U.S. Nonproliferation Policy After Iraq: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, June 4, 2003, Том 4U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003 - Всего страниц: 85 |
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Стр. 5
... possible model for legally acquiring a nuclear weapons option of their own . Any nation , including China , Russia , India , Pakistan , Israel , North Korea , Iraq or Iran , can export many items critical to make weap- ons of mass ...
... possible model for legally acquiring a nuclear weapons option of their own . Any nation , including China , Russia , India , Pakistan , Israel , North Korea , Iraq or Iran , can export many items critical to make weap- ons of mass ...
Стр. 6
... possible imitators . Second , the U.S. should restrain its own nuclear transfers . We can hardly complain about Iran's power reactors , if we continue , as we are , supporting construction of nearly identical U.S. machines for Pyongyang ...
... possible imitators . Second , the U.S. should restrain its own nuclear transfers . We can hardly complain about Iran's power reactors , if we continue , as we are , supporting construction of nearly identical U.S. machines for Pyongyang ...
Стр. 7
... possible model for legally acquiring a nuclear option of their own . Any nation , including Russia , China , India , Pakistan , Israel , North Korea , Iraq or Iran , can export many items critical to make weapons of mass destruction ...
... possible model for legally acquiring a nuclear option of their own . Any nation , including Russia , China , India , Pakistan , Israel , North Korea , Iraq or Iran , can export many items critical to make weapons of mass destruction ...
Стр. 9
... Possible kgs of HEU / yr from 24,000 Pakistani - type centrifuges = 160,000 SWU / 200 SWU per kg HEU = 800 kgs or 40 bombs ' worth ( assuming 20 kgs per bomb ) . Enrichment requirements for making a large number of bombs starting with ...
... Possible kgs of HEU / yr from 24,000 Pakistani - type centrifuges = 160,000 SWU / 200 SWU per kg HEU = 800 kgs or 40 bombs ' worth ( assuming 20 kgs per bomb ) . Enrichment requirements for making a large number of bombs starting with ...
Стр. 10
... possible nuclear neighbors , but as a hedge against the Superpowers if they refused to curb their own nuclear arming ) . But if " because of higher considerations of the interests of mankind " non - weapons states decided not to ...
... possible nuclear neighbors , but as a hedge against the Superpowers if they refused to curb their own nuclear arming ) . But if " because of higher considerations of the interests of mankind " non - weapons states decided not to ...
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acquire nuclear weapons Administration allies Arms Control ballistic missile believe BEREUTER BERMAN Biological Weapons Convention BOLTON bombs Bushehr capabilities centrifuges Chairman HYDE chemical weapons China civilian clear Committee concern Congress cooperation countries Defense develop Disarmament efforts Energy enforcement export controls facilities global going highly enriched uranium IAEA Iklé interdiction Iran Iran's nuclear Iranian Iraq Iraq survey group Iraqi Libya mass destruction ment Middle East military nations NONPROLIFERATION POLICY Nordion North Korea nuclear materials Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty nuclear program nuclear proliferation Nuclear Suppliers Group nuclear technology nuclear weapons program option Pakistan peaceful Perkovich plutonium pose President proliferation protocol Pyongyang question reactor recently regime rules Russia Saddam sanctions Schumer Amendment scientists Secretary Bolton Security Council SOKOLSKI Syria target terrorism terrorist Thank threat tion trade U.S. Nuclear United uranium enrichment verify violation weap weapons of mass Zelicoff
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Стр. 12 - Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating. - to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and — to nuclear disarmament and - to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Стр. 3 - That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.
Стр. 16 - Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies...
Стр. 13 - Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 9 Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 45. 10 Ibid., 46. 11 Ibid., 45. 12 Thomas L. McNaugher, "Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War," International Security 15, no.
Стр. 58 - ... possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies. Interdiction Effective interdiction is a critical part of the US strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means. We must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist...
Стр. 51 - It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict...
Стр. 27 - We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systematically break them.
Стр. 51 - ... called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and a number of our close allies, including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies.
Стр. 50 - We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution," and "We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program.