MILITARY COLD WAR EDUCATION AND SPEECH REVIEW POLICIES THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1962 U.S. SENATE, SPECIAL PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE Washington, D.C. The special subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:40 p.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building. Present: Senators Stennis (chairman), Thurmond, Bartlett, and Saltonstall. Also present: Special subcommittee staff: James T. Kendall, chief counsel. Senator STENNIS (presiding). The subcommittee will please come to order. Members of the subcommittee, we are delighted to have with us this afternoon as our witness Rear Adm. William C. Mott. Admiral Mott, will you stand, please, and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that your testimony here will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Admiral MOTT. I do, Senator. Senator STENNIS. All right, gentlemen, let us have quiet, please. TWINING BIOGRAPHY AND STATEMENT Members of the subcommittee, I have a statement by Gen. Nathan F. Twining, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force and also former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This statement is in response to a letter that the chairman mailed out on behalf of the subcommittee last November to several men of the military, most of whom were retired, calling their attention to our hearings, our problems, pointing up some questions, and asking for their responses and comments thereon. General Twining is another one of the gentlemen of this great profession that I have known for years and whose work I have observed closely. I think that his statement is of value. We have had it mimeographed, and we have distributed copies to the press. Without objection we will now place General Twining's statement in the record, preceded by a short biographical sketch. (The documents referred to are, as follows:) GEN. NATHAN F. TWINING, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED) Nathan F. Twining, born in Monroe, Wis., saw his first military service as a corporal with the 3d Oregon National Guard Infantry on the Mexican border in September 1916. Through the guard, he received an appointment to West Point in 1917. Twining graduated from the advanced flying school at Kelly Field, Tex., in 1924 and has been associated with aviation ever since, first in the Army Air Corps and then in the Air Force. During World War II General Twining had tactical command of all forces in the South Pacific, then commanded the 15th Air Force in strategic bombardment from bases in Italy until the end of the war in Europe. He then commanded the 20th Air Force operating from the Marianas Islands against Japan until the close of the war in the Pacific. He became Air Force Chief of Staff in 1953, and assumed the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's top military post, on August 15, 1957. General Twining retired from active duty September 30, 1960, ending 44 years of military service. STATEMENT OF GEN. NATHAN F. TWINING, U.S. AIR FORCE (RETIRED) Hon. JOHN STENNIS, WASHINGTON, D.C., November 27, 1961. DEAR SENATOR STENNIS: I welcome your invitation to comment on the problem now before your subcommittee. It strikes me that your committee is confronted not with one problem but two— a real problem and a bogus problem. The real one is concerned with the question of whether some military men may be talking too much and whether what they are saying is to the general disadvantage. The bogus one seems to be enveloping the other. That is the implication that military men tend to think alike and to act alike, and that their thoughts and actions are organically reactionary and perhaps even something worse. I just don't believe that. The Military Establishment of the United States is not today and never has been a monolithic community. It is not today and never has been something separate and apart and unique in itself. It remains what it was meant to be: the ever-visible and ever-obedient instrument of a Nation devoted to peace, liberty, and justice under the law-the good right arm of representative government. The idea that our armed services might be turning into something different is wholly false. Your committee, I am confident, will draw the line between the real problem and the bogus one. A military officer is first of all a citizen in uniform. There is nothing about his training or his professional life so singular as to separate him in the slightest degree from other citizens in the value he is expected to attach to the body of American law and of American traditions. There is not now and there never has been in our system a military class, a military mind, or a military outlook. Take the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps as institutions, examine them separately in terms of their behavior, and you will discover that together they present an authentic mirror of American life. Officers no less than men are drawn from the people in all of their differing situations and persuasions. Each service renews its officer corps from generation to generation by drawing upon the same unbounded source the people as a whole. The American Military Establishment, as I came to know it through 44 years of service, is in fact, and much more so than any other Federal community, a true and worthy reflection of American life in all of its diversity and meaning. It is controlled by civilians, beginning with the President as Commander in Chief. Inside the Department of Defense, it works side by side with civilians. Its roots reach deeply into every community throughout the land. It looks to the universities for research and invention and even for doctrine. It draws upon private and other public institutions for advice and direction. There is everywhere a flowing out and a flowing in. Nowhere is there a wall between the miiltary and the people except in those particular details of information judged too critical to the national security to be exposed to the view of a possible enemy. Even here the judgment of what should or should not be exposed rests not with the military alone, but with the civilian direction to which the military must and does respond. By law and by tradition, the military services separately and the Department of Defense as a whole have a stated responsibility to give a full and continuing accounting of their aims, means, and activities to other superior branches of the Government. They must do so with the executive branch. They must do so with the Congress. And they must also do so, within the limits permitted by security, with the press and through the press with the American people. The armed services, by my observation, are completely responsive to civilian control. That condition is insured by the powers over the military given the legislative and executive branches by the Constitution and by various lawsespecially the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The military's actions and policies are scrutinized continuously and in minute detail by the Congress. The findings are published in many volumes of reports of hearings and other studies, which are available to the press and the general public. The primacy of civilian control is thus fixed in law. But even without this, I believe, these matters could safely be taken for granted. The responsible officer, being a citizen, is himself not indifferent to the virtue of self-restraint. He takes an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States which rules us all. That is an officer's controlling obligation, and he would not have it any other way. The accountability of an officer to civilian authority is, therefore, not really in question. What has lately come into doubt in some quarters is the degree in which an officer shall be permitted to speak out on matters of public concern and particularly those matters affecting strategy, forces and foreign policy in which the sense of the Nation as a whole may not have crystallized. It stands to reason that all officers on active service should and must follow unswervingly the declared policies of the Government. It is equally to be expected that in areas where the military competence, and responsibility are important, the view of the military will be given full hearing in the proper public councils and debates. Thus the self-restraint expected of the military in the public evolution of the military side of national policy is made reasonable in practice by the expectation that in the development of such policy the military advice, which may itself be at odds, will be allowed free expression before the proper authorities. That rule is the product of long and occasionally painful experience. It accords the professional military officer a respectable and valuable place in a republic. It keeps him from being a mercenary. He remains, as I have said before, a citizen, with the right, and even more the duty to speak out in the general interest on matters within his special competence and responsibility, but within the bounds prescribed by custom, usage, and law. You are quite right, Senator Stennis, in your belief that the services have evolved, "within themselves, unwritten precedents, precepts, traditions, and ethical standards" concerning the proprieties that should govern an officer in his relationship to controversial issues of policy. I do not claim that these conventions are perfect. From time to time officers here and there have offended these conventions, although never for long and seldom, if ever, to their personal advantage. Nevertheless, I do say that through the years and through the process of social and political change, matters have been so arranged, consistent with the American spirit, that the professional officer remains at once a trustworthy and indispensable public servant and a responsible citizen. In the more senior grades, he may even be something of a public figure, although I see nothing wrong in that. There is no mysterious force working inside the military, so far as I can tell, which compels the public interest to demand that officers shall now be subjected to still tighter checks, be more or less walled off from public intercourse, and otherwise rendered less visible than they already are. The present generation of officers is just as sensitive to the metes and bounds prescribed by public convention as mine was and it may even be more so. Concerning what an officer may or may not say about service or national policy in a book, an article, a speech, an interview with the press, or to the troops under him, the rules are stern and the checks not only numerous but all but stifling. I am naturally most familiar with those governing Air Force personnel, but from my experiences as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am also aware that all the military departments have similar policies which have been promulgated and not only on their own initiative but also in support of Department of Defense directives. The rules apply to all officers on active duty, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff down through the service chiefs and into all commands. Any formal talk by officers on active service about subjects affected by the national interest, any article or book written by them and intended for publication, must be submitted for review by a higher authority in the light of prevailing regulations. Where the work of the more senior officers is involved, civilian officials of the Government of the day-at the Pentagon, at the State Department (if the paper touches upon international affairs), and often at the White House-have at all times the option to review any proposed public statement by them. The final decision over what an officer may say in public, except as he is obliged to respond to inquiry by the Congress, rests not with the military services but with the executive branch. No reasonable military man objects in principle to such a system of check and review. There would be chaos, obviously, if every officer on active duty tried to provide his own interpretation of national policy, and especially at times when that policy may be deliberately obscure. This whole question, however, has another side which, it strikes me, deserves equal attention in the inquiry going forward. This other side concerns the responsibility and function of the reviewing authority. It is one thing for that authority to shut off an officer on a straightforward ruling that he is outside the established bounds. It is something else for the same authority, out of bias or timidity or expediency, to close off officers from a discussion of military and foreign policy issues merely on the arbitrary ruling that the issues are or may be controversial. My point, to be more precise, is that for a military man to seek the direction and guidance of the higher authority does not mean that what he may feel needs saying in these matters is without merit and pertinence. Manifestly, an officer has no business getting into these and related public questions simply as a politician. The Hatch Act, for one thing, imposes severe limitations on politicking by Federal servants. And it is a long-standing tradition in the services themselves, deriving from the constitutional separation of powers, and the military forces shall stand outside party politics. I know of no officer, senior or junior, who wants partisan political activity injected into the military. What really bothers me about this whole right-to-speak question is that the proper suppression of wrong actions may be expanded to justify the wrongful suppression of good ideas merely because they may be inconvenient or challenging. All of us, the policymakers along with the military, are caught up in a new kind of world situation. Power, whether we like it or not, has become a decisive element in the pursuit of our national aims. In practically every situation with which U.S. foreign policy is concerned, political and military factors are inseparably mixed in greater or less degree. Now, as never before, the policymaker must learn to walk and talk with his military adviser who in most of the situations that affect our world position is expected to provide the power essential to the effective operation of policy. On each rests the same duty: To uphold and advance the American interest. But how effectively that interest is to be upheld and advanced will depend, in my judgment, upon the thoroughness with which the policymaker and his military adviser arrive at a realistic understanding concerning the policy and principle that should govern the means of national power at hand or coming to hand. In these crucial matters-the fitting of the new means of power to the desired ends of policy-the need is for more discussion, not less. Perfect understanding between the makers of policy and its agents may forever elude us, but we must strive for it. The revolution in weapons is forcing all of us, the military along with the rest, to reassess not only the logic of strategy but also the role of power in diplomacy. Ideas are still in flux, inside the Government and out. Even within the military services there is wide disagreement about matters of doctrine. Vast investments in new systems have been made, and yet in many areas policy and means are not yet reconciled. Only continued discussion, public as well as internal, will hasten the desired understanding. I am not arguing that the military view is necessarily the wisest one. My only point is that it cannot be safely excluded from the general discussion of policy and means. Here, really, is our central problem: Given the world as it exists, how does the Nation fit what it has given the military into policies and doctrine that accord with our national philosophy and our material needs? There is no way to do that except the traditional way-by discussion, a discussion in which the military view will have reasonable expression, within its competence and in accordance with the long-standing proprieties. This is com monsense. To isolate the military community from this most fateful discussion would have the effect of separating a substantial part of the American people—the part most directly concerned-from issues the outcome of which bears on us all. If the military are to be silenced in their field of competence, if they are to be discouraged even from hammering out doctrine among themselves in their own pro fessional journals, where are the rest of the people to look for responsible and scrupulous advice on issues of national defense? Let us continue to look for that advice, as we are accustomed to do, in the free play of opinion among the parties most directly concerned, with no reputable voice excluded, and least of all military. I have no objection to your placing this statement, if you so desire, in the record of the hearings. Sincerely, NATHAN F. TWINING, General, USAF (Retired). TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM C. MOTT, U.S. NAVY, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY Senator STENNIS. Admiral Mott, you have been asked to come here and testify this afternoon. You are the present Judge Advocate General of the Navy, is that right? Admiral MOTT. That is correct, sir. Senator STENNIS. And, among your other duties, you have under your jurisdiction this professional service journal, the Judge Advocate General's Journal. That is under your general supervision, is it not? Admiral MOTT. That is correct, Senator. Senator STENNIS. Mr. Sylvester, of the Department of Defense, testified that all the professional service journals were under the clearance program and were really passed on by the same gentlemen in the Department of Defense and the State Department, who pass on speeches and related matters. You have been brought here to give us the modus operandi from your viewpoint, and to point out the problems, as you see them. Do you have a prepared statement? Admiral MOTT. I have a short prepared statement, Senator. MOTT'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Senator STENNIS. We will put the biographical sketch of Admiral Mott in the record at this point. ' (The biographical sketch referred to is, as follows:) REAR ADM. WILLIAM C. MOTT, U.S. NAVY William Chamberlain Mott was born in Maplewood, N.J., on September 7, 1911, son of Mrs. Arthur B. Cross (nee Helen Chamberlain) and the late Dr. Raymond L. Mott. He attended Cranston, R.I., High School prior to his appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., from the State of Rhode Island in 1929. As a midshipman he participated in cross country and track. Graduated on June 2, 1933, he resigned and entered civil life. He entered George Washington University, Washington, D.C., from which he received the degree of Bachelor of Laws and subsequently became a patent lawyer. Commissioned lieutenant (j.g.) in the U.S. Naval Reserve on February 16, 1940, he advanced progressively in rank, attaining that of captain to date from July 1, 1952. He was transferred from the Naval Reserve to the U.S. Navy on November 22, 1946. Called to active duty, he reported in August 1940 to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C. He remained there until February 1942 when he became Assistant Naval Aide to the President of the United States, also serving as officer in charge of the Naval Section of the White House Intelligence and Communications Center. |