or hesitate on every subject and on every occasion until we had duly considered the grounds and propriety of the case, little good would be done, and often that little too late: the life of man being too short for this very deliberate proceeding. The best rule, therefore, to govern our conduct by, when no fixed principles occur, is found in our own chastened inclination, which may be readier than reason, coupled with the most approved practice of mankind; without sticking too long, or too much doubting of consequences. For, without tempting Providence, something may always be expected too from that quarter.

-7, Therefore, it is in the next degree, v. g. of Diffidence, distrust, &c., that the aversive principle begins to shew itself, or to appear as well as to exist: though even here it appears rather faintly. Indeed, there is one sort of diffidence, and that the most commonly understood by this expression, in which there seems but little room for aversion; i. e. a diffidence of ourselves, a distrust of our own virtue or abilities. Yet, regarding this as one step towards self-dissatisfaction, disgust and abhorrence, it may still pass for an aversive property. And a very useful property also it is, though diffidence may not look so well to some minds as the opposite extreme. However, it will be a fortunate case for any beginner in the voyage of life, if he should retain his native diffidence long enough to allow time for the accumulation of genuine worth: then let the young man's diffidence subside, if it will, into a modest assurance. A diffidence of this sort, or so circumstanced, ought not to be ranked among evil properties, nor hardly among indifferent, it being decidedly good: while on the other hand there is a diffidence as decidedly evil, v. g. unauthorized jealousy, uncharitable suspicion, censure ill deserved, and the like. These are evil characteristics certainly; as much as fond confidence, and ill deserved admiration. And if men are not accountable to men for such evil thoughts "before they are expressed in word or in deed", because they must then be secret, as occurring only in the heart,

a sphere to which man's observation and empire do not extend; they will have to account for them, no doubt, to One who reigns there universally, and knows all the secrets of the heart even better than the heart itself. So, on the other hand, if men will be so fond, as to confide in men of no worth, and to doat on men of whom they know no good, they may thank themselves for the consequences of their miscalculation. We ought neither to trust nor distrust any one without sufficient reason, or reason equal to the occasion and degree of either sentiment.

But this is only a place to speak of the essential property, and not of evil diffidence, nor of evil jealousy, nor of evil suspicion: for there may be an evil sort of each, as well as a good; and that is why the property ranks among essential, and consequently neutral constituents, rather than among characteristic. Which being observed, it may now be time to have done with the consideration of both appetitive and aversive properties not naturally characteristic; as it is hard to find neutrals in such a scene of corruption as the world presents, and another step perhaps would conduct us to properties that are commonly evil; before which we find the whole order of intellectual essential to be yet considered.

3. For still ascending by degrees through the ranks of essential properties in the heavenly kingdom, we are at length arrived at the greatest exaltation of which we, or they (being the same) can have any conception in the region of Intellect; being now got among such entities, products or concretes, as Talents, Faculties, Gifts, Abilities; and among such general properties as Apprehension, Memory, Judgment, Will, Imagination, and risen to such an element as the Mind, Understanding, or Intellect. All which may be considered, like other classes of constituents, either essentially or characteristically: the essential view of the subject being more metaphysical; the characteristic more moral; and the first mentioned, that with which we are now engaged. Agreeably whereto, it may be first ob

served, that intellectual properties, or the element of intellect which they compose, is the sum of intelligence and the description of reality; signifying the same with mind and with understanding, and answering to genius nearer than spirit does, though spirit and genius are often used interchangeably in their concretes, as we say Genii or Spirits. And so we may say indifferently, that such a man is one of an elegant mind, genius, understanding or intellect; referring to the sum of that exalted class of essential properties which is now under consideration, v. g. to intellect, as his distinguishing part and uppermost constituency.

Intellect is the sum or product of the acts, instances or particulars, of every kind of thinking, afforded by three combinations successively; 1, of the said accidents into numerous properties; 2, of these properties into several classes, sorts or distinctions; 3, of the said classes into the said element of intellect. But there have been three different opinions among philosophers respecting the life or operation of this element: one ascribing it to spirit alone; another on the contrary to matter alone; and another, to spirit by the instrumentality of matter. These are the different opinions of philosophers respecting the operation of intellect while divines have still another opinion, ascribing to intellect its own operation; though they admit at the same time a reciprocity, a co-operation, and even an unity between the three elements or classes here mentioned in connexion. Perhaps they have all some reason for their hypothesis: so that intellect, or its constituents, being originally self-motioned and all-sufficient, is still liable to be actuated and influenced by its associates, whether the same as those above-mentioned, or any others. v. g. Intellect in combination with matter and spirit may be exalted by this and depressed by that; or it may, as formerly observed, be depressed and degraded in particular cases by the spirit to which it is allied, even more than by the supposed weight of matter, or by any other burden,

defect or inconvenience, whether real or supposed, that has ever been attributed to it.

If the spirit, or any spiritual constituent is liable to suffer from its association with the material, there appears no reason why the intellectual should not suffer in a double proportion from its connexion with two inferiors. And to remedy this inconvenience, there is little hope according to some fatalists, maintaining that both spirit and intellect are tied, as well as matter, to a certain course, by the immutable law of nature. For they perceive or imagine, that in themselves each of these constituents is bound by laws of the strictest necessity, as well as the vegetative process in trees, shrubs, and other productions of the botanical department on every side: so that every impulse to which the mind and soul are subject, shall have a necessary effect answerable to itself, ordained and decreed from the beginning to attend it. They observe, that the mind as well as the body has its aptitudes, tastes and propensities; the soul, its passions and appetites,-its likings and aversions; the former preferring one kind of knowledge to another; the latter, one kind of practice. And hence, judging of universals by particulars, these advocates for statu quo conclude the same of spirit and intellect in the abstract, as they experience in a particular concrete. But they might as well employ themselves some other way, as in concluding at all, where their data are so very insignificant. All that we know, or can know, respecting the elements of which we are compounded, is proportioned to the share that we possess them in, and adapted to the circumstances in which we possess them: this share and these circumstances therefore should be the boundary of our conclusions on the subject; within which it is possible to conclude a few particulars, but not too certainly.

Thus we observe the universality* and integrity of both these elements, spirit and intellect, in their respective

* Meaning Commonness or General Diffusion.

spheres. We observe first an universality and integrity to prevail in intellect through the mental intercourse subsisting between men of all ages and nations, by means of tradition as well as conversation, and by numberless phenomena of art, as well as of nature, exciting similar ideas between millions of intellects which never had the smallest knowledge of the bodies belonging thereto. And secondly, we observe an universality and integrity of spirit in the same passions and appetites extending and descending without let or intermission, through all times and all places, so that it might be most pertinently queried of these, as well as of some other subjects, "Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See, this is new?" (Eccles. i. 10.) To such an universality and integrity of constitution both in spirit and intellect may therefore be imputed a general affinity of moral, which is the same as of spiritual and intellectual, constituents: by means whereof all disprejudiced thinkers of the same principles and capacity will be apt to think nearly alike; entertaining nearly the same views, and drawing nearly the same conclusions therefrom: which will be a means of their finally aiming at nearly the same ends in morality, however they may vary in taste and disposition respecting things indifferent to this subject. For men who are united in spirit may be divided on many points; such as dress, amusements, habitation, &c., which they cannot so well be on points of morality fairly proposed. Moreover, as we observe in human nature the universality and integrity of these two elements, spirit and intellect respectively, so likewise in the whole sphere of this existence, as far as it is subject to our observation, collectively. And where spirit was originally united with intellect, it will be united still; where it was originally severed, it will be severed still.

And still it does not follow, from these observations, that all intellect must be like human intellect, or all spirit like human spirit; but, while from the moral and intellectual improvement occasionally perceived in some portions of