I do not agree with those who feel that nothing but disparity has been achieved by the passage and operation of the National Security Act. So many witnesses of position and discernment have testified that real progress has been made, that to deny it seems unreasonable. That there still persists, however, damaging rivalries and even controversies within the military establishments, many other witnesses have stated and events have proven. The country cannot afford to endure the wasteful character of these divergencies either in war or peace. It is my view that we shall not be able to avoid these controversies or achieve the best preparation for war if some drastic steps are not taken to elevate the thinking of the officers of our armed services to a plane beyond that of the interests of their respective services.

Though the last war was handsomely won, victory was accomplished as much by the plenitude of our resources and energies as by good management. Those who know something of the inner conduct of the war are aware of the frustrations and compromises which marked some of its planning. Though the level of planning and decision was high it could have been better and in the next war it may well have to be better. The next war, if there be one, is so certain to demand all our capacities that we shall not be able to afford less than the best management as well as the best economy of our resources. It is for these fundamental reasons that I urge the establishment on the highest level of men in uniform whose sole duty it is to consider the problems and potentialities of the fullest and best utilization of all our armed forces without relation to the interest or alleged interest of the various services. The country needs and deserves to have something other than plans based on the desires of any particular service or on a compromise of the desires of all of the services. Just as certainly as it proved wise to have general officers thinking in terms of the best use of the forces which the cavalry, the arillery, and the infantry could deliver rather than a committee of the chiefs of those services determining our preparation for war so I believe it is now essential that we have officers whose ambitions and whose duties are to consider the best combined use of our air, sea and land reserves. There is no force so technical that its application cannot be considered, given good technical advice, by mature and intelligent men. I therefore feel that though this report gives some recognition to this concept in providing for what is called a military assistant to the Secretary of Defense it does not go far enough to be fully constructive in its recommendations regarding this officer and his relation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is my view that the position of highest rank and dignity in the armed forces should go to the man whose heavy responsibility it will be to give thought to the over all application of the Nation's force and to advise the Secretary of Defense accordingly. Just as our Committee felt it important to make the authority of Secretary of Defense unequivocal so I feel should raise those who think in terms of the over all defense of the country to what is clearly the highest position in our armed forces. I believe it would stimulate the younger officers to such type of thinking if they knew that the highest possible achievement of their careers would lead them to such a post rather than to the post of command of a particular service or to the office of chief advocate for their service's point of view in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The uniformed adviser to the Secretary of Defense should therefore in my judgment be indisputably senior to all other officers in the Armed Services. I would make no bones about calling him Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. I would not call him a military assistant or an adviser. His authority would be subordinate to that of the Secretary of Defense and, of course, to the President, but I would leave no doubt in anyone's mind that he occupied the post of highest distinction of all our men in uniform.

I do not lay much emphasis on the "man on horseback" complex. It is frequently put forward by those who themselves seek unfettered power. I doubt whether we need fear the man in uniform in this regard any more than the man or men in civilian clothes to whom we have given far greater authority.

Indeed, as many examples as there are of authority usurped by generals or admirals, I believe history records about as many instances of usurpation on the part of civilians with at least as disastrous results. Witness Hitler and Mussolini.

I do not wish to labor this point but I would feel more comfortable if the Secretary of Defense had by him some one of high stature to assist him in reaching the most difficult judgments regarding military matters which, under our recommendations, as well as existing law, he has now to render. History, I may add,

records a number of examples of the moderating influence which the military have, from time to time, exercised over too adventuresome statesmen.

Although I feel we will. come to the point in case of war, I would not at this time press my recommendation to the point of insisting that the Chief of Staff, as I describe him, be given over-all command in time of peace. As for the Joint Chiefs of Staff I would have the Chief of Staff, as I describe him, sit as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings and I would give him at least the power of terminating discussion in that body after he had given full opportunity for discussion. He should also have power to report the result of the discussion with his recommendation to the Secretary for decision.

I would make the officer I describe a member of the Security Council. I think this is extremely important. It is just as important that the civilians on that Council receive the over-all military point of view in making their political decisions as it is that this individual receive the full force of the political, social, and economic considerations which affect military actions. Since it is this man's duty to consider the full application of the Nation's force it is his duty to take into account the economy of the country. He will only be sensitive to this influence if he operates on a plane elevated above that of the services.

I have mentioned the suggestion, in connection with the emphasis we are placing on economy, that such an officer would be in a better position to effect economies with this power and rank than many civilians.possibly could. He would recognize padding more readily and he would not be so easily deflected from inquiry by technicalities as some civilians might be, particularly if he came to feel, as I believe he soon would, the full responsibilities of his office. I would not deny such officer the right to have such assistants as he needs, whether they are called "staff" or members of his office.

As for the argument that time will heal all and therefore one should proceed gradually in order to allow greater time for experience to play, I would inquirehow much time have we got? The condition of the world today demands that our Military Establishment be put in order right away. Because the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the heart of the matter as we are now organized I would deal with them and their authority. They are much more important than even the Munitions Board or the Resources Board and their decisions are more far-reaching. We recognize that the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Resources Board, civilian organizations, shall have power of decision yet we hesitate to grant power of decision to the military agency which sparks the whole thing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff can less afford the system of committees and veto rule than others. Even with the urgency of war and the presence of a great and objective personality as one of the Chiefs, the frustrations of this system were evident on a number of occasions in the last war. Moreover, even with this suggestion there will be plenty of opportunity for evolution to improve whatever organization we adopt. The important objective is to get off center so that we evolve in the right direction.

There are many other considerations which I feel could be advanced for this program but this letter is already too extended. I wish to conclude by emphasiz ing that, though I feel deeply on the point I have dwelt upon in this letter, I strongly commend the committee and particularly you as its chairman for the exhaustive work which I feel it has performed.

If the conclusions I urge were followed there are a number of statements in the general discussion and particularly in those dealing with the military assistant and the Joint Chiefs of Staff which would need alteration in order to fit the tenor of my recommendations but this letter, I think, gives a sufficient indication of the character of such changes without the necessity or advisability of being more specific at this time.

Sincerely,

The CHAIRMAN. We have with us Mr. Kimball who is Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. In the absence of Mr. John Sullivan, who is ill and away on leave, we have asked Mr. Kimball to come up and give us the views, his own or the Navy Department's, or both. as to the merits and demerits of the new bill to further unify the Armed Services.

We will be glad to hear you, Mr. Kimball.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN A. KIMBALL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR AIR

Mr. KIMBALL. Thank you, Senator. I am a little new at this business and some of my opinions

The CHAIRMAN. In order that the record will be accurate, how long have you been acting in this capacity?

Mr. KIMBALL. Five weeks, tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. KIMBALL. But I have put in a considerable amount of study on this bill and the other problems of the Navy, and I certainly want to support the President's message to Congress on the need for effective action by the Department of Defense and also Colonel Johnson's need.

I don't know whether this is pertinent to the thing or not, but I think whether this new bill is enacted or not, Colonel Johnson will run the show very capably. He is a very strong man and has very decided opinions and is extremely capable, so I don't know whether it is necessary to have this enacted. That is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps not in his case, but it might be necessary in somebody else's case, is your position?

Mr. KIMBALL. If you get a weak man later on, it would be very necessary that the provisions of this bill be clearly defined so as to carry out the wishes of Congress. The size of the Military Establishment is so large that it really needs a very considerable amount of thought. About two-thirds of the personnel of the Federal Government work for the Military Establishment and they have, as you know, about a third of the budget. So it is in dollars and people much more important than any other executive branch of the Government.

I may say, in my opinion, unification is going along extremely well, much better than I was led to believe before I got there. I found that most of the fighting was in the newspapers and not among the people that were doing the work. When you get down in the committees that I have been very busy with, you start off with a problem and there is an extreme difference of opinion and after a day or so you resolve that down to something that we all agree is sensible and that we can live with. So every day you are making real progress on it.

Now, I took this organization chart that I noticed here this morning with the differences from the present bill, the way they have been outlined, and point No. 1, which is the change of the National Military Establishment, Department of Defense, I think is O. K.

The second one, where the Secretary of Defense gets increased authority to direct and control, I think that is all right. I think that is good. I think there may be some question whether you could transfer personnel between departments, between the different services without the concurrence of those services.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean civilian or military personnel?

Mr. KIMBALL. I am thinking primarily of military personnel. There should be some check on the transfer of military personnel between the departments except in the fields of procurement and accounting. I think there is quite a lot of work to be done on that, and I am drafting some recommendations to Mr. Johnson now on procurement and accounting, and have some ideas that I have gotten on how we can reduce our costs over there. I think those things have got

to be done. We have got to get an approach as commercial establishments do in the way of cost to get their work done there. I think we have to have a par course that will approach or better what they are doing. I don't know whether we are getting that now or not. I don't think we are.

On point No. 3, the Under Secretary of Defense, that is all an accomplished fact and I think it is very good, and I think the selection of Mr. Early is excellent. I don't think you could pick a better man. On No. 4, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, if Mr. Johnson and the President think that that is necessary, it may be all right, whatever they want. They have actually three administrative assistants now, but if the three Assistant Secretaries of Defense are appointed, I believe their duties should be defined in relation to the Secretaries of the different services because the way the bill is, as I read it, you don't know whether they are above them, equal to them, or below. I think you have to define some line of authority.

On the fifth point, the Secretary is removed from membership in the National Security Council. I am not in favor of that. I think that the services are primarily concerned with security and the services, in addition to the State Department, must be in on that to the greates possible extent. The problems will be so large that it seems to me it is going to be pretty hard for one man to be able to handle all that thing. I think the thing is so intimate to our national security that we should have the people on there that are on there now. I haven't studied that as much as I might have, but I think that represents the feeling, at least the Navy.

No. 6, for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I think that is all right, but I do believe the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be for a definite term and there should be rotation between the services. I don't think you can have a chairman that is indefinitely-in wartime you would practically have to-but actually you would hate to put all the responsibility for the Military Establishment in one man which is essentially what you do in this.

On point No. 7 on the limitation of a hundred members, I think that is satisfactory. I think he has to have more.

Point No. 8, on Chairman of the Munitions Board, that is satisfactory, but I believe that Board should carry out the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because that is primarily what they are for, assistance and planning.

The Chairman of the Joint Research and Development Board, I think that is satisfactory. I would like to point out in connection with points 8 and 9 that it is possible to make the chairmen of those Boards the authority on the Boards and the balance only in an advisory capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. One a full-time job and the others on call from time to time?

Mr. KIMBALL. At the discretion of the Secretary of Defense, they can vest all the authority of the Board in the Chairman. My only observation on that is that in a business enterprise you wouldn't do it that way, you have a Board of Directors. The Chairman of the Board of Directors may be browbeating them into what he wants, but actually he has got to listen to their advice, and I would say that the Chairman should not be the final authority on that without a lot of thought. On No. 10, where the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force

are military departments within the executive department, I just have one question on that: Isn't that a merger and not unification? I have not clearly defined in my mind executive department.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, each one of them would be a separate department, as I understand it, and it is so defined in the bill. It would be the Navy Department, the War Department or the Army Department, and the Department of the Air Forces.

Mr. KIMBALL. I have not gotten the fine distinction between the military department within the executive department. It seems to me that may be a merger and not unification.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Mr. Secretary, it is pretty nearly unanimous here, as I have listened to the committee talk, that no matter what happened, we would want these three Departments within whatever executive department is created separate and not pushed together, so that they will be administered as separate units. Isn't that your thought?

Senator KNOWLAND. I am not so sure about that. I think it is something we have been exploring here, but as far as the services are concerned, I think everybody is agreed that they are not going to scramble all the services together. But, frankly, I am not clear in my own mind, providing your services can be maintained as separate entities, because they have separate jobs to do, whether it would be more valuable, or less valuable, to have the men who are now Secretaries, Secretaries of separate departments or as Under Secretaries in the Department of Defense, because in fact they become almost that under this law, as I read it.

Mr. KIMBALL. Whatever the title is, that is exactly what they are. Senator KNOWLAND. That is what they are. Now, the question is, rather than throwing in an intermediate echelon of three Assistant Secretaries we will say to the Under Secretary and maybe having the line of command a little confused, whether you would be better off in having an Under Secretary for Air, an Under Secretary for the Navy, and an Under Secretary for the Army, and maintaining your three services separately, because even in your own Navy Department you have the Marines and the Navy now. You don't have a secretary for the Marine Corps and yet the Marine Corps has been maintained as a separate service in the Navy Department.

Mr. KIMBALL. I agree. As a matter of precedent and pride, you might get better men as Secretaries of those Departments rather than Under Secretaries, as a practical matter.

Senator KNOWLAND. I am not going to say, quite frankly, that I am not convinced either way that it would be either a good thing or not a good thing to do, but I would like to explore it some on these hearings.

Mr. KIMBALL. I think that should be explored and I think it is very essential that the integrity, if you might call it, of the three Departments be maintained. I feel, as I expressed before, with Colonel Johnson they will be, and he is a very capable man and a very forceful man and he would do a fine job running it, but looking down the road, if you get a weak man down there we may have trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are not opposed to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as I recall it?

Mr. KIMBALL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You think somebody has got to be boss up there?