The Conference expressly refrained from considering whether members of the Second Chamber should be paid or not; it does not even say what they are to be called or what the name of the Chamber is to be. These things may have some practical bearing on the readiness of candidates to come forward; but, whatever attractions of the kind there be, the members of the House of Commons, geographically grouped, will still have to exert themselves to find, in sufficient numbers, men of the kind which the scheme contemplates, so that their choice may not be too much limited to men of another sort, who, whatever their merits, do not conspicuously enjoy the distinctions of experience and comparative freedom from bias unanimously demanded in the Report. It is tolerably certain that the members of the House of Commons would take the line of least resistance, and would do, when geographically grouped, what they are accustomed to do and think it right to do, when they tax and legislate, make and unmake Ministries, and so forth. They would look to the central offices of their Party organisations at least to provide them with a list of candidates; they would not turn a deaf ear to the recommendations of their Party whips or Party leaders; and, if they recalled that, in the words of the Report, 'the Second Chamber ought not to be so strongly entrenched as to dispose it to engage in frequent contests with the House of Commons, so as to embarrass the Executive and clog the wheels of legislation,' and took care to choose safe men who would be free from such temptations, who should say them nay? Naturally room will be found for Viceroys and Field Marshals, Ambassadors and Captains of Industry; but, when these jewels have been assembled, they will find their place in a setting which, with some fine gold, will probably include a good deal of alloy.

It is proposed, however, that in addition to 246 persons elected by Members of the House of Commons grouped in territorial areas, there should be a further body of 81 persons, elected by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses. The reasons given for this are curious.

'The large majority of the Second Chamber having been thus constituted upon a principle which was deemed such as would give a thoroughly popular character to the Chamber

as a whole, the Conference had next to consider the means by which the historical continuity of the reconstructed Second Chamber with the ancient House of Lords could be preserved.'

This is what the 81 are meant to do. They are to be chosen by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses, say five from each. 'Such a Committee might be trusted to see to it that due representation was given to every shade of political opinion.' Again the Conference was haunted by the spectre of party spirit. If the 81 were 'chosen by the whole body of Peers' (which appears to be a precious hint at the style of the members of the future Second Chamber), it seemed that, as in the House of Commons, 'the election would be likely to fall under the control of party motives and party managers.' It is much to the credit of the uprightness of the Conference, that it should have been so scrupulous to avoid so great an evil, but it is less to the credit of its intelligence to have adopted such a method. Here is a small Committee of Selection, five from each House, expected to make such a choice of 81 persons as will give due representation to every shade of political opinion. There is no casting vote; any five acting together can prevent the election of any particular person; any six acting together can ensure it. What an opportunity for compromise! What a field for traffic! If the members of this Committee pay much attention to anything but the voice of party, they must needs be scarcely human.

The Conference recommends that, in the first instance, the whole 81 should be chosen from the Peers who were such at the passing of the Act, but that the number to be so chosen should be gradually reduced, till, after three elections, they should only be 30, though Peers are to be eligible like other people for the remaining 51 places. Thus the Peerage would always have thirty members in a House of 327. Why? Here is the answer.

'The respect which it is desirable that the nation should feel for the Second Chamber will be all the greater, if it be regarded as an ancient institution remodelled in accordance with modern views and feelings rather than as a brand-new creation. . . . The Great Council of the Nation, from which the House of Lords directly descends . . . is the oldest and most venerable of all British institutions, reaching back

beyond the Norman Conquest and beyond King Alfred into the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity.'

This is one reason; the other is that

'among the existing peers there are many men of distinguished ability and long experience in legislation and administration, men whose services the country would desire to retain.'

This must be very gratifying to the House of Lords, but all one can say is that, if the Nation can regard such a Second Chamber as an ancient institution remodelled, and not as a brand-new creation, or can believe that members of it, selected by members of the House of Commons, will be chosen by the People but without taint of party spirit, the Nation can believe anything.

The Second Chamber, then, starts with a complement of 81 existing peers. This is in order to find room for those peers who had been taking an active share in public business' before the scheme becomes law. For this purpose half as many would have sufficed, but no doubt a politic and temporary liberality of this kind was thought likely to disarm opposition and smooth the passage of the scheme. After a few years 30 peers would be chosen, and, as peers, would presumably be compellable to serve by the Sovereign's writ of summons, so as to recall to an imaginative People the memory of the most venerable of all British institutions and to reach back (as well as they can) into the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity. This seems to be a piece of exaggerated sentiment. Historical continuity is all very well, but this is not continuity; it is antiquarianism. This contingent of Peers would resemble the herds of indigenous cattle, long preserved at Chillingham or Cadzow, at most seasons of the year shy and inoffensive, though curious visitors are warned not to approach them without precaution. What part they may be expected to play in enlightening and influencing the people through debate is another matter; but if, with some assistance from the Spiritual Peers, they maintain a sufficient air of hoary antiquity they will, no doubt, have justified their existence.

It is in connexion with the scheme for resolving differences between the two Houses by means of a Free

Conference, that the practical significance of this plan for the composition of the Second Chamber is fully brought out, for, as observed above, the House of Commons will always get its way, if it chooses to stand firm, and will get it, too, no later than the following session, except in one unlikely event, namely that in a joint conference, not exceeding sixty in number, half chosen by the House of Commons itself from among its own members at the beginning of each Parliament, and the other half chosen by a body mainly of its own creation, a majority of three of the members present and voting cannot be got.

The procedure of this Free Conference is very remarkable. It is to debate in secret; the names of those voting are to be kept secret, unless the Conference itself otherwise orders; and even the numbers of those voting are to be secret too unless the Conference itself discloses them. In ordinary deliberations a man is so far supposed to propound his real opinion, that he is expected afterwards to make his action accord with it. Not so in this Free Conference. Its members ought to be at liberty to make suggestions for compromise, without prejudice to their own subsequent action in further sittings or when the matter comes before each House as a whole.' Could anything be more cynical? Except in bodies swayed by mere faction, the considered decision of a majority ought to represent what it thinks is right. Anything else is something which, in greater or less degree, it must deem wrong. The attitude of this Free Conference is quite otherwise. Decisions of two branches of the Legislature, which, though each seems right to its authors, are inconsistent decisions, are to be regarded by the Conference not as things decided and to be maintained because they are right, but as things indifferent. to be set aside in favour of something else, which, not being the same as either, must in the eyes of both Chambers be pro tanto wrong.

There may be another plan. One party may consent to what it thinks wrong on one point, in consideration of the other party doing the same on another. This is called Compromise. The thing is conducted in secret. It be carried by the votes of persons whose names are never disclosed, every one of them so free to follow

may

his convenience or his orders, that on later occasions he will be free to vote the contrary, if his decision is to be given personally or in public. It is all very well to say that the Free Conference

'would address itself to the solution of the controversy by friendly methods, exploring the various points involved and seeking to find a way out of the difficulty either by compromise or by discovering some new plan, which might prove more acceptable to both Houses than that contained in the Bill passed by one House, or in the amendments passed by the other.'

When it is examined, it is seen to be a conclave for secret traffic. It can satisfy those alone who believe that in legislation one thing is pretty much as good as another, if only people can make up their minds to say

It may be practical, although, if the 60 members sit at a Round Table, experience leads one to expect a negative result; but, as a plan, it hardly warrants the complacency with which its authors regard it.

As the numbers of those dissenting on the occasions, fairly numerous too, when the Conference was not unanimous, are only twice given, there is some danger of doing injustice to individuals by attributing to the Conference or to any part of it particular reasons or intentions beyond those which are expressly stated in the Report. Still it may reasonably be taken that, to some of the members at least, it was a matter of moment to enquire whether particular proposals and features would be likely to get through the House of Commons. It would be hardly censorious to suppose that on some points there was, perhaps unconsciously, a stronger desire to please the House of Commons than to select an ideal plan. At any rate the scheme adopted by the majority is carefully contrived to ensure that the Second Chamber shall be as light a fetter on the freedom of the First as it was possible to devise.

No one, however, can have thought much about the other question, namely, what would be likely to get through the House of Lords; for, except for the dubious case of the thirty peers perpetually standing with one foot in the present and the other in the shadowy regions of Teutonic antiquity, there is nothing about the scheme