STATEMENT TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON THE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BY H. ALLEN HOLMES ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE JULY 26, 1989 INTRODUCTION United States Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee: I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the foreign policy implications of biological weapons (BW) proliferation. I welcome the interest demonstrated by the Committee in this problem at this time. A disturbing and dangerous trend has emerged in the recent past in the increasing efforts by states to acquire biological weapons. The technology to produce them is improving apace, and the agents themselves are becoming ever more threatening. I should like to state from the outset that the United States is adamantly opposed to the development, production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons. We have renounced any biological weapon capability of our own, have destroyed our stockpile, and are committed to doing all we can to eliminate these weapons from the world's arsenals. In this respect, we find useful the efforts of the Congress to formulate domestic criminal legislation against those who would develop or produce biological weapons or assist foreign nations to acquire them. We are presently studying the language of the draft legislation, S 993, to determine where we can contribute to the drafting process. I would defer to my distinguished colleague from the Department of Justice for specific comments on the substance of the draft legislation We feel that passage of such legislation at this time would give a clear signal to the world that the United States is serious about controlling the proliferation of biological weapons. It would signal to terrorists that we are deadly serious about keeping such weapons out of their hands. The legislation is timely and important, and we are grateful to the congress for bringing it forward.. Now I would like to give you some background on the development of U.S. policy on biological weapons and on the present state of play in this area. I will then describe how we are working to achieve our goal of eliminating these weapons. BACKGROUND There are two international agreements relating to biological and toxin weapons, both of which have proven inadequate to prevent their proliferation. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the first use in war of chemical and biological weapons, but not their development, production, possession or transfer. The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and transfer of biological and toxin weapons. The U.S. itself unconditionally renounced all aspects of biological warfare in 1969 and President Nixon ordered the Department of Defense to destroy existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. In 1970, the U.S. unilateral ban was extended also to cover toxins, that is, poisonous chemicals which occur in nature as a product of living organisms. All research in the area of biological warfare has since been confined to the development of strictly defined defensive measures, for example, development of vaccines. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION The United States followed up these unilateral actions by leading the fight for an international ban, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Article I of the BWC, confirmed by the treaty's negotiating record, prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and retention of all biological agents "that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." Thus, research for protective and prophylactic defenses against biological weapons continued to be permissable. The BWC was approved by the U.S. Senate on December 16, 1974 and entered into force on March 26, 1975. All U.S. military stocks of biological and toxin agents, weapons, equipment or means of delivery prohibited by the Convention had already been destroyed unilaterally, pursuant to President Nixon's instructions. Facilities in the United States which had been built and used for biological or toxin weapons purposes were converted to other use. For example, some of the military facilities at Fort Detrick, Maryland and Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, previously used for BW activities, are now the property of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and are used by the National Cancer Institute and the National Center for Toxicological Research. |