so Albertus, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Richardus, Du- BOOK III. randus, Dominicus à Soto, St. Thomas, &c. This latter opinion seems the truest, which we do the rather defend, because it so much displeaseth our adversaries, and Jo. Calvin especially. Bellarm. in his fifth book of Grace and Freewill, chap. 1. p. 337. Ninthly, Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel; Gregor. Ariminensis, Bonavent. opposite to each other. Catholici, ALL Catholics agree, that no works, meritorious of grace, Conveniunt can be done by the only power of nature; and secondly, Theologi that all our works before justification are no sins. Within &c. these bounds some dispute for freewill, perhaps more freely and lavishly than were meet; as Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, upon Sent. 2. d. 28. Others again give less to it than they should; as Gregorius Ariminensis, Capreolus, upon Sent. 2. d. 28. and Marsilius. We will follow that which the greater and graver sort of Divines teach, namely, Alexander, Albertus, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, &c. Bellarm. 1. v. c. 4. p. 351. Tenthly, Two sorts of nameless Doctors opposed. possunt. PERHAPS those authors which say that without the help Fortasse of God no tentation can be overcome, and those which conciliari hold some may be vanquished without it, may be reconciled; yet their opinion and speech is more agreeable to Scriptures and Fathers, which say, no tentation can be overcome without God's aid. Bellarmin, ibid. chap. 7. p. 363. DECADE V. First, Bellarmin, with Saint Thomas and Bonaventure, against some nameless Doctors. mune Scho For the common saying in Schools (To the man that doth Dictum ilwhat he can, God denies not grace) I answer; that this is well lud comexpounded of St. Thomas in Prima Secundæ, q. 109. and larum, &c. Saint Bonaventure, in Sent. 2. dist. 28. grace is not denied to him that doth his utmost, when a man doth it by working together with God's grace, whereby he is stirred; not when he worketh only by the power of nature. Certainly BOOK III. those which teach that man by doing what he may, is by the only strength of nature prepared to grace, either think that he may thereby desire and ask grace, which is the Pelagians' heresy, or hold that man by his own strength may keep all the moral law, &c. and this also is Pelagianism, confuted in the former book. Bellarmin, of Grace and Freewill, book vi. chap. 6. p. 508. Aliqui etiam cis, &c. Secondly, Bellarmin against Dominicus à Soto. SOME Catholics, and especially Dominicus à Soto, book ex Catholi- ii. of Nat. and Grace, chap. 14, deny that our dispositions towards justification can by any reason be called merits; and to be justified freely, they hold to imply a justification without any merit whatsoever: but I cannot understand, why we should not in that case use the name of merit, especially with that addition of congruity, when we speak of works done by the preventing grace of God. Bellarm. De Justificat. 1. i. c. 21. p. 103. In eandem sive potius, &c. Thirdly, Albertus Pighius, and the Divines of Cologne against the Council of Trent and Bellarmin. NOT only Martin Bucer, but Albertus Pighius, (with sententiam some others, as namely, the Divines of Cologne) in his second controversy, held this opinion, or error rather, that there is a double justice, whereby we are formally justified; one imperfect, which is in our inherent virtues; the other perfect, which is Christ's righteousness imputed; whose opinion is rejected by the Council of Trent, Sess. 6. c. 7. Bellarm. of Justification, book ii. chap. 1., p. 124. De propositá Fourthly, Gropperus, Catharinus, St. Thomas, Bonaventure, Scotus, in three opinions. Or this matter, concerning certainty of salvation, there igitur quas are three opinions, or rather falsehoods. The first, of the tione, &c. heretics of this time, that the faithful may have such knowledge, as that by a sure faith they may know their sins forgiven, &c. The second is of the author of the Enchiridion Coloniense, which holds, that a man both may, and ought to be certain his sins are forgiven, but yet he denies, that he is justified by faith alone: but this book is in many other things worthy of the censure of the Church. The third is of Ambrosius Catharinus, who holds, that a man may be certain of his own grace, even by the assurance of faith. Contrary to these errors is the common opinion, of almost all Divines, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus, Roffensis, Alphonsus à BOOK III. Castro, Dominicus à Soto, Ruardus, &c. Nicholas Sanders, Thomas Stapleton, &c. that no man can by any certainty of faith be assured of his justice, except those which have special revelations. Bellarm. De Justificat. book iii. c. 3. p. 206. Fifthly, the Divines of Louvain and Paris against Catharin. How Bellarmin presseth Catharinus with the authority Nam Pariof the Universities of Paris and Louvain, and the flat words siensis, &c. of the Council of Trent; and Catharinus his answers and sium verò, elusions of all: see Bellarm. ibid. c. 3. p. 208. Sixthly, Bellarmin against Catharinus. CATHARINUS exposition of those places of Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiasticus, Job, for his purpose, see largely confuted by Bellar. ibid. c. 4, 5. p. 211, 212. Seventhly, Catharinus and two ranks of Popish Lovanien &c. man Dico nullum For Catholicum Scripwrem, I SAY there is no Catholic writer holds, that a should ever doubt of his reconciliation with God. there are three opinions amongst Catholics. One of Am- &c. brosius Catharinus, which doth not only exclude all doubt, but adds, that the just man may have an assurance of his justification, by the certainty of a Divine faith. Another goes not so far, yet holds that perfect men are wont to attain unto that security, as that they have no fear of their justification, as we believe without all doubting that there was a Cæsar, an Alexander, &c. though we saw them not; but this opinion, I confess, I like not. The third, which is more common in the Church, takes not away all fear, but yet takes away all anxiety, and wavering doubtfulness. Bellar. of Justification, book iii. chap. 11. p. 264. (tom. 4. col. 888-89. Paris, 1613.) Eighthly, Andr. Vega against Thomas and other Catholics. &c. ANDR. VEGA in his eleventh book upon the Councils, Ab hoc chap. 20. holds venial sin to be properly against the argumento, Law. But venial sins, without which we cannot live, are not simply sins, but imperfectly, and in some regards, and are not indeed against the Law, but besides it, as St. BOOK III. Thomas teaches well in Prima Secunda, q. 88. Bellarm. book iv. chap. 14. p. 359. Fuit opinio Ninthly, Robert Holcot against Saint Thomas and the common opinion. ALTHOUGH Some have taught, that freedom of will is not necessary to merit, as Robert Holcot held, witness Jo. Picus in his Apology, yet the common opinion of Divines is contrary, as it appears out of St. Thomas, Prima Secundæ, quæst. 114. and other Doctors, upon Sent. 1. dist. 17. &c. Bellarm. of Justification, book. v. chap. 10. p. 432. Tenthly, A certain nameless Author against Pius V. It was the opinion of a certain late author, which was cujusdam, in many points condemned by Pius V. that eternal life is &c. due to good works, for that they are the true obedience to the law, not for that they are done by a person advanced by grace into the state of the Son of God; so he holds, that meritorious works may be done by a man not regenerate by Baptism, &c. The contrary opinion is received and allowed in the Schools of Catholic Divines: see Pet. Lombard, and the Divines upon Sent. 2. dist. 24. Bellarm. of Justification, book v. chap. 12. p. 438. Fuit singu Gulielm. DECADE VI. First, Guliel. Altisiodorensis against all Popish Doctors. It was the singular opinion of Gulielm. Altisiodorensis laris opinio (book iii. tract. 12. chap. 1. &c.) that merit doth more principally depend upon faith, than charity; which opinion of his doth not a little favour the heretics of this time: but in truth Scripture is so pregnant against him, that I wonder so worthy a man could be so far deceived. larm. ibid. c. 15. p. 4.54. &c. Bel Secondly, Bellarm. against many of their grave Authors. THOUGH there be some grave Authors which hold, that every good work of a just man, and a man endued with charity, is meritorious of eternal life: yet I hold it more probable, that there is further required to merit, that the good work should in the very act of it proceed from BOOK III. charity, and be directed to God as the supernatural end, &c. Bellarm. book v. chap. 15. p. 456. Thirdly, Thomas Waldensis, Paulus Burgensis, ALL Catholics acknowledge, that good works are Catholici meritorious of eternal life. But some hold that these omnes ag noscunt, &c. words (of congruity and condignity) are not to be used: but only that we should say absolutely, that good works by the grace of God do merit eternal life: so teacheth Thomas Waldensis, tom. iii. of Sacraments, chap. 7; Paulus Burgensis in Psalm xxxv. Others will have them to merit by condignity, in a large manner: so teach Durandus and Gregorius. The common opinion of Divines doth simply admit a merit of condignity. Bellarmin, book v. chap. 16. p. 459. Where note, that Bellarmin finds Durandus to hold the same in this point with us. p. 460. line 5. Fourthly, Bellarmin against some of their How some distinguish nicely betwixt Dignum and Quod verò Condignum; and their confutation, who will admit a merit quidam distinguunt, of dignity, not of condignity; see Bellarm. book v. chap. &c. 16. p. 459. Fifthly, Cajetan and Dom. à Soto; Scotus and Andr. Vega; Tho. and Bonaventure, with Bellarm. differing. SOME hold, that the good works of the just merit eternal Non desunt life upon their very worth, in regard of the work, though qui censeant there were no such agreement betwixt God and us: so hold opera, &r. Cajetan, in Secunda Secundæ, quæst. 114. and Dominicus à Soto, third book of Nature and Grace, chap. 7. Others, contrarily, think that good works, proceeding from grace, are not meritorious upon the very worth of the work, but only in regard of God's covenant with us, and his gracious acceptation: thus holds Scotus in Sent. 1. dist. 17. q. 2; whom other of the old Schoolmen follow; and of the later, Andreas Vega: yet this opinion differs far from the heresy of the Lutherans, &c. But to me the mean opinion seems more probable, which teaches, that good works are meritorious of eternal life upon condignity, in respect of the work and covenant together, which opinion I doubt VOL. 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