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accepted action activity admitted analysis animal appeared approve argument assertion association beauty belief benevolence body called cause character common sense connection consciousness consequence derived desire distinction doctrine duty effect elements emotions Essay evidence excite existence experience expression extension external facts feeling follows give Hamilton happiness human Hume Hutcheson ideas imagination immediate impressions independent individual influence Inquiry intellectual intelligence interest judge judgment knowledge known leading lectures logical maintained material world matter means mental mind moral Moral Philosophy motion nature necessary never objects opinion organism original particular pass perceive perception phenomena philosophy pleasure position possible present primary principles Professor published qualities question reality reason reflection regard Reid relation represented says scepticism Scotland Scottish sensations space speculation statement Stewart substance supposed theory things thinks thought tion true truth universe virtue whole
Page 180 - Tis night, and the landscape is lovely no more; I mourn, but, ye woodlands, I mourn not for you; For morn is approaching, your charms to restore, Perfum'd with fresh fragrance, and glittering with dew, Nor yet for the ravage of winter I mourn; Kind Nature the embryo blossom will save.
Page 60 - When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived! And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.
Page 135 - Speaking of the perception of the external world — " We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand all the philosophers, ancient and modern ; every man, without exception, who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I find myself classed with the vulgar.
Page 79 - But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness.
Page 74 - As the sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reflection on those subjects, it always encreases the farther we carry our reflections, whether in opposition or conformity to it. Carelessness and inattention alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them...
Page 179 - O how canst thou renounce the boundless store Of charms which Nature to her votary yields ! The warbling woodland, the resounding shore, The pomp of groves, and garniture of fields; All that the genial ray of morning gilds, And all that echoes to the song of even, All that the mountain's sheltering bosom shields, And all the dread magnificence of Heaven...
Page 70 - It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects resembling them : how shall this question be determined ? By experience, surely ; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be, entirely silent.
Page 76 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 72 - Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions ; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it.