quantity. Of the forces thus raised, about 500,000 have, according to common report in Washington (the statement of number is not authoritative), been transported to France.

In the Aviation Service a personnel of over 100,000 officers and men has been raised, representing an increase of something like 10,000 per cent. over the force existing in April, 1917. About 2500 officers have completed their preliminary training in flying; and of these a relatively small number have received advanced training, for the most part under French or British auspices. It was not until the May of this year that an American-trained aviator was reported to have brought down a German aeroplane. American production of aircraft has been limited thus far to the training planes; but a standardised motor, said to be suitable for all types except the light battleplanes, has been designed and successfully tested, and its manufacture on a large scale is reported to be assured. Meanwhile a large number of planes, over 6000, have been contracted for in France; and motors of British, French, and Italian design are being manufactured on a small scale in America. It is evident, however, that the American air service will be unable for some months to take any effective part in the operations.

As respects the increase of Shipping-one of the most pressing problems confronting the United States-it appears that 186 vessels, aggregating 1,290,000 tons deadweight, have been added during the year. Of this number 112 are German and Austrian ships which had been laid up in American ports since the beginning of the war, and which their crews had endeavoured to disable early in 1917. These have been successfully repaired and put in commission, most of them being incorporated in the Navy. Seventy-two of the new vessels were under construction by private contract, and were requisitioned before their completion. Two vessels were of the number contracted for by the Shipping Board. This does not appear to be any very considerable accomplishment; but an additional number of about 1200 wooden and steel vessels have been contracted for, of which twenty have already been launched; and 338 of the requisitioned vessels are under construction, 52 of which have been placed in the water. The number

of shipyards has been increased from 70 to 151, and many of the old yards have been expanded. The number of workmen employed on ship construction has been increased from 43,500 to 170,500; and a much greater number will be available as soon as housing can be provided.

With respect to meeting the Food Requirements of the Allies a certain degree of success has been attained, although the requirements have not been fully met. The acreage of 1917 was ten per cent. greater than that of 1916, while the principal food-crops were twenty-six per cent. larger than those of the preceding year. Owing to the severity of last winter, however, the wheat crop, while larger than that of 1916, is a distinct disappointment and will fall far short of the record crop of 1915. Only two crops, oats and maize, were sufficient for both American and Allied needs; and it was necessary, therefore, to endeavour to make up the deficit in the other food-stuffs by reducing American consumption.

The problem of effectively operating the Railroad Systems of the country proved to be one of the most difficult in the programme. In spite of efforts at cooperation among the railroads, the transportation system failed utterly to meet the demands made upon it; and in December the Government was forced to assume control. This breakdown of the railroads was one of the most important factors in delaying the execution of the military programme.

After a year of war the organisation of Industry and Labour on a war basis has been but partially accomplished. It is, however, rapidly going forward; and the reorganised War Industries Board and the newly appointed War Labour Board are accelerating the process.

The raising of Funds for war expenditures and for loans to the Allies presented no particular difficulty to a country into which money had been pouring at a rapid rate for nearly three years. Over ten billions of dollars have been secured (bonds and certificates of indebtedness, $8,500,000,000; war-saving stamps, $140,000,000; taxation, $1,535,000,000), of which amount $4,500,000,000 (900,000,000Z.) have been loaned to the Allies. It was estimated that the war expenditures of the first fiscal year (July 1 to June 30) would amount to $18,500,000,000 ;

and it was planned to raise about 16.5 per cent. of this amount by taxation-a proportion of income from taxes to war expenditures which Great Britain did not reach until the third year of the war. It now appears that the war expenditures will fall nearly one-third below the amount estimated, a fact which may be taken to indicate roughly the extent to which the United States has failed to complete its programme.

Views as to the American performance during the first year vary greatly. Those who regard it absolutely say, and with some reason, that it is exceedingly creditable; those who regard it comparatively are not so optimistic. It cannot be asserted that it has met the necessities of the situation. To end the war this year, much greater reinforcements are needed in France than America seems likely to be able to send. As compared with the performance of Great Britain to Aug. 1, 1915, the accomplishment of the United States does not seem inspiring. During her first year of war Great Britain raised an army of 3,000,000 men, all volunteers; succeeded in putting 750,000 men in Flanders, where they held an important sector of over thirty miles; and sent expeditionary forces to Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles. The British losses during the first year were over 320,000; those of the United States a little over one per cent. of that number.

During the last three months vigorous dispute has been carried on in America as respects the accomplishments of the first year. Congress has laboriously, and in some cases acrimoniously, investigated the various war activities. Charges of inefficiency and stupidity have been freely made and briskly refuted. The interest of the country has shifted, for the time being, from the issues to the conduct of the war. It is impossible to isolate any single cause, or any two or three causes, for the failure of the United States to execute its programme more rapidly and efficiently. There are a great number of causes, more or less clearly related.

The situation of military affairs in the United States prior to April, 1917, was not favourable to the speedy organisation and equipment of a large army. The regular army was too small, and contained too many

recruits, to serve as a cadre for the training of a force nearly one hundred times its size. Congress had failed, in spite of repeated and insistent recommendations from the War Department, to make appropriations which would have enabled the army to lay the foundations for an adequate supply of equipment and munitions should an emergency arise.

The General Staff and the War Department appear not to have worked out any definite programme before the declaration of war, although the events of the two and a half years preceding would seem to have made obvious the desirability of such action. The General Staff, until its reorganisation a few weeks ago, had by no means the predominating position occupied by the French or German General Staff. It made studies and gathered information, and offered recommendations; but the heads of the great bureaus of the War Department were not clearly subordinated to it. An enlightening comment on its rôle is the fact that, shortly after the beginning of the war, the Chief of Staff was absent from the country for some months on a distant mission which had no relation to the raising and equipment of an American army. The result of this failure to prepare a programme was that, when the emergency arose, the programme had to be prepared and executed at the same time. This necessarily resulted in delays and wasted effort. Such matters as the composition and strength of a division were not finally settled until August 1917. A machine-gun which satisfied the requirements of the Ordnance Department was not tested and adopted until last February. A scientific classification of those who registered for conscription was not worked out and applied until long after the first draft had been called to the colours.

Another cause of delay and confusion was a failure to realise that a reorganisation, rather than a mere expansion, of the existing military and governmental agencies was necessary. Bureaus of the War Department competed with each other for supplies and labour. Military officers found themselves obliged to purchase supplies which could not be procured in sufficient quantities without an expansion of the industries producing them-a test which called for more knowledge of sources

of supplies, industrial conditions, and prices, than could possibly have been acquired from their previous limited experience. To aid in such operations, advisory committees of business men and engineers were appointed by the Council of National Defence; but there was lack of proper coordination among these various committees.

The Council of National Defence was created a few months before the declaration of war, for the purpose of preparing a war programme for industry, labour, agriculture, transportation, and scientific research. It consisted of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labour, and was assisted by an advisory commission. The Council was not organised until March 4, 1917; and there was not then time for it to render the service for which it had been created. By bringing to Washington men of wide experience, it was able to furnish to the Government advice of the greatest value; but it was impossible for it, faced as it was by the necessity of getting things done as speedily as possible, to construct at the same time a comprehensive programme for the most effective way of doing them.

The failure of the transportation system was one of the most important factors of delay. It was impossible for four hundred and forty railroads to operate as one system without unity of control. The problem was rendered still more difficult by congestion at the seaboard, which resulted in the detention of loaded cars for long periods, and by the lack of any comprehensive plan with respect to priorities. When the Government finally took over the control of the railroads, the general feeling was that, if this step had been taken at the outset, much confusion and delay might have been avoided.

It is difficult to estimate the extent to which the failure of the shipping programme delayed other operations, because it is not clear whether, under the most favourable circumstances, enough ships could have been completed by the present time to produce much effect on the situation. Undoubtedly the inability of the Shipping Board, as at first organised, to agree upon a policy retarded the construction of ships; but the effect of such delay would not fully manifest itself by the present time. If the Shipping Board had been promptly reorganised, or, better still, if its original members had been more