After the BWC was completed, many thought that the security problem posed by biological and toxin weapons had been solved. However, this clearly is not the case. Despite the limitations of the BWC, which has no verification provisions, we have identified a number of compliance problems. In previous years and again in 1988, President Reagan reported to the Congress that the Soviet Union had continued to maintain an offensive biological warfare program and accompanying capability, and that the Soviet Union had been involved in the production, transfer and use of mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan, in violation of the 1972 BWC. Furthermore, we have yet to receive a satisfactory official explanation of the unprecedented outbreak of anthrax at Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1979.

Two review conferences for the BWC have been held, in 1980 and 1986, with the next scheduled for 1991. At the two review conferences, the United States confirmed that it is in full compliance with the BWC. At the second review conference, the United States expressed its concern that the Soviet Union, Laos, and Vietnam had violated the Convention. Several other States Party to the Convention also expressed concern about compliance.

These concerns are reflected in the Final

Declaration of the 1986 review conference, which notes

statements that compliance with Articles I, II, and III of the BWC was "subject to grave doubt" and that efforts to resolve the concerns expressed had not been successful. Since then, our concerns have intensified as evidence mounts of BW

proliferation, especially in areas of particular concern to us.

U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BWC

Article IV of the BWC provides that each state "shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere." As you know,

several statutes exist that already regulate these noxious weapons, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Arms Export Control Act. These laws prohibit both the manufacturing and transfer of biological toxins.

We recognize, however, that additional domestic criminal legislation addressing biological materials may be useful in further implementing the Convention. We believe that the draft

bills now under consideration by the Congress are a useful starting point for such legislation, and we and other agencies are prepared to work with the Committee as the legislation

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES

In addition, the rapid advance of technology in the biological field has led to another set of problems for the Convention. In many ways, recent progress in biological technology increases the ease of concealment of illicit manufacturing plants, particularly for biologically-derived chemicals such as toxins. Verification of the BWC, always a difficult task, has been significantly complicated by the new technology. The ease and rapidity of genetic manipulation, the ready availability of a variety of production equipment, the proliferation of safety and environmental equipment and health procedures to numerous laboratories and production facilities throughout the world, are signs of the growing role of biotechnology in the world's economy.

They also make it easier

for nations and others to produce the lethal agents banned by the Convention.

As advances are made in the field of biotechnology, the potential for using this technology for biological and toxin weapons increases commensurately. Not only has the time from basic research to mass production of lethal weapons decreased, but the ability to create agents and toxins with more optimal weapons potential has increased. Simply put, the potential for undetected breakout from treaty constraints has increased significantly.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

When the BWC was negotiated, only the United States

acknowledged having biological weapons.

In contrast to the

openness we have practiced regarding our military programs, t.e Soviets, to date, have never officially acknowledged having a biological weapons program, and in fact only admitted in 1987 having a CW program.

Today a number of countries are estimated to be working to achieve a BW capability. Our information on which states are

involved in BW programs is based on extremely sensitive

intelligence sources and methods and I would defer to the Intelligence Community to provide you a fuller description of these programs in closed session.

We are especially concerned about the spread of biological weapons in unstable areas and about the prospects of biological and toxin weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, or into the arsenals of those states which actively support terrorist organizations. To date, we have no evidence that any known terrorist organization has the capability to employ such weapons, nor that states supporting terrorism have supplied such weapons. However, we cannot dismiss these possibilities.

If the proliferation of BW continues, it may be only a matter of time before terrorists do acquire and use these weapons.

U.S. BIOLOGICAL DEfense_resEARCH_PROGRAM

The unilateral U.S. renunciation of BW in 1969 was

accompanied by the recognition that maintaining a strong program to provide for defense against BW is essential for national security. That requirement is reflected in Article I of the Convention which permits production of biological agents and toxins in quantities required to develop protective measures. In today's circumstances, with the concerns about compliance, proliferation and rapid advances in biotechnology, the requirement for defensive measures is even greater than in 1969.

The BWC clearly permits research and development for protection against biological and toxin weapons.

The U.S. biological defense research program is in full compliance with the provisions of the Convention. It is also open to public scrutiny. No other country even comes close in its openness.

ELIMINATING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Vigorous action is needed to deal with the problems that I have just outlined. These problems are tough ones that will not be resolved easily or quickly. But we are determined to deal

with them.