APPENDICES APPENDIX A Certificate of Eligibility for Non-Immigrant (F-1) Student Status' 10. School Certification: I cantly under penalty of perjury that all information provided above in dems through 8 was completed before i signed the form and is true and correct, i esecuted this form in the United States after review and evaluation in the United States by me or other officials of the school of the student's application, wenscnpts or ether records of courses taken and preet of financial responsibility, winch were received at the echeal prior to the execution of the form; the school has determined that the above named students quefications meet all standards for admission is the achest; the student will be required to pursue a full course of study as defined by 8 CFR 214.20(6); I am a designated official of the above named school and I am authorized to leave this form. 11 Student Corsication: I have read and agrees to comply with the terms and conditions of my admission and those at any extension of stay as specified on page 2. I cerely that all informaten provided on this form refers specifically to me and is true and correct to the beat of my knowledge. I certify that I seek to enser or remain in the United States temporarily, and solely for the purpose of pursuing a course of study at the school named on Page 1 of this form. I also authence the named school to release arvy information from my records which is needed by the ING pursuant to a CFR 214,3(g) to determine my nonimmigrant status. U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Form I-20 A-8/1-201D (Rev 04-27-88) N. 15 (161) The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) has established a pre-inspection program that currently is used in a handful of countries. The goals of that program include preventing "bottlenecks" at busy United States airports, as well as preventing the entry of undesirable aliens, especially international terrorists and criminals. Aliens have fewer rights in foreign countries than they have once they have entered the United States. Thus, a thorough law enforcement program, such as a vigorous employment of the INS pre-inspection program, can be a valuable tool for preventing the entry of undesirable aliens into the United States. Expansion of the INS pre-inspection program should be explored. Immigration issues in the United States The members of the EAB also made several suggestions concerning procedures and policies relating to aliens present in the United States. United States Government agencies cannot presently use protected or classified information—including sensitive technical and human source information-in deportation or other proceedings against aliens, because there are no adequate means to protect that information under existing law. Disclosure of the information could compromise ongoing investigations. There is, therefore, a need to establish a mechanism for in camera, ex parte proceedings relating to the use of protected or classified information in alien proceedings.4 A related problem involves deportation appeal procedures. Those procedures often delay deportation for many years, thereby defeating the goal of expeditiously removing undesirable aliens. Failure to remove them swiftly from the United States simply exposes our country to needless risks. Aliens coming to the United States to engage in illegal conduct know that one of the easiest ways to enter and remain in the country is by requesting asylum. Such a person entering the United States today either is asked to post a small appearance bond or released into the United States on his own recognizance, and instructed to appear for an immigration hearing at a future date. Any legal procedures devised to address such aliens will fail unless they include provisions for the detention and removal of the alien. At present, too may of these aliens simply blend into American society and never return for their immigration hearing. Two other categories of aliens require additional scrutiny: those who enter on student visas and do not abide by their terms; and, those who enter the United States and thereafter engage in “sham marriages” with American citizens or permanent resident aliens in order to attain permanent resident status themselves. Aliens seeking to avail themselves of these immigration privileges should undergo thorough scrutiny at the outset, as well as some form of continuing scrutiny. In the case of student visas, such follow-up investigation would include reviewing the alien's academic records. Investigative tools The EAB also assessed the need for various tools that can be used to investigate alien activities in the United States. At present, some portions of an alien's INS asylum file are not available to other law enforcement agencies. For example, the FBI has noted that, in terrorist investigations, those unavailable portions of an alien's asylum file could prove invaluable. Indeed, those portions could provide sufficient leads to prevent the commission of further terrorist acts or crimes. Thus, in certain instances, full or expanded disclosure of the contents of an alien's asylum file should be considered. I also note that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act does not provide for "roving authority" to intercept communications. Such authority would enhance the FBI's ability to investigate aliens' terrorist activities in the United States. I am available to discuss this matter at your convenience. 3 In those instances in which a suspicious alien's is not blocked in the foreign country, the pre-inspection program allows American law enforcement to use the alien's flight time to the United States to conduct any additional investigation which could prevent his entry. 4I urge reconsideration of the "Terrorist Alien Removal" legislation that the Department of Justice has drafted previously. The core concept of this legislation creates a special court to conduct "special removal hearings" directed, against aliens in the United States who engaged in international terrorist activities. At the hearing, the court would conduct an in camera, ex parte review of certain types of sensitive, classified information. 5 Obviously, the intent is not to harass an alien who lawfully opts either to study in this country or to marry an American. Instead, the intent is to ascertain which aliens are using these avenues as a means to remain in this country indefinitely in order to engage in unlawful conduct. I recognize that certain legitimate privacy interests are implicated. The requirements for such authority in criminal investigations are set forth at Title 18, United States Code, Section 2518 (11). (II) The gathering of information on potential targets for terrorist activity. (III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, false documentation or identification, weapons, explosives, or training, to any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity. (IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or for any terrorist organization. (V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist organization, terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity. (iv) REPRESENTATIVE DEFINED. As used in this paragraph, the term "representative" includes an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, counsels, commands, or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity. APPENDIX C.-FBI DIRECTOR'S MEMORANDUM ON LOOPHOLES IN THE U.S. VISA SYSTEM1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM To: Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General From: Louis J. Freeh, Director, Office of Investigative Agency Policies At your request, the Office of Investigative Agency Policies (“OIAP”) has considered "Current procedures, policies and practices relating to aliens' entry into and departure from the United States," and addressed ways "to improve the Department's law enforcement capabilities in these areas." In making this request, you noted the participation of aliens in two heinous crimes: the World Trade Center bombing and the killings outside of the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters. After consulting with the members of the OLAP's Executive Advisory Board (“EAB”),2 I make the recommendations contained herein. The recommendations, if fully implemented, would require an infusion of funds and personnel. Visa applications The members of the EAB stressed the need for coordination and cooperation in determining whether the United States Government should issue a visa to an alien. In this regard, it was noted that, when agencies provide information to the State Department which suggests that a visa should not be issued, the State Department should not specify the reason for the visa's denial. Such information often results from criminal investigations and, thus, its disclosure could jeopardize them. Accordingly, the EAB recommends, and I endorse, the establishment of a uniform system for the State Department's communication of visa denials. The members of the EAB also expressed concern about the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, which the United States Government employs with a growing number of countries. Criminals and terrorists can use that program to their advantage. For example, although an undesirable alien may be a citizen of Country A (a country that does not participate in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program), he obtains false documents demonstrating his citizenship in Country B (a partner of the United States in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program). Such false documents avert the necessity of his procuring a visa to enter the United States, thereby avoiding any overseas State Department scrutiny of his right to enter. Failure to allow that overseas scrutiny shrinks the United States Government's "window of opportunity" to exclude or detain that person from a few weeks to just a few hours. I recognize the foreign policy and political implications of United States participation in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. Nevertheless, in view of the competing law enforcement interests described herein. I recommend careful review of any expansion of United States participation in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. 1In this memorandum, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh outlined several concerns regarding the potential use by terrorists of loopholes in the U.S. visa system to gain entry into the United States. In particular, Freeh cited the need to subject foreign students to thorough and continuing scrutiny both prior to and during their stay in the United States. Subsequent footnotes in the memo are from the original. 2The EAB consists of representatives from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), United States Marshals Service (USMS), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Justice's Criminal division. The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") has established a pre-inspection program that currently is used in a handful of countries. The goals of that program include preventing "bottlenecks" at busy United States airports, as well as preventing the entry of undesirable aliens, especially international terrorists and criminals. Aliens have fewer rights in foreign countries than they have once they have entered the United States. Thus, a thorough law enforcement program, such as a vigorous employment of the INS pre-inspection program, can be a valuable tool for preventing the entry of undesirable aliens into the United States. Expansion of the INS pre-inspection program should be explored. Immigration issues in the United States The members of the EAB also made several suggestions concerning procedures and policies relating to aliens present in the United States. United States Government agencies cannot presently use protected or classified information-including sensitive technical and human source information-in deportation or other proceedings against aliens, because there are no adequate means to protect that information under existing law. Disclosure of the information could compromise ongoing investigations. There is, therefore, a need to establish a mechanism for in camera, ex parte proceedings relating to the use of protected or classified information in alien proceedings.4 A related problem involves deportation appeal procedures. Those procedures often delay deportation for many years, thereby defeating the goal of expeditiously removing undesirable aliens. Failure to remove them swiftly from the Ûnited States simply exposes our country to needless risks. Aliens coming to the United States to engage in illegal conduct know that one of the easiest ways to enter and remain in the country is by requesting asylum. Such a person entering the United States today either is asked to post a small appearance bond or released into the United States on his own recognizance, and instructed to appear for an immigration hearing at a future date. Any legal procedures devised to address such aliens will fail unless they include provisions for the detention and removal of the alien. At present, too may of these aliens simply blend into American society and never return for their immigration hearing. Two other categories of aliens require additional scrutiny: those who enter on student visas and do not abide by their terms; and, those who enter the United States and thereafter engage in "sham marriages" with American citizens or permanent resident aliens in order to attain permanent resident status themselves. Aliens seeking to avail themselves of these immigration privileges should undergo thorough scrutiny at the outset, as well as some form of continuing scrutiny. In the case of student visas, such follow-up investigation would include reviewing the alien's academic records. Investigative tools The EAB also assessed the need for various tools that can be used to investigate alien activities in the United States. At present, some portions of an alien's INS asylum file are not available to other law enforcement agencies. For example, the FBI has noted that, in terrorist investigations, those unavailable portions of an alien's asylum file could prove invaluable. Indeed, those portions could provide sufficient leads to prevent the commission of further terrorist acts or crimes. Thus, in certain instances, full or expanded disclosure of the contents of an alien's asylum file should be considered. I also note that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act does not provide for "roving authority" to intercept communications. Such authority would enhance the FBI's ability to investigate aliens' terrorist activities in the United States. I am available to discuss this matter at your convenience. 3 In those instances in which a suspicious alien's is not blocked in the foreign country, the pre-inspection program allows American law enforcement to use the alien's flight time to the United States to conduct any additional investigation which could prevent his entry. 4I urge reconsideration of the "Terrorist Alien Removal" legislation that the Department of Justice has drafted previously. The core concept of this legislation creates a special court to conduct "special removal hearings" directed, against aliens in the United States who engaged in international terrorist activities. At the hearing, the court would conduct an in camera, ex parte review of certain types of sensitive, classified information. 5 Obviously, the intent is not to harass an alien who lawfully opts either to study in this country or to marry an American. Instead, the intent is to ascertain which aliens are using these avenues as a means to remain in this country indefinitely in order to engage in unlawful conduct. I recognize that certain legitimate privacy interests are implicated. 6 The requirements for such authority in criminal investigations are set forth at Title 18, United States Code, Section 2518 (11). APPENDIX D.-CONCLUSIONS OF THE INS TASK FORCE ON FOREIGN STUDENT CONTROLS 1 The following conclusions were reached by the task force: At present, foreign students in the U.S. are not subject to continuing scrutiny, tracking, or monitoring when they depart, drop out, transfer, interrupt their education, violate status, or otherwise violate the law. Schools are not required to notify INS regarding such key elements of student events. Presently there is no effective system or process for reporting or maintaining current addresses of foreign students in the U.S. Weak and ineffective data system or process for reporting or maintaining current addresses of foreign students in the U.S. where the INS has authority and responsibility. These are: Admission of a foreign student at port of entry (POE) to the United States; upon change of status to student; and upon application of associated benefits. There is no inter-agency data system access between INS, DOS, and USIA in the current process. The current change of status process for aliens within the U.S. fails to apply effective scrutiny relative to granting of student status. The current system does not use biometric identifiers to verify true identity of foreign students. The Student/School data system does not provide all the information needed to effectively monitor and regulate students and schools, and also is not linked to other related INS data systems. The INS has no system in place to monitor or audit schools. APPENDIX E.-AUTHORIZATION FOR A PILOT PROGRAM TO MONITOR FOREIGN STUDENTS 1 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 1997-P.L. 104–208 SUBTITLE DOTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 641. PROGRAM TO COLLECT INFORMATION RELATING TO NON-IMMIGRANT FOREIGN STUDENTS AND OTHER EXCHANGE PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS (a) IN GENERAL. (1) PROGRAM. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Education, shall develop and conduct a program to collect from approved institutions of higher education and designated exchange visitor programs in the United States the information described in subsection (c) with respect to aliens who (A) have the status, or are applying for the status, or nonimmigrants under subparagraphs (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; and (B) are nationals of the countries designated under subsection (b). (2) DEADLINE. The program shall commence not later than January 1, 1998. * (c) INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED. (1) IN GENERAL. The information for collection under subsection (a) with respect to an alien consists of (A) the identity and current address in the United States of the alien; (B) the nonimmigrant classification of the alien and the date on which a visa under the classification was issued or extended or the date on which a change to such classification was approved by the Attorney General; (C) in the case of a student at an approved institution of higher education, the current academic status of the alien, including whether the alien is maintaining status as a full-time student, or, in the case of a participant in a designated exchange visitor program, whether the alien is satisfying the terms and conditions of such program; and 1U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Controls Governing Foreign_Students and Schools That Admit Them," Final Report by the Task Force on Foreign Student Controls, 1995. The INS convened the task force in response to FBI Director Freeh's 1994 memorandum (see Appendix B). This is a partial list of the report's principal conclusions. This recently enacted legislation authorizes a pilot program to determine the feasibility of monitoring foreign students in the United States. |