From that

war, and emerged still enjoying their confidence, is an accomplishment of a remarkable order, the more remarkable in view of the highly developed critical faculties of the Boers and their exceptional disregard of rank or position. It is, morever, significant evidence of his wisdom, tact, and powers of leadership. time he became the recognised head of his people. Having played a distinguished part in the war, he was equally prominent in the peace settlement. He took a leading part in the negotiations that led to the Terms of Surrender; and the Ten Articles that were ultimately signed lent some colour to the claim set up later that this instrument constituted a Treaty of Peace. No useful purpose would be served by a technical discussion upon the differences between Terms of Surrender and a Treaty of Peace, but, in the light of later events, it may be interesting to recall a passage from the 'South African News,' a Bond organ, which shows how the concessions made by the British Government were magnified.

'As every person possessing an ounce of imagination has seen long ago, the main hope of the permanence of the structure, whose foundations were laid at Vereeniging, is just the fact that the Republicans were not beaten to their knees, but entered the British Empire "in cap and plumes erect and free," and, therefore, able to forgive and co-operate with those whose full-blood brethren and partners they then became.'

This is not true of the condition of the Boer forces when peace was sought, nor is it true, unfortunately, that the Boers as a whole became 'brotherly' in their attitude towards the British Empire. It may be interesting to remark that the correspondence preceding the agreement concerning the Terms of Surrender discloses the efforts of the Boers, first to retain their independence, then, while surrendering independence as regards foreign relations, to retain self-government under British supervision. Finally, finding themselves unable to make any headway upon such terms, they obtained powers from the burghers in the field to accept the conditions approved of by His Majesty's Government for the surrender of the Boer forces, and set forth in the Ten Articles. Botha himself, no doubt as a matter of good policy, always referred to this document as the Treaty

or Peace of Vereeniging; but it should be clearly understood that he never wavered in any of his utterances from the position that the Boers were bound by every dictate of honour to respect the obligations into which they had entered.

It was not surprising that, after the conclusion of hostilities, a sea of bitterness remained. Botha and the other Boer leaders stood aloof and denied their assistance to Lord Milner during the period of Crown Colony administration, and they declined the proffered seats upon the Legislative Council formed in 1903. About the beginning of that year, owing to the continued state of depression in the country, agitation for political reform began. Slack times find men without sufficient occupation for their thoughts in the business of life, and they turn to the contemplation of their misfortunes, fruitful foster-parents of political discontent. The British section of the South African population, therefore, split up into two groups, the one desirous of full responsible Government, the other, and, I think, the more thoughtful, of a half-way house in advance of Crown Colony administration as a first step. The divergence of views among the English encouraged General Botha to summon a Congress of the Boers, which was opened in Pretoria in May 1904. Towards the conclusion of his opening address, he said,

'Our people have made great sacrifices; they have shed their blood and wept tears of bitter sorrow; but they must thoroughly understand that the lowering of their flag and the change of Government do not entail the renunciation of their traditions. Now is the time for us to prove to our new Government that we are and shall remain one people, of whom they must become proud. We have one object in view, and that is to live and to work in unison with the new population; and my earnest hope and prayer is that it may please the Almighty to inspire the entire white population in South Africa with feelings of unity, so that a nation may be born worthy to take its place among the nations of the world, where the name of "Africander" shall be heard with honour and applause.'

I quote this passage because, although Botha consistently pleaded for the unity of the white population, he did not

embrace the golden opportunity of that moment to join the Responsible-Government Party, with whose views he and his friends were in accord. If racial divisions could have been eliminated, there was no ground then for the formation of the third party, Het Volk.' It is impossible to say whether or not he could have induced his followers at that date to join with their English fellow-citizens, but at that Congress undoubtedly the first public step was taken to set up an organisation by which the two white races were kept apart. Botha, of course, knew his fellow-countrymen well, and may have had good grounds for considering that the memory of the war was too fresh to permit of a union.

The Progressive Party stood as a whole for the policy of Lord Milner. They were most anxious that the fabric of Government created by him should be fortified, because they foresaw in the consolidation of that system thoroughly progressive control in education, in agriculture and railway administration, in the department of justice, in short, in all those departments of State in which good government is eminent. But the time had arrived for giving to the people greater powers than they enjoyed as a Crown colony. The British Government framed what was known as the Lyttelton Constitution, which was transmitted to the Transvaal on March 31, 1905; and the Progressive Party favoured its adoption as a suitable bridge between the previous system and the grant of complete representative or responsible Government. But the Liberal Unionist Government was then tottering to its fall. The Liberal Party, thanks in no small measure to the effective if unscrupulous use made of the Chinese Labour cry, came into power with a very large majority in December 1905, under the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman. They made short work, without a trial, of the Lyttelton Constitution, and in December 1906, granted the full powers which General Botha and his compatriots, as well as the members of the Responsible Government Association, who had split away from the Progressive Party, had demanded.

A Commission, consisting of Sir West Ridgeway (Chairman), Lord Sandhurst, Sir Francis Hopwood (now Lord Southborough), and Colonel Johnston, was

thereupon sent to South Africa to delimit constituencies in view of the settlement of the Transvaal Constitution. After investigation, the Commission determined to discriminate to some extent in favour of the country districts. There was considerable force in the arguments used, namely, that the sparse population of the country districts would be at a disadvantage in exercising their voting rights, as against the population in the towns, and on this account were entitled to some consideration. The net result of the action taken was, however, to throw power into the hands of the South African Party, with which, to no small extent, those who had belonged to the Responsible Government Association threw in their lot. A good deal of heat was generated during the elections; and, in spite of all parties declaiming against the revival of old animosities, a great deal of racial bitterness ensued. Animosity was, perhaps, even stronger between the Progressives and ResponsibleGovernment men than between the Progressives and the Boers. After the elections, Botha's party had secured 37 seats, the Progressives 21, and the Nationalist, Labour, and Independent Parties between them the remaining 11. Botha therefore commanded a majority, and became Prime Minister of the Transvaal in 1907.

When the House met the atmosphere was rather electric, and the leading men on either side hardly spoke to each other. The unfriendly state of feeling seemed to forbode evil consequences, and the situation was one that called for cool-headed judgment. I was not at this period a member of the House, nor had I taken an active part in the elections; I was therefore in an independent position and able to work for less inimical relations between the rival parties. After some time, I came to be on friendly and, indeed, intimate terms with General Botha and General Smuts, not without rather unhappy moments for myself from time to time, because the old and valued friends, with whose political creed I had always been identified, viewed my action with dislike, and even, at times, with suspicion. The effort, however, was not altogether unsuccessful, nor was it, indeed, onesided, because the Prime Minister discussed matters with me, which, on account of the strained relations, he would

not discuss with his political opponents. General Botha continuously and publicly avowed his desire to do justice to, and bring about a reconciliation between, all sections of the white people. Every one in South Africa realised that nothing could be worse for the country than the widening of the breach.

Happily, there came about a gradual amelioration in the state of feeling; and during those fateful years I learned to appreciate General Botha's breadth of view and his sincere desire to earn the confidence of British and Dutch alike. That, upon his assumption of office, he should have found it necessary to place a number of his own countrymen in positions of responsibility is not surprising; nor, indeed, would it probably be inaccurate to say that his inclinations also leaned in that direction. In any case, the victory at the polls necessitated and justified some consideration for the members of his party; and I do not think his action in this connexion can be deemed extravagant. Some of those to whom he gave appointments may not have been as competent as could be desired; but, be that as it may, one is bound to admit that he was faced with an extremely difficult task, and the manner in which he succeeded in carrying it out is a very high tribute to his statesmanlike qualities. The Progressive Party was naturally critical, because they believed that the welfare of South Africa was, to some extent at least, being sacrificed to political expediency. If exception may be taken to some of Botha's measures, one fact cannot be denied, namely, that he steadily gained in the people's confidence and rose in popular esteem. To him above all other men should be accorded the credit of rendering the National Convention possible.

Lord Milner relinquished office in March 1905, and was succeeded as High Commissioner by the Earl of Selborne, whose affable disposition, coupled no doubt with his knowledge and love of farming, rendered his appointment a very happy one in the circumstances. He set to work to cultivate friendly relations, not only with General Botha and his Cabinet, but also with the people at large. He travelled about the country, visiting the farmers, and contributed in no small degree to the establishment of a better state of feeling. The work of reconstruction and the forward railway policy of