The CHAIRMAN. You have given us a very fine picture of the existing system. You have touched very briefly on what this bill would do to that system.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Lines 1 through 4 on the top of page 5-is that what you have described?

Mr. STAUFFACHER. If I might say this, the bill as it now stands or as the revision which you have mentioned provides, would not affect the internal operating procedures as such. The significance of lines 1 to 5 that you have mentioned there would be, as Mr. Pace has indicated, to give the Secretary of Defense a firmer role than he now has for prescribing internal procedures by which the budget shall be developed.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a coordinator with the power to coordinate if he has to exert it. Is that it?

Mr. PACE. That is it, and also the power to obtain the kind of information that will permit him to know what is happening within his Department. I think it is fair to say that this bill as set up will not and, in my estimation, should not prescribe the internal budgetary procedures, because it is difficult to define by law exactly how a budget can be established, and most intelligently set up within a department, but it does provide to the Secretary of Defense the power, the capacity, and the administrative facility that will permit him to develop the kind of a budget that will most intelligently reflect what it is intended shall be accomplished for the defense of this country.

The CHAIRMAN. You would generally favor, in other words, giving the Secretary of Defense the power within the scope set by the President to coordinate and make decisions, but you would likewise favor, I take it, having a provision that if any department thought the national defense equation from an over-all standpoint was being injured by that policy, having the right to come to Congress, for example, and say, "We think such and such a program is wrong."

Mr. PACE. They have always done so.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean to spell it out in the law. Suppose we were to say that the battleship fleet shall be scrapped, just as an example, and to save money, and so on, we will go to air entirely, to take an extreme case.

Suppose the President agreed to that. Suppose the Secretary of Defense agreed to that. However, suppose the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff of the Navy thought it was a very serious error. What the committee would want to know was that that man wouldn't be bottled up, that he wouldn't feel he was committing insubordination by coming up and saying, "Do you realize that, for example, the atomic bomb may not be used and if it isn't going to be used, your whole type of warfare will have to be on a different basis than if the bomb is used?"

We don't want to get into a position where the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Staff of the Navy feels that he is disloyal to his Commander in Chief and disloyal to his Government by coming up here and giving us his point of view. You would favor giving him the right of free speech up here before the committee, wouldn't you?

Mr. PACE. Unquestionably. I think, as I pointed out in speaking to Senator Bridges' point, there is nothing in this act that would in any wise affect or cause any one of the individual department heads or any of the individuals who are members thereof to feel that they were

not in a position to testify in the same fashion as they had done before. The CHAIRMAN. Of course, all of this discussion as a practical matter is more or less academic for this reason: That in the case that I conjured up, if the law prevented Mr. Sullivan or Admiral Denfeld from coming up here on their own initiative, it would be very easy, and I assure you they would have ingenuity enough to get word to some of us on the committee that they would like to be called, and we would simply send word down that we wanted to hear them. The net result would be the same.

Nevertheless, they want to feel free to come of their own initiative without going through that underhand, you might say, procedure in order to acquaint us with what they think is a great wrong.

I don't believe, frankly, that we could pass a bill-and I don't know that we should-that wouldn't give them the right to come to the Congress on a fundamental matter and make a complaint on their own initiative. There is enough fear left that one of the services may swallow up the other two that they want at least their day in court.

As I get your testimony, you want the Secretary of Defense to have this power, but you are not reluctant to give the departments the right to come and have their day in court if they believe it is advisable. I would like to get your answer on that.

Mr. PACE. I think to answer that I can say this, Senator: There is no possible way, either under this act or under the previous act, that any of the departments could be swallowed up, except by congressional action.

The CHAIRMAN. You are in basic accord with the situation I have stated, but you take the position, if you don't put it in the law, it is there anyway?

Mr. PACE. There is no question but that they have that right.

Senator KNOWLAND. I think there is, however, quite a difference between whether a Secretary is going to feel free to volunteer his testimony under this new arrangement or at least is as free as he formerly felt to come up and volunteer his testimony, and as far as the junior Senator from California is concerned, on matters that affect the three departments I think we should follow as standard operating procedure in this committee the practice that we send for the Secretaries of the three departments, as a committee of the Congress, to get the information, because otherwise they may be put in the position that they are volunteering and by doing that are perhaps not quite following out their chiefs' point of view.

I don't think we should permit the erection of an iron curtain between us and the Defense Establishment. I think the responsibility on us is too great.

The CHAIRMAN. That is my point.

Senator KNOWLAND. As far as I am concerned, I am going to request the chairman to send for the Secretaries when matters of this kind are before us and not merely rest upon their voluntarily coming before us.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean irrespective of that proposal?
Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you, but I think we can probably find language which will make it less difficult for them and certainly will not violate the ethics of the matter for them to come up here if they

feel that they want to come of their own initiative. We would always call them anyway.

Senator KNOWLAND. If the situation were as grave as the hypothetical case you mentioned, there would always be left to the individual the power to offer his resignation and thereby bring it to the attention of the country, but there may be other cases which are still important but are not of such importance that he would be justified in resigning because of a disagreement that the Congress should be fully informed

on.

The CHAIRMAN. We would send for him anyhow in the case that was conjured up because we would have to look into it and have the whole works up here. I think a good many of our fears with one or two exceptions, are rather imaginary.

Mr. PACE. There is, however, a very definite problem for the Secretary of Defense in seeking to reach the decisions and conclusions which he must do if he is not permitted to present his point of view and the reasons for that point of view prior to the time that it is challenged before Congress.

To establish the subordinate status of the service departments, amendments to section 201 (b), (c), and (d), and section 207 (a) and (b) of the National Security Act of 1947 are proposed. These amendments will change the service departments to military departments and confer the status of an executive department upon the Military Establishment, renamed the Department of Defense, in its entirety.

The amendments designed to clarify the status of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as officials responsible to the Secretary of Defense under the President are those proposed for section 101 (a) and section 202 (b). These sections remove the service secretaries from membership on the National Security Council. They eliminate the language which presently gives the service secretaries the right to go over the head of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Director of the Budget and which vests in them all powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense.

These amendments, which adjust and clarify the roles and status of the service departments and their secretaries, require corresponding adjustments in the position of the Secretary of Defense. Those adjustments are proposed in amendments to section 202, which prescribes the duties of the Secretary of Defense in broad terms appropriate to his status as head of an executive department; section 204 which authorizes the Secretary to employ civilian personnel; and sections 211, 213, and 214, which describe the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitnons Board, and the Research and Development Board as functions of the Secretary of Defense.

As noted above, the proposed change in title of the Defense Establishment is appropriate but not determining. It is the interrelated amendments affecting the status of the service departments and their heads, the statutory agencies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the duties of the Secretary of Defense, which are significant. For, when taken together they will change the National Military Establishment from what has been described as a loose federation of agencies into an organization with many of the characteristics which

we have become accustomed to associate with an executive depart

ment.

Second, what is the significance of the changes proposed to provide assistant secretaries and to change the status of the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Perhaps this is reiteration. The Secretary of Defense can accomplish very many of the objectives as set forth here without section 3 of the act, can he not? In other words, he can do practically everything that sections 4 and 5 of the act accomplish without having a single department; is that right?

Mr. PACE. Mr. Stauffacher, would you like to comment on that? Mr. STAUFFACHER. That is correct, Senator, if what you are in effect saying is that you can create the same legal structure which would exist within an executive department without terming it an executive department.

Senator SALTONSTALL. And which would leave the present status of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Mr. STAUFFACHER. The proposed status would not be affected necessarily by whether or not you called it an executive department, with the exception of those general statutory provisions which go along with an executive department.

Senator SALTONSTALL. That is what I was trying to bring out.

Mr. PACE. The real point in your concern raised by Mr. Eberstadt's statement as to the creation of an executive department is that what is really done here is to spell out many of the relationships that would actually exist in an executive department. The purpose of calling it an executive department is primarily for the purpose of establishing uniformity throughout the Government.

It will be easier for the President, easier for the Secretary of Defense, and easier for a Director of the Budget to determine what is happening in dealing with an executive department rather than a grouping that is undefined except by specific legal authority in this

act.

I don't think the term is meaningful other than being descriptive and affecting certain minor powers, whereas, the major powers are spelled out.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You have left out the prestige of the various agencies, prestige in this country and throughout the world.

Mr. PACE. We considered that very carefully in the original consideration of this act. You know, it was recommended by the Hoover Commission that these men be designated as Under Secretaries. The President determined, however, that they should, and it is so included in this amendment, be designated as Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

I find it difficult to believe that their prestige will be reduced as a matter of practical fact throughout the country and the world if they are still designated as Secretaries, whether they are the heads of a military department or an executive department, the difference between which is not generally understood.

I think the Secretaries themselves could speak to that point, and you would find their statements most interesting.

To repeat one paragraph of my statement:

Second, what is the significance of the changes proposed to provide Assistant Secretaries and to change the status of the Munitions Board. the Research and Development Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff!

The purpose of the amendments dealing with these units is to provide staff assistance to the Secretary of Defense which will enable him to fulfill adequately his enlarged responsibilities.

The Congress has recently provided for an Under Secretary of Defense. This is an important step forward in strengthening the position of the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense proposed in S. 1269 would further increase the ability of the Secretary to handle the many and varied problems with which he is faced. It is not intended that these officials will be an additional echelon between the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air and the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense. Rather, they will function as staff assistants to the Secretary of Defense on such matters as he may assign to them.

The National Security Act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board as statutory agencies with duties which they perform in their own right. The changes proposed in S. 1269 are intended to make it clear that these duties are to be performed for the Secretary of Defense, under his control, and subject to such reassignments as he may find are necessary in order to have them performed most effectively. The amendments to sections 211, 213, and 214 are intended to give the Secretary of Defense some latitude in assigning duties to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board, as well as placing their functions under his control, as noted above. Section 212, as amended, would clarify the status of the Joint Staff as a group responsible to the Secretary of Defense and would permit him to enlarge that staff if necessary.

Third, what is the significance of the proposed change in the arrangements for military staff assistance to the President and the Secretary of Defense? I have already referred to the proposed amendments to section 211 of the act, which prescribes the composition and duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I believe I should discuss this matter at greater length because it affects an important agency of the National Military Establishment which has been the subject of wide public discussion.

The proposed bill provides for a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who shall, in the language of the act, be "the head thereof"; provides for the appointment of the Chairman by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate; and that the Chairman, while holding such office, shall take precedence over all other officers of the armed services. In addition, the bill provides that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and shall perform such other duties as the President and Secretary of Defense may direct or as may be prescribed by law.

It is a fundamental tenet of this bill-and, indeed, has been a fundamental tenet of military organization in the United States— that the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to render military advice and recommendations to the President and the Secretary of Defense in connection with questions of military strategy and policy. The power of decision rests clearly in the President and in the civilian head of the department. While the President or the Secretary may refer matters to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may choose to abide by their recommendation, it has not been embodied in the tradition