to counter the challenge involve effective integration of the military, political, economic, and psychological strength of the free world. It is therefore not possible in this era of cold war to discuss military matters in general, military operations in oversea areas, or the military aspects of the Communist threat in isolation. They are interlaced with related foreign policy, economic, psychological, and other implications. There is, in fact, no black and white division between international military and political affairs. Any comprehensive discussion of national military policy is bound to touch on some aspects of foreign policy. It is often said these days that a professional military officer must have a broad knowledge of political, economic, psychological, and sociological factors which affect national security in order to perform his duties well. This is certainly true. The senior officer in particular should know as much as possible about these things. Many officers have had extensive contact with communism and its practitioners. I know, for example, from my personal experience of commanding the United Nations forces in Korea, that members of the Military Armistice Commission there have learned a lot about Communist aims and methods from frequent, face-to-face contacts with their opposite numbers. The same can be said concerning our officers now involved in the critical politico-military confrontation in Berlin. The military officer should and does know about these things, and is generally qualified to discuss them. But they are not his primary responsibility. They are the primary responsibility of officials in other agencies of the Government. It is therefore both proper and desirable that those public utterances of military men which necessarily touch on such matters be reviewed by designated representatives of the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate, by representatives of other responsible agencies. Most frequently, of course, this involves the Department of State. I for one do not object to such review; I consider it helpful. I must admit that I have been disappointed on occasion at being advised that changes or deletions in something I had planned to say were necessary in order to accommodate the policy requirements of other agencies. But I certainly do not want to say anything in public which, in the opinion of the agency primarily responsible for the matters involved, would not be in the best interests of the Nation if said in a particular context or at a particular time. The system of review which is in effect today and which has been in effect for some time is basically a good system. It insures a balanced expression of policy on the part of the Government as a whole. It also prevents innocent or inadvertent deviations from fact or established national policy on the part of those whom the American people and the world view as authoritative spokesmen of the Government. We cannot all know the details of every aspect of national policy. The review system is intended to insure that what we say on a variety of related subjects is accurate and represents actual Government policy. In this respect, the system is a protection for the individual as well as for the Government. The complex challenge of communism poses another difficult problem which is of more immediate concern to the military. This is the heavy responsibility to see to it that the people under our command are fully prepared as individuals to meet the threat. The goals of the Communists are unlimited. They intend to dominate the world and all the people in it. They employ every kind of instrument from the threat of massive military power to the confused individual who unwittingly furthers their ends. The targets of communism are unlimited. These targets include all the non-Communist nations of the world-and all the systems, institutions, beliefs and people who compose the strengths of those nations. They therefore include, certainly, every soldier in the U.S. Army. If the threat were just a simple military one, it might be possible to limit our training programs to imparting only the necessary military skills. Since this is not the case, we have the obligation to train our men to cope with the whole spectrum of the threat, to include its psychological and subversive aspects. Today, therefore, it is important for the soldier to understand communism and how it operates, for he, himself, is one of its targets. I should point out, however, that this understanding of communism is but one of the important objectives of our troop information program. It is by no means the only objective. The overall purpose of troop information is to develop in the soldier an understanding of our national security problems; to let him understand and have pride in the role of the Army, and his own role in the Army from all points of view; and to keep him informed of the military and civil events that affect him as an individual. This involves what his own Nation is and what it stands for, and the importance of his own duties in peace as well as in war. I understand that this program will be discussed in detail by individual witnesses from the various departments. I can summarize my views on these matters as follows: In this period of national peril, the military is understandably and properly bound into the whole fabric of national life. We have an important role to play in national security policy formulation and in public understanding of the major issues involved. However, our responsibilities are limited primarily to military matters. Certainly, all military men should speak out on subjects which are within their competence and the scope of their responsibilities. I shall continue to do so, and I shall expect other Army officers to do so. On the other hand, we have always been-and should continue to be-detached from the political arena. We cannot totally avoid involvement in foreign policy matters, but we in the military should certainly stay clear of domestic political issues. We do have the particular responsibility to provide thorough and effective training for the men entrusted by the Nation to our command. This necessarily involves alerting them to the nature of the Communist threat. It also includes orienting them in the principles of American democracy, the obligations of citizenship, the mission of the Army, and their responsibilities as soldiers to fight to protect the American heritage. We do not have the responsibility for overall public understanding of national policy and strategy. It is not our responsibility or our prerogative to discuss controversial views in public, even those on national military strategy, let alone subjects more remote from the military field. These matters are the responsibility of the highest civilian officials in Government. Thank you very much. I am ready to respond to any questions you may have. Senator STENNIS. Thank you, General. I think you have made a good statement here. We will proceed in the usual way and call on counsel for questions. Mr. KENDALL. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would like to place. in the record an abstract of the changes and deletions in the unclassified speeches and articles of General Decker for the period of January through September 1961. This information was prepared for us with General Decker's cooperation and the cooperation of the Directorate for Security Review. Senator STENNIS. All right, without objection, the matter will be placed in the record. (The material referred to follows:) |