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quantitative and monetary basis, under regulations which he shall prescribe. Such property records shall include the fixed property, installations, and major items of equipment as well as the supplies, materials, and equipment held in store by the armed services. The Secretary shall report annually thereon to. the President and to the Congress.
"REPEALING AND SAVING PROVISIONS
"SEC. 413. All laws, orders, and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this title are repealed insofar as they are inconsistent with the powers, duties, and responsibilities enacted hereby: Provided, That the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense under this title shall be administered in conformance with the policy and requirements for administration of budgetary and fiscal matters in the Government generally, including accounting and financial reporting, and that nothing in this title shall be construed as eliminating or modifying the powers, duties, and responsbilities of any other department, agency, or officer of the Government in connection with such matters."
MISCELLANEOUS AND TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS AND SAVING PROVISIONS
SEC. 11. (a) The National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking out the term “National Military Establishment”, wherever it appears in such Act, and inserting in lieu thereof “Department of Defense".
(b) Section 207 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 207. (a) Within the Department of Defense there is hereby established a military department to be known as the Department of the Air Force, and the Secretary of the Air Force who shall be the head thereof. The Secretary of the Air Force shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”
(c) Section 207 (b) of the National Security Act of 1947 is repealed.
(d) The first sentence of section 208 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking out the word "under” and inserting in lieu thereof the word "within”.
(e) Section 308 (b) of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as follows:
“(b) As used in this Act, the term 'Department of Defense’ shall be deemed to include the military departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and all agencies created under title II of this Act.”
(f) The titles of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Under Secretaries and the Assistant Secretaries of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, shall not be changed by virtue of this Act, and the reappointment of the officials holding such titles on the effective date of this Act shall not be required. It is hereby declared to be the intention of Congress that section 203 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 5 of this Act, shall not be deemed to have created a new office of Deputy Secretary of Defense but shall be deemed to have continued in existence, under a new title, the Office of Under Secretary of Defense which was established by the Act entitled “An Act to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for an Under Secretary of Defense”, approved April 2, 1949 (Public Law 36, Eighty-first Congress). The title of the official holding the Office of Under Secretary of Defense on the effective date of this Act shall be changed to Deputy Secretary of Defense and the reappointment of such official shall not be required.
(g) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the National Military Establishment, the Departments of the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force, or to any officer or activity of such establishment or such departments, shall, except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, have the same effect as if this Act had not been enacted; but, after the effective date of this Act, any such law, order, regulation, or other action which vested functions in or otherwise related to any officer, department, or establishment, shall be deemed to have vested such function in or relate to the officer or department, executive or military, succeeding the officer, department, or establishment in which such function was vested. For purposes of this subsection the Department of Defense shall be deemed the department succeeding the National Military Establishment, and the military departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force shall be deemed the departments succeeding the Executive Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force.
May 12 (legislative day, APRIL 11), 1949.-Ordered to be printed
Mr. TYDINGS, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the
(To accompany S. 1843)
The Committee on Armed Services, having had under consideration amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, report favorably a bill (S. 1843) to convert the National Military Establishment into an executive department of the Government, to be known as the Department of Defense; to provide the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility and authority, and with civilian and military assistance adequate to fulfill his enlarged responsibility; and for other purposes, and recommend that it do pass.
Development of the National Security Act of 1947
From the beginning of the discussions conducted by the Woodrum committee in 1944, it has been apparent that our postwar system of national security is a matter of deep concern to the public, the Congress, and the military services. Such widespread awareness of the importance and gravity of this question of a sound organization for our armed forces was a natural outgrowth of the impact on the national consciousness of a long and bitter war. World War II demonstrated with startling clarity that the demands of modern warfare call for a far tighter integration of all phases of national effort than was the case in World War I. In no field of our prodigious wartime endeavor had this need for unity of effort been more apparent than in the operations of the armed forces themselves. Throughout the period of actual hostilities each succeeding year emphasized with increasing clarity the fact that the conducting of successful combat operations required a degree of coordination among the Nation's land, sea, and air forces that was far beyond anything which had been required before. Fortunately, under the stress of the most trying
conditions, during which the very existence of the Nation was imperiled, our armed forces were able to develop wartime operating procedures which were sufficiently integrated to bring about the total defeat of all hostile military forces.
With the end of active hostilities it became apparent that the statutory organization for national security under which the Nation had previously operated needed extensive revamping lest in the relative apathy of peace it revert to its antiquated prewar structure and the invaluable lessons learned during the stress of combat be lost.
It was against this background of war experience that the discussions originally begun in 1944 were continued during the succeeding years, with the result that the more basic issues began to identify themselves clearly, and the areas of disagreement became more apparent. There was general agreement that our postwar military organization should be built around a tightly knit core of land, sea, and air power. The difficulty lay, not in determining whether, but how closely, these three major branches of our military strength should be integrated.
On the one hand many persons, civilian as well as military, having impressive ability and broad experience, advocated an outright merger of the services. On the other hand, a very substantial number of individuals, having equally impressive ability and experience, advocated a much less drastic course of action and suggested that the solution to this very complex problem lay in a plan of voluntary coordination among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In the face of such widely differing opinions, it is not strange that over 3 years elapsed before an acceptable solution was formulated, and the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted into law. This act was admittedly a compromise between the two extremes of opinion, but it was regarded at the time as the most suitable basis upon which to build for the future. The declaration of policy which appears in section 2 of that act is so fundamental to the basic concept of the statute as to merit quoting it at this point.
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.
A significant provision of the declaration of policy is that the three military departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force shall retain their identity and shall be administered on a departmental basis. Operation of the 1947 act
Most students of the problem of unifying the armed forces have felt that the process is basically one of evolution and will take considerable time to reach full fruition. Further, they are in general
agreement that the National Security Act of 1947 represented but a starting point and that it would be necessary to return to the act from time to time so as to reexamine its provisions in the light of experience. The lay mind is perhaps less patient. At any rate, from the very outset the actual operation of the Unification Act was observed with critical public scrutiny; and it soon became apparent that the road to unification was a very circuitous one indeed. After watching the act operate for 18 months, there was general agreement among all types of observers that although it provided a practical and workable basis for a beginning in coping with the twin problems of unification of the military services and coordinating the military policy with foreign and economic policies, its operation revealed certain weaknesses in the statute that required correction. At the same time, however, the declaration of policy upon which the act was built had shown itself to be basically sound and worthy of continued acceptance.
In concluding this outline of the history of the development and initial effectiveness of the National Security Act of 1947, it is both appropriate and accurate to point out that the wholesome gains which have been made toward the goal of sound unification, and the prestige and respect which the Office of the Secretary of Defense enjoys in the minds of the people of this country, can be traced directly to the vision, the ability, the tireless effort, and the personal stature of the first Secretary of Defense, Mr. James Forrestal. The President's message
On March 5, 1949, the President recommended to the Congress certain modifications of the National Security Act of 1947 which he considered essential if the Nation was to keep its security organization abreast of changing requirements. The message recommended certain definite changes in the existing law, as is shown in the following extract taken from the message:
1, therefore, recommend that the National Security Act be amended to accomplish two basic purposes: First, to convert the National Military Establishment into an executive department of the Government, to be known as the Department of Defense; and, second, to provide the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility and authority, and with civilian and military assistance adequate to fulfill his enlarged responsibility.
Within the new Department of Defense I recommend that the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force be designated as military departments. The responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for exercising direction, authority, and control over the affairs of the Department of Defense should be made clear. Furthermore, the present limitations and restrictions which are inappropriate to his status as head of an executive department should be removed. The Secretary of Defense should be the sole representative of the Department of Defense on the National Security Council.
I am not recommending the blanket transfer of all statutory authority applicable to the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense. Neither am I recommending any change in the statutory assignment of combatant functions to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. I recommend, however, that the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force administer the respective military departments under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense
To meet these additional responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense needs strengthened civilian and military assistance. This can be provided by the creation of new posts and by the conversion of existing agencies of the National
Military Establishment into staff units for the Secretary. I recommend that Congress provide an Under Secretary of Defense and three Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
The duties now placed by statute in the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board should be recognized as responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense The act should be amended to make possible the flexible use of both of these agencies, and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as staff units for the Secretary of Defense. Finally, I recommend that the Congress provide for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to take precedence over all other military personnel, and to be the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and to perform such other duties as they may prescribe History of proposed bill
A bill, S. 1269, reflecting the recommendations of the President was introduced in the Senate on March 16. The Committee on Armed Services held extensive hearings and discussions on this bill, and after a series of executive sessions devoted to a detailed consideration of the issues involved reports a committee bill in lieu of S. 1269. The committee bill, as was the case in S. 1269, is in very close agreement with the President's recommendations. It also is in general accord with the recommendations made by the Hoover Commission, as reflected in the report of that Commission submitted to the Congress in February 1949.
Section 10 of the bill, which adds a title IV to the National Security Act of 1947, provides for certain budgetary and fiscal reform within the military departments. This proposed title is in accord with the Hoover Commission's report on budgeting and accounting made to the Congress in February 1949 but not included as a part of the President's message of March 5. These particular amendments were drafted under the supervision of Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt. The committee wishes to record its appreciation for the great amount of painstaking effort as well as the brilliant personal attainments which Mr. Eberstadt devoted to this task.
Since the armed services are the Nation's biggest spenders, it is considered entirely logical by the committee that these measures for fiscal reform should be applied initially in the armed services without waiting for their adoption on a Government-wide basis. Experience gained in the military departments can later be profitably used as these reforms are extended to other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
The committee feels that the amendments to the 1947 Act which are recommended herewith, are a sound step forward in this transition to a national-security structure which will meet the demands of a modern world. Further, the committee feels that the proposed amendments veer toward the conservative, or evolutionary, view of the problem rather than toward the more decisive approach suggested by an outright merger. As a matter of fact, the committee is quite aware that there is considerable validity to a criticism that the proposed legislation is somewhat too conservative-a criticism to which the views of a number of witnesses whose national prestige as well as whose practical experience in this field lends considerable weight. Notwithstanding conflicting views, the committee feels that the measures recommended in the legislation are fully adequate at the present time and do not go beyond the correcting of weaknesses which 18 months of experience has clearly shown to exist in the 1947 Act.