his fate, never to know what it is, that has so terribly overpowered his senses. But should the man be allowed to survive, and happen to wake up in the midst of the din, it may be said of him, that he has felt sleeping what he now apprehends waking.

And if people are not prepared for the doctrine of a man's feeling in his sleep, what would they think of his feeling when dead? For such may be the case too, and will most assuredly, at that awful crisis, when the pealing of the last trump shall be felt one moment, and apprehended the next; but in a storm of which none that was ever felt or seen upon earth can afford the most distant conception.

External apprehension is a process between sensation and conception, or between the access of ideas and their final apprehension: it is the end of sensation, and the beginning of perception; being virtually, but not substantially distinguished from either. For these three, being so many distinct parts, are yet all employed on one object or material notwithstanding; as in the animal economy sanguification succeeds digestion, and is itself succeeded by a still more elaborate preparation; the end, as well as the beginning of the process, being altogether three parts with only one material.

-2, Therefore, when the object or material has thus been grappled with, and laid hold of, literally apprehended and taken into custody as it were, the final or internal apprehension views it in confinement, it is under the eye of internal apprehension, and subject likewise to every other intellectual property or process; the memory, judgment, will, imagination, and others, if there be others, with the faculties, arts, methods and inventions founded thereon respectively, as learning and teaching, hearing and speaking, &c. The image of an outward object is now assimilated as closely as it can be to the inner man; as closely as a man's diet, or any part of it, can be assimilated by the outer; and helps to swell the bulk of that, as diet

to swell the bulk of this. Food in the belly, or in any other position, is not, nor ever can be, an ingredient of the human shell, or of the outer man; no more can sensible objects or images be lasting ingredients of the heart or kernel, as we consider it; because these both consist of properties to which the others only serve as matter or fuel: but as near as any one subject can be to identification with another, so near to the body is food thoroughly assimilated, so near are objects internally apprehended to the soul or intellectual spirit.

And here a question might be raised, that were very trying for any theorist, and more especially for one who has ventured to assert a general hypothesis on the subject to which it relates, because such a one has not merely to answer in that case, but to answer on his own principles. The question then is, How or by what means are objects internally apprehended? what is it within us that apprehends them? and where are they when apprehended? Because it has been asserted, that the soul is an assemblage of properties as well as the body, the apprehension being one. But where is the apprehender or subject of apprehension; who or what is he, and how does he perform his part? To this question the answer may be twofold, one general, and the other particular. 1, For a general answer, enough has been said already. It is the apprehension that apprehends, and is also formed by apprehending; as it is the light that shines, and is formed by shining; or as it is life that lives, and is formed by living. If this answer prove not satisfactory, it will be hard to come nearer to a general conclusion that may be so. And the second sort of answer, though more particular, is not different in principle from this. For if it should be asked, What is it that apprehends this or that sort of object particularly? it may be answered, a corresponding apprehension: and no other answer can or will be thought of. e. g. Some objects are more spiritual or heavenly, as they say; some, more natural or earthly.- How, or by what

means are these different sorts of objects apprehended respectively, who, or what is it that apprehends them, and what is to become of these particular apprehensions?

St. Paul may inform us on these intricate points, although he was not a professed metaphysician: he will tell us, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things; yet he himself is judged of no man. For who hath known

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the mind of the Lord, that he may instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ" (Cor. I. ii. 14, &c.). So then the Spirit of God will apprehend the Spirit of God; and the mind of Christ will apprehend the mind of Christ. The Highest Intellectual Spirit alone can apprehend the Highest Spirit or Intellect, and others by Him: as a man in one STATE cannot see what passes in another, any more than a man in one place. For there is an affinity, a sort of elective attraction in spiritual and intellectual as well as in natural and earthly ingredients, by means of which like tends to like continually. And thereto our Saviour's doctrine also agrees where he says, Whosoever hath to him shall be given" (Mat. xiii. 12). something more intrinsic in us, something like a substratum to apprehend or receive the treasures of science, and nothing but a substratum will satisfy him; let him tell us, what is the substratum to receive more ordinary treasures sometimes, as a drop of water for example-what may be the substratum when one drop takes another? for it were as easy to tell, what may be the substratum, when too ideas meet. It is hard to trace the progress of sense even to the first degree of intellect: therefore the hope of tracing it farther may seem almost ridiculous.

Or if a man would have

These two sorts of apprehension, v. g., external and internal, with the modes above mentioned, are the most memorable of all that can be considered essential; the rest of that class, of which there are several, being rather charac

teristic. And the radical property of apprehension having thus been noticed, from which those of memory, judgment, will, imagination, take their rise, and many other branches of intellect through them, it will not be requisite to dwell particularly, or at much length, on these in an occasional sketch like the present; which is subservient to other purposes than those of metaphysical science: yet it may be useful to observe them a little, and somewhat of them in common.

It has been already observed how these properties, v. g., of memory, judgment, will, imagination differ, as well as how they agree in proceeding alike from simple apprehension; when the difference between it and them was shewn to be less on comparison than may be generally conceived: and the more we compare their subjects the less this difference will appear.

2, The second named property of Memory, will be an example to this effect: for as the apprehension or holding is but the first sight of an object continued, so memory is nothing more than a continued, and as it were closer, apprehension. It is a sort of annexation to the intellectual principality or district, but without any distinct form or process, of what is acquired for it by simple apprehension with the help of other correlatives, particularly of the imagination. So that it may be as hard to draw the line between memory and apprehension as between the property and accidents of either. And therefore it is a false conclusion respecting the memory or continued apprehension, to look on this likewise as a substratum, or as a corner of the general substratum which people imagine in the mind. Yet such a conclusion is soon set up: and then they talk of the memory being richly stored with knowledge, facts or ideas; as if the memory was one thing, and its acts or simple constituents another, the same as a store-room would be one thing, and its stores another; or a magazine one thing, and its merchandize another: whereas the intellectual store and store-room are all one; and the intel

lectual merchandize will keep itself without a magazine. But all this mistaking proceeds from the same gross conception, which requires a foundation, floor, or substratum for every spiritual and intellectual property to rest on, as well as for the material; materializing immaterial things, to suit a material apprehension. For material things must needs adhere to material; as spiritual to spiritual, and intellectual to intellectual; their natural affinity requires, and they cannot exist without it: but the subjunction of material things to intellectual can be no more necessary, than of intellectual to material; and it were as reasonable to suppose that no material body could exist without a mind, as that no mind could exist without a material body.

The memory is liable to be connected with other properties of its own heavenly nature; and then may be regarded as a basis itself to certain secondary properties, such as conscience, e. g., with its varieties and dependents likewise; and to faculties, as that of recollection, and others equally dependent again on this, either useful and pleasant, or useless and terrible Gift-as it may happen to be employed. The memory itself is now mentioned only as an essential constituent of the heavenly kingdom: but if its characteristic quality was to be indicated, it could not be better accomplished any how than by an exposition of its importance to the next mentioned intellectual property or class, being,

3, The comparative class of intellectual properties usually called Judgment; by which is not to be understood at present a particular act only, but its repetition or habit; as by apprehension in the forecited use of the word was understood, not any particular apprehension, but the property or habit of apprehending. The foundation of judgment is memory, as aforesaid: but it will also have at the same time other foundations or principles equally indispensible; as attention, deliberation, comparison, decision; which are all likewise variable by various criterions. Indeed the composition of this, as of other proper