they are certainly qualified to speak in public without having been previously subjected to censorship.

Not only is such censorship of the Chiefs of our military services wrong in principle, but it is highly improper in its practical aspects. Who actually does review-in fact, censor-the proposed remarks of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? While on rare occasions the proposed remarks may be read by the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States who are the recognized superiors of these top military officers, there is no doubt but what some of the censorship is done by military and civilian officials within the Department of Defense. This means that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-the senior officers of the respective military services-are having their thoughts and their views subjected to the judgment of those who are junior to them. This procedure is at best highly irregular. It constitutes a disparagement of the status, the role, the authority, and the prestige of the senior military officers of our Armed Forces. In so doing, it downgrades the status of the military as a whole.

It is, Mr. Chairman, just as improper for the views of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be censored within the Department of State as it is within the Department of Defense.

One of the most constructive steps that could be taken to assure the maintenance of respect for the military profession would be exempting the Joint Chiefs of Staff from censorship.

Such action by the Secretary of Defense or the President would symbolize a reaffirmation of the faith and confidence which our Nation has in our military leadership.

It does not seem unreasonable to permit the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest military body in our Government, to speak in public without being checked out ahead of time.

Of course, the matter of removal of review requirements for members of the military below the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would involve some complicating factors. It would, however, seem proper that to the maximum extent possible, military personnel should be permitted to speak without censorship as has been generally possible in the past. It would appear that the military services with their standards of discipline should have the means of holding their personnel responsible and accountable for what they say.

Such procedure with respect to exempting members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from compulsory censorship of public statements presupposes, of course, a clear understanding on the part of these senior military officers as to existing policy. It is reasonable to assume that if the civilian superiors of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide sound guidelines as to policy, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their public statements will be able to reflect that policy.

I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that exempting the Joint Chiefs of Staff from censorship would result in either irresponsible or unduly unilateral public expression of views by these individuals. It is proper to assume that prior to making any public speech such individuals, holding the position of high responsibility as they do, would automatically ascertain that their intended remarks were accurate and to this end a voluntary cross-check with appropriate agencies and departments would be accomplished.

By removing the censorship, particularly as it pertains to the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President would be demonstrating to the Nation that they have the utmost confidence in the patriotism, responsibility, and probity of these senior military officers.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) That restrictions on the showing of "Operation Abolition" to military personnel be removed.

(2) That overcentralization of control of troop information and education programs be avoided, in order that the Secretaries of the military departments and their military subordinates may be vested with full discretion in conducting such programs within the broad guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) That the participation by competent military personnel in national security seminars, free of domestic political issues, under responsible sponsorship, be encouraged.

(4) That the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be exempted from mandatory censorship of public remarks.

(5) That the Congress continue its vigorous support of the war-proven Joint Chiefs of Staff system; that such support continue to include the rejection by the Congress of proposals that would tend toward establishment of a single Chief of Staff-national general staff system.

(6) That the intent and purpose of the Department of Defense directive of October 5, 1961, concerning military participation with civilian groups in the conduct of cold war indoctrination activities and seminars, be clarified.

(7) That the Congress renew its determination and effort to exercise fully its constitutional responsibility with respect to defense matters.

(8) That every effort be made to widen and increase both governmental and public recognition of the importance of the constitutionally established executivelegislative partnership in military matters.

(9) That a deliberate effort be made by the civil authority to assure that our military leadership is accorded the respect, authority, and status to which its professionalism, responsibility, and dedication entitle it.

(10) That the spirit of intellectual inquiry so necessary to original thought and analysis in any discipline, be safeguarded for military professional publications by adherence to a policy of academic freedom for their writings and articles. (Whereupon, at 10:10 a.m., the subcommittee went into executive session.)

MILITARY COLD WAR EDUCATION AND SPEECH

REVIEW POLICIES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

SPECIAL PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The special subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:35 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building.

Present: Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Thurmond, Bartlett, Saltonstall, and Case.

Also present: Member, ex officio: Senator Cannon. Special subcommittee_staff: James T. Kendall, chief counsel. Department of Defense: Cyrus R. Vance, general counsel.

Senator ŠTENNIS (presiding). The subcommittee will please come

to order.

Members of the subcommittee, we reconvene this morning in open hearing, following our recent conferences, and we have Mr. Lawrence back with us. We also have Secretary of Defense McNamara. Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you here, sir. I think the fact that you wished to come further bespeaks your interest, your responsibilities, your duties, and your willingness to carry them out.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Members of the subcommittee, I have a statement that reviews very briefly the situation that has already happened, that brings us down to Senator Thurmond's question that the witness, Mr. Lawrence, did not answer.

It also brings in the legal basis for some of these matters. The Chair will call on Mr. Lawrence, for the reasons given, to answer the question.

But, Mr. Lawrence, I want to say to you in the beginning and for the record that you certainly made a good witness the other day. Mr. LAWRENCE. Thank you, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Further, Senator Thurmond was entirely within his rights to ask the question he did. It was a relevant and direct question on the subject matter, proper in every way to be asked. There is no issue here of a personal nature of any kind whatsoever. Reviewing the past as to what has happened-Mr. Reporter, a quorum is present, and, Mr. Lawrence, you understand that you are still under oath as a witness?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT

Senator STENNIS. On January 31, 1962, Mr. Willis D. Lawrence, Assistant Director for Policy and Procedures, Directorate for Security Review, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), appeared voluntarily and testified before this subcommittee. He was first duly sworn as the record will disclose. During the course of his examination, the following question was propounded to Mr. Lawrence by Senator Thurmond:

All right, now, Mr. Lawrence, speaking about the speech I referred to there, which was the speech of General Trudeau, and this speech was to be delivered before the House Science and Astronautics Committee, who within the Army section of the Directorate of Security Review handled this proposed testimony? Mr. Lawrence's response was as follows:

Sir, I will have to respectfully decline to answer that question. I have been instructed by the Secretary of Defense that all personnel of the Department of Defense are hereby instructed to refuse to answer any question in a manner which associates a particular reviewer with a particular speech or article.

The above question and answer appear on page 616 of volume 5 of the official transcript of this hearing.

Being pressed to answer Senator Thurmond's question, Mr. Lawrence continued to decline to give an answer and his final statement

was:

Senator Stennis, I am carrying out the instructions of the Secretary of Defense at this particular time.

Mr. Lawrence's position raised, of course, the historic question of the powers of the legislative branch of the Government as compared with those of the executive branch. However, by agreement of the subcommittee, a specific ruling upon the proposition then presented was deferred and the hearing proceeded upon other matters.

Since that time the subcommittee has had two executive meetings. At each of these meetings, all of the members of the subcommittee were present. The issue presented by the position taken by Mr. Lawrence under Mr. McNamara's instructions has been exhaustively discussed. As a result of these discussions, it was decided yesterday by unanimous vote of the subcommittee that Mr. Lawrence's refusal to answer did not constitute a claim or invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege and that the statement made by him to the subcommittee that is, that he was acting under the instructions of Secretary McNamara-was insufficient to justify his refusal to answer the direct question propounded to him.

Having reached this conclusion, the subcommittee then, by unanimous vote, ordered that Mr. Lawrence be recalled for further examination by the subcommittee and specifically for the purpose of affording him an opportunity to answer the question which he previously declined to answer. Our further action in the premises will be determined by the nature of the response which Mr. Lawrence gives to this question when it is again asked of him.

Now, Mr. Lawrence, as a preliminary here, and leading up to the Chair's repetition of the question under the action of the full committee, I want the record to be clear and plain, so your name, now, is Willis D. Lawrence, and you are the same Mr. Willis D. Lawrence who appeared before us on January 31, 1962, is that correct?