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Board) of Office of Inspector of Naval Material, San Francisco, Calif., at annual savings of $7,000.


As a result of a joint study in Hawaii, the Navy has assumed the responsibility of producing the printing and reproduction for all three departments in the Hawaiian area, resulting in a one-time saving of $9,000 and an annual saving of $50,000.



Joint organization of inspection facilities at the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Newport News, Va., was accomplished whereby Navy assumed inspection work for Army on Army transport conversions, effecting an estimated (one-time) savings of $120,000 during the fiscal year 1948. Standardization of procedures and policies for cost inspections for the armed services has achieved

| coordination and uniformity estimated as saving $300,000 annually in their costinspection program. Under one detail of this program the Navy will inspect Army orders without reimbursement up to $30,000 a year. The Army has implemented a joint Army-Navy plan consolidating technical services and Navy procurement at one headquarters in New York City eliminating duplicating expenses and overhead to achieve an annual savings of $17,000.

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In March 1948 the Munitions Board's Committee on Facilities and Services completed a plan which directed the combining of public information schools of the armed forces at one location, effecting an estimated annual savings of $101,076.


As a result of a series of joint studies throughout the United States, the Secretary of Defense directed joint use of recruiting facilities on December 1, 198. Annual estimated savings, based on accruals to date, amount to $1,132,346 in the Chicago and San Francisco areas alone. These savings are achieved through reducing the amount of rental space, personnel, motor vehicles, and other facilities and services.


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Of the many unification projects undertaken in the field of research and development within the National Military Establishment, 60 projects have been concluded in the form of joint agreements between, or directives to, the services to effect greater economies and efficiencies. On 21 of these completed actions it has been possible to estimate at this time the monetary savings effected on an annual or one-time savings basis as indicated (dollars shown below are savings).

Amphibious radar special tests conducted by Navy for the Marine Corps, $250,000 (one-time); Research and Development Board enabled the Navy's Bureau of Yards and Docks to avoid expenditure of $948,000 (one-time) in research projects on dry-cleaning plants, low-temperature batteries, lightweight air-borne tractor, ice mechanics kit, and highly technical warfare defense equi; ment; jointservices coordination on Army's Corps of Engineer development project on liquid fuels plant, storage, and distribution equipment at a savings of $750,000 (onetime), plus an additional $100,000 (one-time) savings through Army-Navy joint development of a semiportable generator, in connection with the guided-missiles program; joint Army-Navy development of petroleum distribution and storage equipment, $325,000; joint Army-Navy use of facilities and services in joint research on water distillation, $273,000 (one-time) ; joint Army-Navy development of a miniature gyrocompass for navigation, $100,000 (one-time); joint Army-Navy research and development of demolitions and mine fields (amphibious assault shakes, water, and temperature resistant detonating cords), $48,000 (one-time) ; joint Army-Navy development of Diesel pile hammer, $10,000 (onetime) ; joint Army-Air Force development of 25-ton truck-mounted crane, $86,000 (one-time) ; joint Army-Navy development of 5,000-pound capacity air-borne hydraulic crane, $40,000 (one-time) ; Army's use of naval electronic laboratory in planning antiaircraft problem generator, $75,000 (one-time) ; Naval Ordnance Laboratory, Newton Neck, Ma., closed and fuze testing functions transferred to Aberdeen Proving Ground, $68,000 (annually); Army-Air Force quartermaster


research by agreement performed by Army, $4,000,000 (annually). Army's agreed use of Air Force's climatic hangar, Eglin Field for testing of its protective equipment, flame throwers, etc., $200,000 (one-time) and $5,600 (annually); Army's agreed use of Air Force's Aero-Medical Laboratory, Alaska, for cold weather and Arctic testing of chemical warfare, $25,000 (one-time), and $1,000 (annually); Army's agreed use of Air Force's Langley Field wind tunnel for testi.lg aerial ordnance and other warfare equipment, $16,000 (one-time) ; Army's use cf Navy facilities at Muroc, Calif., for testing mechanism of chemical munitions, $11,000 (one-time) and $800 (annually); Army's Chemical Corps joint use of a Navy west coast facility (identity withheld) saved $200,000 (onetime) and $65,000 (annually) ; joint Army-Navy-Air Force cooperation in basic research program with colleges and universities saved $1,961,000 (one-time); joint Army-Air Force Alaskan Electronics Field Laboratory, $1,500,000 (onetime) ; joint Army-Air Force agreement on vacuum-tube components and materials development, $1,000,000 (annually).


McGuire Air Force Base is supplied, under agreement, with subsistence (class 1 supplies) and other supplies and services by Army's Fort Dix, N. J., at estimated annual saving of $24,000. The Navy roasts coffee for the Army at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, Calif., and the Naval Clothing Depot, Brooklyn, N. Y., at estimated annual savings of $150,000.


More than 60 projects have been completed toward unification of training facilities and services. Several of these projects involve multiple facilities and services. An example of a project on which it has been possible to estimate monetary savings effected is the joint Army-Air Force agreement providing for cross-service specialist training of Air Force installations personnel in engineer, SSN's and for the specialist training of replacements for engineer ASWAF units at Fort Belvoir at an estimated annual savings of $2,040,000. Organized Reserve units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are jointly using facilities in 19 cities in seven States with savings as yet undetermined. A Nation-wide study for extension of joint use of such facilities is well under way.


Joint-services agreements and directives to date have effected monetary savings possible of being estimated as follows: Navy's use of Army's spare charters Seattle-Alaska runs saved $33,000 (one-time); other naval intercoastal use of Army's chartered vessels for lifting naval cargo saved $918,215 (one-time); Navy's use of Army's tank cars has sared $150,000 (one-time); Army's OTC base and field maintenance of Air Force's rail equipment effects savings of $792,000 annually ; Dow Air Force Base maintains 5 Army recruiting vehicles at annual savings of $1,100 and Presque Isle Air Force Base maintains another 5 Army recruiting vehicles at annual saving of $1,500; Rome Air Depot, N. Y., maintains 15 nearby Army vehicles at annual savings of $700 (difference saved per vehicle accounted for by difference in travel) ; Fort Warren Air Force Station maintains 27 nearby Army vehicles in Wyoming at annual savings of $19,000; 22 additional Army vehicles are maintained by the Air Force at savings of $4,224 annually ; Navy maintained an average of 30 Army vehicles at an estimated annual savings of $3,384; Army furnished technical services and maintenance on Air Force railroad equipment in the Sixth Army area at a saving of $5,106 annually. Sixth Army Marine Repair Shop furnished the field maintenance and emergency repair on Air Force and Navy floating equipment at annual saving to the Air Force alone of $14,500. Additional annual savings effected in the field of joint-automotive maintenance from studies conducted and completed to date are $861,350 annually in the Northeast area of the United States, and $56,000 annually plus a one-time saving of $61,000 in Puerto Rico; Navy's logistic support for Army and AEC for operation Sandstone and in the Eniwetok proving area effected onetime saving of $288,000 (in lieu of chartered ships).


Joint efforts, negotations, and agreements effected between and by the military departments with the private utilities concerned have effected accomplished annual savings of $410,000 plus a one-time refund of $65,000 to the Government. The annual savings were effected through cross-servicing arrangements, exchange of equipment, installation of single metering, single service contract with the assistance in some cases of the Department of Justice or the Federal Bureau of Supplies. These consolidating projects involved the military installations at Chicago, Ill., Arlington, Va., Brooklyn, N. Y., Hawaiian Islands, and Kansas City, Mo.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have with us this morning Mr. Eberstadt, who has had considerable experience in the general field of military preparedness, in several capacities, and whom we have invited to appear before us today so that he might give us his advice on the pending reorganization in the National Defense Establishment.

Mr. Eberstadt, we will be very glad to have you proceed.

Mr. EBERSTADT. Senator Tydings and gentlemen, with your permission I will go through this statement and if you care to interrupt me, at any point, that will be entirely satisfactory.


Mr. EBERSTADT. I appreciate your invitation to appear before this committee.

I am not a member of the Hoover Commission nor am I authorized to speak for it. I was chairman of the Commission's task force committee on the National Security organization which made its report to the Commission but I am here today as an individual, not on behalf of our committee.

Anyone familiar with the mass of conflicting evidence and controversial recommendations on unification that have been heaped upon you in recent years must feel deeply grateful, not only for your thorough and astute attention to these vitally important matters, but also for your wise and moderate decisions.

While we still have a long way to go before our national security machinery is operating efficiently and economically, we can draw some encouragement from the fact that it is today in many important respects better than ever in our history. Credit for this belongs largely to your committee.

The National Security Act of 1947 was a tremendous step forward and far superior to the views of extremists on either side of the fence. That does not mean that the act is perfect in all respects. It does mean, however, that in its broad philosophy and framework, the act sets up a structure responsive to the new and urgent needs of our times; a structure conceived on sound principles which, with such specific improvements as practical experience indicates to be desirable, affords a means of accomplishing the vitally important objectives which Congress outlined in the declaration of policy constituting section 2 of the act.

The improvement over the last year or so in our national security positon is in substantial measure the result of this act. In absence of clear proof of need, we should, therefore, be very deliberate about making drastic changes in this essentially sound statute.

When our committee assembled last June, the national security organization was about 8 months old. When we completed our task last November, it had been in operation for only slightly more than a year. It was diflicult to discriminate between defects of youth and weaknesses inherent in the structure itself. No less difficult was the

problem of correct assignment of responsibility for shortcomings as between policies, organization, and personnel. In dealing with organizational problems, it is important to remain aware of these distinctions for there is a constant temptation to attempt to cure defects in the other two categories through organizational expedients. This is impossible and not free from danger. The attempt to meet deficiencies in these fields through drastic organizational expedients will not only fail of its purpose, but may injure a sound organization.

Good organization can facilitate the formulation of sound policy and its implementation; but organization, in and of itself, however perfectly conceived, will not automatically assure either efficiency or economy. That is, and will remain, a matter of human action based on study, experience, and judgment.

I mention this point at the outset because, from shattered illusions that mere passage of a unification act would produce a military utopia, there has sprung an equally illusory belief that present shortcomings will immediately disappear if ony more and more authority, is conferred on the Secretary of Defense, and more and more functions put into his office, and more and more people added to his staff. I do not share this view. To some extent that theory permeates the amendments proposed in the bill before you (S. 1269). I suggest that great care be exercised lest the Office of the Secretary of Defense, instead of being a small and efficient unit which determines the policies of the Military Establishment and controls and directs the departments, feeding on its own growth, becomes a separate empire.

Our committee was conscious of these limitations to a purely organizational approach to the problems of our national security organization. We tried to be quite clear as to exactly what specific organizational defect each proposed change was intended to remedy, to aim the recommendation squarely at the defect—to use a rifle instead of a shotgun--and to recommend the minimum change necessary to assure attainment of the desired objective, lest the proposed cure bring other and possibly worse ailments in its wake. I hope you will not object to my using these same criteria in commenting on the amendments to the Security Act of 1917 proposed in the bill.

Our military services have already undergone a pretty thorough shake-up, from which they have by no means yet settled down. Unnecessary changes will delay this process, an undesirable condition in present circumstances. The new structure should have a chance to knit and to grow together, to develop its policies and to build up its personnel.

The sum and substance of our committee's conclusions were that the National Security Organization of 1947 was soundly conceived but is not yet working well

. We recommended certain measures aimed at improving organization and procedure. Some of these require legislation but most of them, involving improvements in departmental and interdepartmental procedures and relationships, do not. While our report was scrutinizing and, I hope, frank, we did not overlook the tremendous measures of progress that had been made over the brief span of time during which the act had been in effect. It is substantial and impressive. There have been great accomplishments in many fields-not in all.

I am not going to review in detail the findings and recommendations of our committee. They are available to you, I shall address my

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remarks to certain provisions of the bill, S. 1269, leaving for your questions such other matters as you care to discuss.

Among other things, our committee recommended (1) confining the military representation on the National Security Council to the Secretary of Defense, (2) clarifying and strengthening the statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense, (3) relieving him, so far a possible, of the burdens of routine administration through additional assistance on both the civilian and military sides, and (4) providing additional organizational mechanisms to implement the Secretary authority.

The bill before you aims at these same objectives. Thus I favor the purposes of the bill and I agree with certain of its provisions. I wish I could say that I agreed with all of them, but lack of frankness would be a poor return for your courtesy.. As to some, I have considerable reserve-not about the objectives, but about certain of the means by which the bill proposes to accomplish the desired ends. In these instances, as presently drawn, the bill might bring about results more undesirable than the ailments it aims to cure. All of the objectives of the bill can be accomplished without incurring such risks And in as few words as possible, I shall try to indicate how I think this can be done. I shall take the liberty of making a number of suggestions and seven definite recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we get the bill, Mr. Eberstadt, so that we can follow you?

Gentlemen, do you all have copies?

Go ahead, Mr. Eberstadt, the members of the committee all have copies.

I doubt if there is much difference in the copies. We will follow you, all right.

Comments on section 2: The amendment proposed in section 2 of the bill accords with the views of our committee.

(1) Accordingly, I recommend that section 2 of the bill stand as it is now drawn.

Comments on section 3: I do not understand the purpose, the significance or the consequences of the amendment to the Security Act contemplated by section 3 of the bill headed “Conversion of the National Military Establishment into an Executive Department." Thus, I hesitate to speak too positively about it.

The amendment may be intended to meet the need for clarifying and strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense. If so, it is a shotgun, not a rifle approach to this problem. It does much more than that. In effect, it seems to merge the three military departments, contrary to the expressed intent of the declaration of policy of the National Security Act, and to redistribute them as military departments, leaving behind a vague and undefined residium of authority in the newly created Executive Department of Defense, thus aggravating rather than curing the weakness of unclarity that now surrounds the power of the Secretary of Defense.

I know of no evidence indicating the need for so drastic a change in departmental structure, There was no substantial measure of testimony or recommendations presented to our committee along these lines. Of the 245 witnesses who appeared before us—many, of course, on special subjects not related to this question-only two or three recommended consolidation of the three services into a single depart

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