Mr. Ball, we are delighted to have you here today, sir. In approaching this matter, and going from one Department to the other, I think it is very helpful to the subcommittee and to an understanding of the entire picture to bring representatives of the Department that handles major phases of this program and ask them to come in and put the problem in perspective. I hope that that is one of the things you will do today.

It is one of the matters which you indicated to the Chair that you thought needed to be done as always, and we followed that general course with the Department of Defense. I think that it should always be followed in substance, and we are glad to have you today, sir, to put the problem and viewpoint in perspective, and such additional observations as you wish to make. After that the subcommittee, of course, will proceed as it sees fit to bring in view our perspective and our responsibilities and duties.

BALL BIOGRAPHY

You have a prepared statement that came in last night and which was distributed early this morning. It is helpful to us to have that, and you may proceed now, sir, in your own way. (The biography of Mr. Ball is as follows:)

GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

George W. Ball, former Washington attorney, was sworn in on December 4, 1961, as Under Secretary of State, succeeding Chester Bowles. From February 1, 1961 until December, he served as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Born in Des Moines, Iowa, Mr. Ball attended Northwestern University, receiving his A.B. degree in 1930 and the J.D. degree in 1933.

From 1933 to 1935, Mr. Ball served in the office of the General Counsel in the Treasury Department in Washington, and from 1935 to 1942 practiced law in Chicago.

He returned to Washington in 1942 to be Associate General Counsel of the Lend-Lease Administration, a position he held until 1944. In 1944-45 he was Director, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, based in London.

From 1946 until 1961, Mr. Ball was a member of the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Ball, with offices in New York, Washington, Paris, and Brussels. Mr. Ball is a specialist in international law.

He is married to the former Ruth Murdoch. They have two sons, John and Douglas.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like, if I may, to read the prepared statement, because I think that it sets forth the relevant considerations which have guided us in the responsibility that we have had in this connection. Senator STENNIS. All right, you may proceed, sir.

BALL STATEMENT

Mr. BALL. I come before this subcommittee this morning as the first witness to speak on behalf of the Department of State. I am pleased to add my testimony to that of representatives of the Department of Defense and officers of the armed services who have testified earlier. Their testimony has disclosed a fairly general agreement that speeches

88735 O-62-pt. 2-23

to be made by senior representatives of the U.S. Government, whether military or civilian, and which deal with matters of foreign policy, should be reviewed by the Department of State to insure not only that the Government speaks with one voice but that that voice advances and does not impair our foreign policy.

But, even granting that the review of speeches may be necessary, this subcommittee is quite properly concerned that the procedures for review be appropriate and that the principles applied in recommending deletions or alterations be sound and consistent.

Let me start with the principles.

In the conduct of U.S. foreign policy we are aware every day that the United States is an open society. In many ways this makes the conduct of an effective foreign policy more complex and difficult. We live in a house with open windows and the whole world hears what we say to one another.

But we would not change the system. Not only does it reflect the fundamental values in which we believe, but we are the stronger for it.

Since foreign policy in a democracy is responsive to public opinion, it has the incalculable advantage of a broadly based popular support, particularly when our people are as informed, alert, aware of world events as they are in this country.

It is, therefore, essential, as this subcommittee has recognized, that those officials of the Government who are responsible for the formulation and administration of our foreign policy should be diligent in keeping the American people advised as to what they are doing and why they are doing it.

This is, of course, the principal purpose to be served by speeches of American officials to American audiences-the purpose of advising and informing.

I

When a representative of the United States seek to advise or inform the American people in a public speech, he should be fully aware to the extent that his speech touches on the foreign policy of the United States that he is speaking not to one audience but to at least four. The extent to which the speaker's voice is likely to be heard by all four audiences is directly related to the degree and character of his official responsibility.

What are those four audiences to which I refer? First, of course, the American domestic audience. Speechwriters and speechmakerswhether or not they happen in a particular case to be one and the same person-quite naturally design speeches primarily for the immediate audience-whether the audience in the hall or that larger American public reached through radio, television, or the news media.

But a speech well designed for the American domestic audience may not serve equally well the purposes of our country if it is also heard or read by the three other audiences who are watching and listening.

What are those audiences?

First, the peoples and governments in the countries allied with us in our common struggle to preserve freedom.

Second, the peoples and governments in those countries-many of which have just acquired nation status-that are uncommitted in the struggle betweeen the free world and the Sino-Soviet bloc, but whose independence and continued resistance to Communist infiltration or aggression is a vital concern to all of us.

Third, the Communist leadership in the Iron Curtain countries, which operates a gigantic propaganda machine that feeds on the distortion of public statements by representatives of the American Government, whether civilian or military.

It is clearly too much to expect that officers in our Military Establishment or officials of Government departments other than the Department of State, who speak on aspects of our foreign policy, should be fully informed as to the exact construction that may be placed upon their words in countries allied to us or in the uncommitted nations, or be able to anticipate the manner in which their words may be distorted by the propaganda machinery of the Communist bloc.

It is out of concern for the impact of speeches on these latter three audiences, as well as on the American domestic audience, that the State Department has been entrusted with the review of speeches not only by its own officers but by civilian and military officers throughout the executive branch. In performing this role what are the considerations that must enter into such a review?

II

The effect of foreign policy statements made in any speech is necessarily a function of the time in which the speech is made, events or trends visible or invisible that may affect international relations, and the position and responsibility of the speaker.

Let me comment on each of these.

First, the timing of statements must be considered in relation to events of foreign policy significance that are taking place or impending. Consider, for example, the first part of 1961: În February, the United Nations Security Council was debating the strengthening of the United Nations mandate in the Congo, against the background of the murder of Lumumba.

In March, nuclear test talks resumed in Geneva.

In April came the Cuban crisis.

Then the United States and the United Kingdom presented a draft treaty for a nuclear test ban at the Geneva talks, and a week later we agreed to a call for a cease-fire in Laos.

In the same month Gagarin orbited the earth, and there was the socalled Revolt of the Generals against the Government of France.

In May, the 14-nation conference on Laos opened at Geneva, with foreign ministers in attendance.

In June, the President went on an extensive trip abroad which included his Vienna meeting with Premier Khrushchev.

These are only some of the most important events which occurred in a space of only 5 months to contribute to the changing climate in which speeches were to be delivered. In addition, there was, and is at all times, an unending stream of smaller, but nonetheless significant happenings debates in the United Nations, speeches and statements by foreign leaders, visits by heads of state to this country or other countries, international conferences, and the like.

Moreover, there are at all times confidential conversations underway between nations discussions that in the nature of diplomatic discourse cannot be publicly disclosed.

Unless one is professionally immersed in these events, he will not know how a particular utterance may affect the development of this kaleidoscopic pattern.

Second, we must consider the interpretation that may be given the speech in the light of the position and responsibility of the speaker. Two considerations must be borne in mind in this connection.

One is the well-established tradition in democratic societies that civilians not only administer but enunciate foreign policy. This is clearly understood within the American Government, and I suppose that no one would question the principle. However, it is important that it be observed in practice. This is one of the considerations that enters into the review of speeches.

The other consideration is that special attention must be given to the effect on world opinion of statements by high-ranking officers who command the vast military power of the United States. A "bellicose" and I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that I put that word in quotation marks a "bellicose" speech by a general or admiral charged with responsibility for the deployment and employment of our military might is not likely to frighten the governments in the Communist bloc countries. Our experience has shown that those governments are impressed not with words but with the hard facts of our military capability. Thus, for example, the Soviet Government has unquestionably taken into account our recent military buildup in shaping its policies during the Berlin crisis.

Not only will the Soviet leaders be immune from threatening words of a high-ranking American military officer, but the people in the bloc countries will be immunized. They will not hear them at all—unless it serves the purposes of Communist policy to permit them to do so.

The real impact of "warlike" statements by our military leaders is most likely to be felt on the other two audiences-the governments and peoples in the Allied countries and in the uncommitted nations. One of the pernicious myths that the Soviet propaganda machine seeks to spread around the world is that America is dominated by a bloodthirsty and irresponsible military clique prepared to unleash atomic destruction unless kept in check by Communist might.

Anyone who keeps abreast of the Communist propaganda line put forth by the Soviet or Chinese radio or set out in the speeches of Communist officials or in Communist publications must necessarily be impressed with the amount of space and time devoted to this attempt to create the impression that U.S. policy is dominated by warmongering generals and admirals.

The absurdity of this propaganda-and, of course, it is absurd— does not necessarily diminish its effectiveness among people who have either been sealed off from direct access to the free world or who are so ill-informed or ill-educated that they lack the ability for critical judgment. For this reason it is imperative that statements by highranking officers of our Military Establishment be given scrutiny by professionals versed in the techniques of Communist propaganda. Statements may be perfectly well intentioned and factually quite accurate. They may be of a kind that would be fully understood by the American audience to which they are addressed. Yet, they may

still lend themselves to being wrenched out of context and distorted for the malign purposes of the Communist propaganda machine. Employed in this manner, they can create among our allies a false impression of recklessness, while seriously undermining the good faith and peaceful intentions of America among the peoples of the uncommitted nations.

There is, of course, a time and a place for vigorous statements with regard to the magnitude of our military might. But we should employ such statements only after careful consideration of all the circumstances, so that they will contribute to the objectives of American foreign and defense policy, rather than provide material for distortion by those who would destroy us. For example, the President's speech in July on the Berlin crisis was designed to, and did, drive home the effective buildup we were making and the seriousness of our intentions.

III

Let me turn now to the procedures which the State Department follows in applying these principles to the review of speeches and other public statements.

The Department of Defense has been submitting an increasing volume of material for review. In 1959 it forwarded to the State Department 283 speeches, 218 articles and 27 press releases a total of 528 matters for review.

In 1960 it forwarded 368 speeches, 257 articles and 78 press releases a total of 703 matters for review, or an increase of 175.

Last year it sent us 598 speeches, 495 articles and 86 press releasesa total of 1,179 matters for review, or an increase of 476 over the preceding year.

Of the speeches included in the above statistics approximately 75 percent were to be delivered by military officers, the remainder by civilians in the Defense Department.

Let me describe briefly how this procedure operates.

As you well know, the Department of Defense decides in the first instance whether a particular speech by a military or civilian representative of that Department appears to involve some aspect of our foreign policy so as to need review by the State Department. Once a speech is received by the Department of State, our procedures are designed primarily to insure that any statements in that speech relevant to particular aspects of our foreign policy are examined by those officers in the Department who are engaged in the direction and execution of that aspect of policy. This is essential to an effective review system, since in many instances only the top officers in a particular bureau of the State Department concerned with a specific area of the world may be fully informed as to a substantive policy that we are attempting to carry out at that time. Such officer must be made responsible for insuring so far as possible that statements made by either military or civilian representatives of the U.S. Government will advance that policy and not diminish the chances of its effective

ness.

In practice, speeches are forwarded from Defense to the Policy Plans and Guidance Staff of the Department of State. This staff is located in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public