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Senator DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but could the other three have a chance to respond, if time permits?

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, take one quick minute, if you would.

General CLARK. I'd prefer to go after Saddam Hussein as we're proceeding with the facts at hand. I am concerned about enunciating a doctrine of preemption, especially the pronouncement that it replaces deterrence and what the implications will be for that. I think it's far better to work through on the English case-law basis for changes in law than by trying to make sweeping pronouncements like this.

In fact, we're proceeding pretty well on the basis of what we had without calling this an instance of preemption. In all of the other discussions we've had within the government, over my experienceand there have been many of them where we've talked about preemption-we've talked in terms of going after specific facilities or specific capabilities. We've never talked about preemptively taking down a regime and changing a government, and I think that's a crucial distinction in this case.

You also have the problem in preemption of what is the imminence of the threat. Here, as we've discussed this afternoon, it's indeterminate what the imminence of the threat is. The most conclusive argument is that you can't trust the intelligence anymore to give you any idea of what the imminence of the threat is. That leads to a series of steps that we don't want to pursue here in our country.

So I'm comfortable with where we are moving on Iraq, but I don't see the need for bringing in this doctrine to it at this point.

General HOAR. Sir, very briefly, I think that Iraq is not in compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, and that should be ample reason, if we need a reason, to go forward. I share with General Shalikashvili the concern of the message that this sends to other countries, particularly the example that he used between India and Pakistan, but there are others, as well.

Thank you.

General MCINERNEY. Sir, I happen to believe in the preemption policy. I don't think it's required in this particular instance. I think deterrence, when you have terrorism-weapons of mass destruction have changed the calculus in terrorist states. They have changed the calculus. So the President must make those decisions at the appropriate time, not required in this, because there's 16 U.N. resolutions that he's violated. But almost daily he fires on our airplanes and coalition airplanes, which is an act of war. Anytime you fire on a nation's airplanes it's an act of war. So there is ample evidence for us to respond, and he continues to defy us because we continue to accept it.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me thank each of our witnesses. Some of you have come some distance. Others have made time available in their schedule. In all cases, your schedules are heavy, for good reason, because of the experience that you bring to this issue and to a whole lot of other issues that you address.

Saddam is clearly a problem and a threat to the region and to the world. I would just hope that the actions of this country would be focused on uniting the world to force compliance with disar

mament in Iraq. Uniting the world, it seems to me, has great pluses, both in terms of more quickly achieving our goals militarily, should they be necessary, and also avoiding some of the risks which are incumbent if we're either proceeding unilaterally or being perceived as proceeding unilaterally.

There may be some additional comments or questions that we would like from you for the record, in which case we will get to you within the next 48 hours.

Again, our thanks to all of you, and we will stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 5:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:44 a.m. in room SH216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Cleland, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, Inhofe, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.

Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff director. Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional staff member; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.

Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; L. David Cherington, minority counsel; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Daniel K. Goldsmith, and Andrew Kent.

Committee members' assistants present: Brady King, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Marshall A. Hevron, assistant to Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos and Eric Pierce, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. Senator Warner is a few minutes away, but his staff says that he has no objection to our beginning.

The Armed Services Committee meets this morning for the fourth of our series of hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. We welcome back to the committee Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Central Intelligence; and Samuel Berger, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In their previous positions, our witnesses provided advice to the presidents that they served regarding the use of military force to further U.S. national security interests. They helped shape a national security strategy based on these interests and advised the presidents on its implementation. Over the years, Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Berger have also provided advice to this committee on Iraq and on many other issues.

Two days ago, three of the four former senior military commanders who testified before the committee offered a strong endorsement of the need for a multilateral approach to dealing with Iraq. They stressed that working with the U.N. to achieve a resolution regarding inspections and disarmament backed up by the threat of the use of force by member states to compel compliance would bring great political and military advantages.

General John Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the committee that, "a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force would," in his words, "be a very powerful tool." He went on to say that, "we need to impress upon Saddam Hussein that he's not just facing the United States, but that he's facing the will of the majority of the world. We must also ensure that we have made it possible for as many of our friends and allies to join us, some of whom believe very deeply that you should go to war only unless you are directly attacked or with the sanction of the United Nations." He added, "every time we undermine the credibility of the United Nations we are probably hurting ourselves more than anybody else."

The general told us that, "we must, under no circumstances, ever create the impression that the United States is not free to go to war, but that is very different than not trying to achieve the kind of resolution that, in this case, we want. It would make our job easier, it would help us in the future, and it would surely have an impact on how Saddam Hussein reacts to the current resolutions." General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, commented that the President had made the right move by going to the U.N., stating that, "the President's strong statement provides leverage to build a new coalition for proceeding on a path of diplomacy backed by force. I think it's the appropriate path." Then he added, "we need to be certain that we are really working through the United Nations in an effort to strengthen the institution in this process, and not simply 'check a block."" He advocated taking the necessary time to build the strongest coalition possible to plan for a post-conflict Iraq, and then, if necessary, taking military actions with our allies and with the blessing of the United Nations.

General Joseph Hoar, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, testified that we should, "take the time to do the tough diplomatic work to gain support in the Security Council for disarmament, and, failing disarmament. then military action."

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