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U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AFTER

IRAQ

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] The Committee will come to order. The subject of today's hearing, U.S. nonproliferation policy after Iraq, is one of transcendent importance. It demands our attention. The prospect of rogue states or terrorists in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a terrifying one. There can be no acceptable margin of error in our effort to protect ourselves from this mortal threat, for the measure of our inadequacy will be unprecedented devastation.

I will not attempt to list the many problems and tasks we face as even a lengthy treatment would not begin to exhaust the subject. However, let me offer a few important questions.

How could we combat the fact that many of these weapons are extraordinarily easy to make and to transport? How does one persuade or compel a country to cease its activities, especially if it already possesses the means to proceed on its own? How can one prevent the further spread of the knowledge and technical capacity to produce WMD when this information seems to be so readily available? Must the United States take up this challenge alone? Can we do it alone?

I am hopeful that this hearing will shed some light on these important issues. The unbounded nature of the threat evokes Churchill's words on his assumption of office at Britain's darkest moment. He said,

"You asked what is our aim? I can answer in one word. It is victory, victory at all cost, victory in spite of all terrorists. Victory however long and hard the road may be for without victory there is no survival."

For us, however, there can be no final victory. We must divest ourselves of all illusions. We cannot uninvent these weapons nor erase the knowledge that makes the impossible. Therefore, we must accept the fact that the WMD threat will probably be us forever. Our vigilance and our commitment must also therefore be enduring.

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Today we are fortunate in having the opportunity to hear from an impressive array of witnesses with relevant expertise. As per the Committee's standard practice, I would ask the panelists to limit their opening statements to 6 minutes if they can. Their written statements will also be a part of the record of the hearing. I believe it would be more efficient if the panelists were allowed to give their opening statements in succession, after which the Members can pose questions to any or all of the witnesses. We can then begin a more productive discussion.

Although questions may be directed to individual panelists, I would encourage each of the witnesses to add any comments that they believe to be appropriate to the person asked to respond.

We will hear from Under Secretary Bolton following the initial panel, and I will introduce these panelists here shortly, but first of all, I would like to turn to the Ranking Minority Member, the distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos, for such opening statement as he may have.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We meet today on the heels of our spectacular victory in the war against Iraq. The impact of this victory will be felt for generations. Among other important effects, it represents a major event in the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whatever WMD may or may not be found.

By destroying Saddam's vicious regime, we sent a clear signal to would be proliferators that we are prepared to use force whenever necessary.

There is absolutely no doubt that the Iraqi dictator was hell bent on developing chemical, biological and nuclear arms. But regardless of the evidence we find, and we have already found some, no one should question the real threat Saddam posed to our national security and to the civilized world.

As the historic record clearly show, Saddam had the intention and the capability to wield weapons of mass destruction, and he used them against Iran and he used them against his own people. And as far as the U.N. inspection process is concerned, he lied repeatedly and never accounted for known stocks of WMD.

Had we not acted, sooner or later he would have deployed them. On those grounds alone our actions are not only justified, they were mandatory.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them are indeed a clear and present danger to our national security. Rogue states, including many state sponsors of terrorism, are swapping technology and materials to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

North Korea is the world's premier proliferator, exporting missiles to fellow rogue states, such as Iran, which is now under the cusp of joining the nuclear club.

Globalization has accelerated this trend as sophisticated dual-use research, technology and manufacturing knowledge leaks to rogue states, assisting them in developing weapons of mass destructions and the means of delivering them. Foreign supply dual-use equipment was critical to Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical and biological programs prior to the 1991 Gulf War, and I have no doubt

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