45. Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Rumsfeld, if Iraqi military leaders fail to capitulate to U.S. forces and are destroyed, are there indigenous forces that could be utilized to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Indigenous forces would not be able to organize themselves on a nation-wide basis quickly enough to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq if the current Iraqi military were to be destroyed. Coalition forces would have to be prepared to provide this security until the establishment of an Iraqi Government that renounces WMD, poses no threat to its own people or to its neighbors, and does not engage in activities that pose a threat to international stability.

KURDISH AND TURKISH RELATIONS

46. Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Rumsfeld, Turkey, a critical ally that recently suppressed a long and bloody independence movement by its own Kurdish community, has warned repeatedly that it will not tolerate any move toward an independent Kurdish state on its border if Saddam's regime falls. Turkey fears that establishment of a Kurdish state with oil assets on its southeastern border would incite Turkish Kurds to seek secession from Ankara. Turkish fears have been rekindled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) moves to adopt its own flag and create an independent army, courts, and ministries. How can the U.S. leverage the assets of Iraqi Kurds in the north, but not anger the Turkish Government?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The United States and Turkey have consulted closely regarding events in northern Iraq. The United States remains very cognizant and respectful of Turkish "redlines." The Turkish Government fully understands that the U.S. Government does not support Kurdish independence nor ethnic-based federalism. The U.S. will conduct its relations with Kurdish groups in a manner consistent with these principles and with the goal of a unified, democratic Iraq.

47. Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Rumsfeld, can we be partners with both the Government of Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish forces, or are these mutually exclusive groups?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The United States has long worked with both Iraqi Kurdish political parties and the Turkish Government. Indeed, both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the KDP maintain offices in Turkey. The United States recognizes the security and political concerns of both Turkey and the PUK and KDP. Our Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish interests are not mutually exclusive.

48. Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Rumsfeld, will Iraqi Kurdish groups support U.S. efforts to move against Saddam if the U.S. opposes an independent Kurdish state?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Neither the PUK nor the KDP now seeks independence. After suffering extraordinarily at the hands of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Kurds seek a democratic, parliamentary Iraq with checks and balances to protect Iraq's minorities and ensure that minorities enjoy rights the same as all Iraqis. The territorial integrity of Iraq is a key principle of U.S. policy.

INDIGENOUS FORCES

49. Senator SANTORUM. General Myers, one of the lessons learned from Afghanistan is that highly-skilled U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel were able to leverage indigenous fighters to increase military power against enemy forces. Can we apply this or other lessons learned in the military operations in Afghanistan to the situation in Iraq?

General MYERS. Yes, the use of SOF in Afghanistan was a textbook case of unconventional warfare. Our SOF personnel were able to quickly establish relationships and create alliances that focused varied ethnic and cultural groups on the removal of a regime that was hostile to our country and aided and abetted an evil force that planned and implemented harm against the United States. We will definitely use this same strategy when appropriate against all national and transnational elements in our global war on terrorism.

50. Senator SANTORUM. General Myers, is there a viable indigenous force that, in concert with U.S. SOF, can be leveraged to defeat Saddam's military forces, control Iraq, and secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities?

General MYERS. Yes, there are several indigenous groups with which we can work. There are enough individuals that, with protection, training, resourcing and other forms of support, can be organized into an effective opposition force. The oppo

sition force could potentially assist in U.S. efforts to defeat Iraq's military forces and could form the basis for either an Iraqi Government in Exile or an interim provisional government that could be inserted to stabilize the country of Iraq after a regime change.

51. Senator SANTORUM. General Myers, how do the political objectives of these indigenous forces complicate U.S. efforts to achieve a change in regime, while at the same time maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity?

General MYERS. It is our goal to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq. While there are various factions in Iraq, as you have noted, all reports indicate that these factions are united in their desire to see the Iraqi regime go. We feel this is excellent common ground upon which indigenous forces can build consensus. The U.S. Government has been and will continue to be supportive of Iraqi groups who oppose the current Iraqi regime. It is our expectation that these groups will be key participants in building a representative government worthy of the Iraqi people.

OIL

52. Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Rumsfeld, it is reported that the U.S. is going to take elaborate measures to safeguard our access to oil reserves in the event of a military conflict in the Middle East. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, with 578 million barrels of oil, could be tapped in the event of a war or a national emergency. Recent news accounts note that oil shipments into the Reserve have reached record levels, about 150,000 barrels a day. With the U.S. importing 800,000 to 1 million barrels of oil a day from Iraq, do you believe that military conflict with Iraq will cause a disruption in our energy consumption endangering our economic security? Secretary RUMSFELD. The Secretary of Energy and the heads of other relevant agencies are in a better position to answer your question. However, it is my understanding that with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the reserves of other nations, plus the willingness of foreign producers to replace any lost supply, the United States can weather any foreseeable disruption of supply emanating from a conflict with Iraq without any significant effect on our economy.

53. Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Rumsfeld, would a comprehensive "national energy policy" provide better insurance against a disruption in our importation of foreign oil?

Secretary RUMSFELD. This question should be directed to the Secretary of Energy or anyone else involved in formulating U.S. energy policy.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S.

POLICY ON IRAQ

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in room SH216, Senate Hart Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Cleland, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Warner, Smith, Allard, Sessions, and Bunning.

Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director, and June M. Borawski, printing and documents clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Carmen Leslie Stone, special assistant; and Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Thomas C. Moore, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: Brady King, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Richard Kessler and Eric Pierce, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; Ryan Carey, assistant to Senator Smith; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. The Armed Services Committee meets this afternoon to continue our hearings on

U.S. policy toward Iraq. Last week we received testimony from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Today we will hear from former senior military commanders, all of whom have significant experience planning and conducting military operations. Then this Wednesday we will hear from former national security officials.

We welcome back to the committee this afternoon General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; General Joseph Hoar, former Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command; and Lieutenant General Thomas G. McInerney, former Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and before that, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Shalikashvili provided advice and exercised responsibility related to operations in the Balkans, Northern Iraq, and elsewhere. He also served as commander of Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991.

General Clark led the NATO-led Kosovo operation in 1999 as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in his capacity as Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, he oversaw Operation Northern Watch in Iraq.

General Hoar, as Commander in Chief of Central Command, was responsible for military-to-military relationships with a range of states that comprise the Middle East and North Africa and for operations conducted in Somalia and Rwanda.

Lieutenant General McInerney served as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and has considerable operational experience planning and executing missions in the European and Asian theaters of operation.

As I stated last week, we begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East. It is clear that the international community must act to prevent his efforts to build and possess weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.

The question before this Nation now is, what response is likely to be most effective in achieving the goal of bringing Iraq into compliance with United Nations (U.N.) mandates, particularly destruction of its weapons of mass destruction, and what response on our part is likely to entail the least risk to U.S. national interests?

We look to our witnesses today to share with us their thoughts on the administration's policy and to offer their assessment of the risks associated with an attack on Iraq, whether we attack with a U.N. mandate and with our friends and allies, whether we attack alone, whether we attack now or after we've exhausted other avenues for dealing with Saddam, including inspections; if we attack, the most effective way for our military forces to carry out their mission; and, after the successful conclusion of a military mission, how long U.S. forces will be required to remain in Iraq to ensure stability in the region.

How and under what circumstances we commit our Armed Forces to an attack on Iraq could have far-reaching consequences for future peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle

East, for our interests throughout the world, and, indeed, for the international order.

Each of our witnesses today knows well, personally, the awesome responsibility of committing our forces to combat, and so we look forward to their testimony.

First I'll call on Senator Allard. After I call on him for an opening comment, we would then ask our witnesses if they have opening comments that they would like to make. Then after that I would recognize each of us in the early bird order for a 6-minute first round of questions.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to give Senator Warner's statement on his behalf. He's not going to be here at the start of the hearing. My understanding is he's going to show up a little bit later, but I'd like to make it plain that I associate my thoughts very closely with what he's going to have to say in this opening statement.

So I'd like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in welcoming these four distinguished former military officers before our committee. All four of these gentlemen served our Nation with great distinction. I applaud all of you for your contributions you are making to this important Iraq debate and for the service you continue to provide our Nation as knowledgeable observers of our national security challenges and needs.

Over the past several weeks, our President has courageously focused world attention on the defiant, illegal conduct of this brutal, ruthless dictator, Saddam Hussein. On April 6, 1991, after having been expelled from Kuwait and decisively defeated, Saddam Hussein accepted U.N. terms for the suspension of military terms and promised he would comply with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and submitting to intrusive inspections to verify this disarmament.

Eleven-and-a-half years later, we're still waiting for Saddam Hussein to comply with international mandates, as reflected in 16 United Nations Security Council resolutions. We have over a decade of experience with his deceit and defiance.

The main thing Saddam Hussain has proved to the world in the past 12 years is that he cannot be trusted under any circumstances. I think General Clark had a very similar experience with a dictator in Serbia who is now rightfully behind bars.

Anytime the use of force is contemplated, those of us with a role to play in making the decision to use force must proceed with caution. Resorting to the use of force should be the last step, but it is the step we must be willing to take, if necessary. It is also a step those who threaten us must understand that we are willing to take.

As we contemplate our vulnerabilities and those of our allies in the post-September 11 war, it is clear that things have changed. The concept of deterrence that served us well in the 20th century has changed. Terrorists and terrorist states that hide behind surrogates who are not deterred by our overwhelming power, those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world, are not rational and are not deterred by rational concepts of deterrence.