The committee is pretty well assembled and this would be a good opportunity, before questioning, to have that done. (There was discussion off the record.) The CHAIRMAN. We will now ask Senator Byrd if he has any specific comments or questions he would like to direct to the Secretary. Senator BYRD. I would like to ask the Secretary if his recommendations are the same as the Hoover Commission's, and if not, would you explain the difference? Secretary FORRESTAL. They differ, Senator Byrd, and in this respect I think a dissenting group on the Hoover Commission recommended a Chief of Staff, as I recall it, which this does not embrace. Mr. Leva, would you respond to the question more fully? Mr. LEVA. The principal difference is this: The Hoover Commission recommended that the departmental secretaries be made Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The President's recommendation is that they remain Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively. On this particular point, there was a dissent by four members of the Hoover Commission, the four dissenters recommending that the Departmental Secretaries remain Secretaries. That is a major point of difference between the President's recommendation and the recommendation of the Hoover Commission. Speaking more broadly to this general subject, I might add that the Hoover Commission recommended an Under Secretary of Defense and three Assistant Secretaries, and also a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-the same recommendations on these points as the recommendations contained in President Truman's message of March 5. Percentagewise, the two measures are 80 to 90 percent identical. Senator BYRD. I think, Mr. Chairman, it would be well if the Secretary would furnish a memorandum in that respect, showing exactly in detail the difference between your recommendation as Secretary, and the Hoover Commission's. The CHAIRMAN. Could you do that, Mr. Secretary? The CHAIRMAN. So we could answer specifically how much of the Hoover approach we have, and how much is left out, and why. Senator BYRD. You mentioned on page 3 that there would be a considerable dollar saving by reason of the unification. What is your estimate of that? Secretary FORRESTAL. I would be reluctant, Senator Byrd, to make any estimate. In one particular field, the Munitions Board has stated that there has been a savings of around $40,000,000, but— Senator BYRD. How did that savings occur? Secretary FORRESTAL. I would have to get that in detail for you, Senator Byrd; but, when you come to the identification of savings in a program, we have to bear in mind that where there has been a march down the hill in the demobilization process, we then have had to begin to arrest that process and march back up the hill, and I would say that there has been a saving of a substantial amount in certain procedures of procurement. Senator BYRD. What do you mean by "substantial amount"? Secretary FORRESTAL. Again I would want to identify that more precisely by checking with the specific record. Senator BYRD. Out of the program of expenditures of approximately $15,000,000,000 could you give an estimate of what you think has been saved, or will be saved in the immediate future? Secretary FORRESTAL. Our spending, Senator Byrd, has not been $15,000,000,000, it has been about $11,000,000,000, since the fiscal year 1947 Senator BYRD. Approaching $15,000,000,000, is it not? Secretary FORRESTAL. The authorizations are approaching that. Senator BYRD. It would seem that any economies effected in the 11 billion would be reflected in the 15. Secretary FORRESTAL. I would frankly be reluctant to try to spell out, in a dollar figure, any savings; because, as I say, we have been in the process of first arresting the demobilization and have then been reversing our steps to march back up again. Senator BYRD. Was that not one of the major arguments made for unification, at least there would be considerable savings? Secretary FORRESTAL. It was not made by me, Senator Byrd. I always said that I thought it would be most difficult to identify economies. Senator BYRD. But you state, in what you read, there are considerable dollar savings. Secretary FORRESTAL. I say I will provide you with those specific references. Senator BYRD. You wouldn't call $40,000,000 out of $12,000,000,000 or $13,000,000,000 considerable? Secretary FORRESTAL. What, Senator Byrd? Senator BYRD. $40,000,000 out of 12 or 14 billion dollars, whatever the expenditures would be, is not a very considerable saving. Secretary FORRESTAL. No, it is not; and I am frank to say that the tangible evidences of economy are not great, as of now. I think that the procedures that we can set up, that will be provided for in this measure, will greatly accelerate the methods and the possibilities of getting economies. Senator BYRD. Is anything being done about the procurement? That was testified to, I don't know whether you did or did not, but it was testified to by different agencies that there would be very considerable savings in procurement of supplies. Secretary FORRESTAL. Economies have been effected by the consolidation of procurement, both through having a single department buy for all three and through joint procurement arrangements. For example, all photographic equipment is purchased in one place, all medical supplies are concentrated in their buying, and the result of those consolidations will reflect in the future very substantial economy. I could not say to you, however, that in my opinion there has been any great reduction arising out of this act of 2 years ago. Senator BYRD. What changes have been made in procurement under unification? Secretary FORRESTAL. The specific changes are these: The Munitions Board has addressed itself to the whole field of what the services buy. As a result of their studies, they have informed me that joint or coordinated procurement arrangements now account for approximately 80 to 85 percent by dollar volume of all military purchasing. Senator BYRD. What do you mean by "joint procurement"? Does that mean that one agency buys for the Army, Navy, and the Air Force? Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes. I mentioned a particular example, photographic equipment. I think I have some examples here. Do you have the list, Mr. Leva, of some of those items that can be identified? Mr. LEVA. Yes, sir; here it is. Secretary FORRESTAL. For example, the purchase of coal and all other solid fuels is all under the cognizance of the Navy. They procure for all services. As I mentioned before, the Air Force now buys all photographic equipment. The Army buys all basic foods. Those are three concrete examples. I will get you a complete list of the items which are now either jointly or singly purchased-the distinction being that the method is either an assignment of responsibility to the particular service to buy all of that product, or a collaborated effort for which the two will disburse and buy in common. Automotive equipment, for example, is all bought by the Army, for all three services. Senator BYRD. You intend to furnish a memorandum on that? I confess, as one member of the committee, I was very much disappointed. Apparently it is effecting no economy that anybody can point to that has resulted by this Unification Act. The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Senator Byrd? Senator BYRD. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall? Senator SALTON STALL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask five questions? The CHAIRMAN. Yes; more if you like. Senator SALTONSTALL. First, I hope that the Secretary will be available in the future when we know a little bit more about this thing, word by word. Mr. Secretary, do I understand that the difference between the Hoover report and what you now suggest, is making the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Secretaries rather than Under Secretaries? Does that mean that they retain their positions in the Cabinet? Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, they are not now in the Cabinet. Secretary FORRESTAL. They are members of the National Security Council. Senator SALTON STALL. And would they stay as members of the National Security Council? Secretary FORRESTAL. No, they would not. There would be one member of that Council from the Department of Defense, and that would be the Secretary of Defense. Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, also this act on page 7, proposes that the Secretary of Defense shall be the Chairman, "who shall have the power of decision." I call your attention to those words and then call your attention to the words: "The Chief of Staff is appointed by the President," if a hasty reading is correct, with no time limit, so that the Chief of Staff who would take precedence over all officers, and from whom you would take your recommendations, would be a man presumably 89469-49 --2 in the confidence of yourself and the President, and who would rate on top of all the others. He would have the power of recommenda tion to you and you would have the power of decision. Now, could you elaborate a little on your conception on how that would work? Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, of course I do not refer to this man as Chief of Staff in the sense of exercising command over the military components of the armed forces. I look upon him as a man carrying out the functions of a chairman, who undertakes to, let us say, provide the agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs, see that their business is vigorously prosecuted, to resolve or identify those issues upon which agreement is not reached, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense upon those unresolved questions. Senator SALTONSTALL. May I interrupt? Senator SALTONSTALL. Does that mean that your conception of this officer, and the conception you have of your duty on top of this officer, so to speak his recommendations merely give you the power of resolving decisions in the case of disagreement, and not, we will say, resolving decisions contrary to the advice of all three services, to put an extreme case? Secretary FORRESTAL. I could hardly imagine such a situation. I see what you are driving at. You might have a situation where one man went counter to the military judgment of the three heads of the services; is that it? Senator SALTONSTALL. I bring that up because you will recall 3 years ago, that was the subject of very considerable discussion, and the formulation of the act under the word "general," which was gone into with a great deal of care. Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes. I think the distinction is this: That the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of a consultative body, rather than a single person who is directing and using the services of the military commanders. I visualize his function as collating and bringing together the opinions and views of his three other colleagues, and bringing those views to the attention of the Secretary of Defense, identifying the issues upon which there is no agreement. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Saltonstall, would you like for me to make an observation along the line you are discussing, so those who read the record, who are not on this committee, will be aware of it? As I understand, Mr. Secretary, the present situation is that when the three Chiefs of Staff get together and a problem is submitted to them under the existing law, unless all three agree, no step can be taken. All three of the Chiefs of Staff must agree before they can proceed with a policy. Secretary FORRESTAL. I don't think that is in the law. The CHAIRMAN. I don't mean necessarily in the law, but I say that is the way it is done under the existing set-up. Secretary FORRESTAL. Yes, it is implicit in the present organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It does not necessarily follow that we could not depart from their decision, but the lack of a chairman or a man to coordinate and bring together and bring into sharp focus their views, and make a recommendation upon issues which they have not resolved before, has been pointed out particularly for me by the work of General Eisenhower in the last 2 months. It has made it very clear how much more vigor and how much more energy-regardless of the attainments of the men who comprise the Joint Chiefs of Staff-how much more in the way of results can be attained by a man who is sitting over them directing and driving the completion of unfinished business. The CHAIRMAN. Take the illustration of the recent action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unifying the medical services which ought to eliminate a great deal of duplication and effect some small but notable economy. It was not until recently that they were able to agree on that program, so that all agreements of that kind can be facilitated, leading to unification, if you have somebody to coordinate that right on the spot, is that not correct, Mr. Secretary? Secretary FORRESTAL. That is correct. I might interject, by the way, in response to one of Senator Byrd's observations on economy, that the step to which you have just referred can lead to very substantial economies. We have already, Senator Byrd, made very substantial economies which are difficult, however, to spell out in dollars, now. We have closed or consolidated 38 hospitals in different areas. But, to return to your point Senator BYRD. At that point, Mr. Secretary, you would probably close them anyway. You had them open during the war and I don't think that could be regarded as an economy, closing hospitals that are not needed. Secretary FORRESTAL. But, somebody has to provide the energizing force, or the common central initiative to see that they are closed. Senator BYRD. That is a matter of judgment. Any person that has charge of the program such as that should exercise that judgment. They closed the Woodrow Wilson Hospital at Staunton, Va. I cannot conceive that closing a hospital that was established during the war, in time of peace should be considered as an economy. Secretary FORRESTAL. Unless there is a driving and common central authority, it may not be accomplished. Senator BYRD. I would hate to think that the military departments of this country are so inefficient that they would continue in operation a hospital that is not needed, unless there was some driving force that would compel them. Secretary FORRESTAL. As you know, there is a line of demarcation, and sometimes it is not a very broad one. Senator BYRD. This hospital that I refer to, and others, were closed before the unification program went into operation, to a large extent. I am not going to undertake to bring up an issue on that, anyway, because I have a great admiration for the service you have rendered. I certainly do agree that closing hospitals after the war is over can be productive of economy, if you don't need them. Secretary FORRESTAL. Let us say that the procedure was accelerated and has been accelerated. Senator BYRD. I hope, Mr. Secretary, you can show some more concrete examples when you submit your memorandum. I don't want to interrupt for more evidence, if you want to give it. |